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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Firms’ Strategies for Technology and Platform-based Markets
by
Tianxin Zou
Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration
Marketing
Washington University in St. Louis, 2019
Professor Baojun Jiang, Chair

In this dissertation, I build game-theoretic frameworks to study how new Internet-enabled
technologies can change the strategies of firms and online platforms.
The first chapter studies how the integration of primary and resale concert ticket platforms can
affect consumers and musicians. Consumers can buy concert tickets from primary platforms (e.g.,
Ticketmaster) or from resale platforms (e.g., StubHub) where tickets are resold by other
consumers. Recently, Ticketmaster has also been developing its resale business and attempting to
control the resale market by blocking consumers from reselling on competing resale platforms.
Legislation in many states in the US requires consumers should be able to freely resell tickets on
any resale sites. The rationale is that Ticketmaster’s stronger pricing power will lead to increases
in its service fees and final ticket prices, making musicians and consumers worse off. In this paper,
we establish a game-theoretic framework and show that the opposite can happen: if some
consumers are uncertain of whether they can attend the concert when buying tickets, the primary
platform’s control of the resale market can lower the prices and service fees in both the primary
and the resale markets. The musician and consumers will be better off as a result. Moreover, we
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find that, when the primary platform controls the resale market, the presence of a small group of
scalpers can counterintuitively reduce the final ticket prices and increase the musician’s profit and
the consumer surplus. We also show that competition in the resale market may harm the
consumers. Using data from Ticketmaster.com and StubHub.com, we provide some suggestive
empirical support for the theoretical predictions.
The second chapter studies how new technologies that reduce the consumer’s search cost will
affect online retail platforms, third-party sellers, and consumers. We show that a lower search cost
can increase sellers’ expected profits even though it will increase price competition among sellers.
A lower search cost always benefits the platform when it optimally adjusts its fee. When the search
cost decreases, the platform should reduce its fee if demand elasticity increases significantly, in
which case the platform, the sellers and the consumers can all be better off. By contrast, if the
lowered search cost does not significantly increase demand elasticity, the platform’s optimal fee
will increase, potentially leading to higher retail prices but making consumers and sellers worse
off. Furthermore, when the market has a premium seller with higher base quality than nonpremium sellers, a decrease in search cost will increase non-premium sellers’ profits but has a nonmonotonic effect on the premium seller’s profit. When consumers can filter some product
attributes on the platform, their direct benefit from searching the unfilterable attributes is reduced
but the expected consumer surplus will increase.
The third chapter studies how cost transparency will impact a firm’s intertemporal pricing and
innovation decisions. We show that cost transparency stymies the low-cost firm’s ability to
intertemporally price-discriminate because consumers now correctly anticipate the future price
drops and delay purchases, as it is no longer feasible to pool price with the high-cost firms, whose
future prices drop less because of the high cost. Thus, cost transparency will benefit the high-cost
viii

firms but hurt the low-cost firms. Surprisingly, consumers can also be hurt by cost transparency if
the firm has a high cost. However, cost transparency leads to an expected increase in both firm
profits and consumer surplus—a win-win for both firms and consumers. This increase in expected
firm profits facilitates greater investment by firms in new-product innovation.
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Chapter 1 Can Musicians and Fans Benefit When a Primary
Ticket Platform Controls the Resale Market?
1.1 Introduction
In 2017, the revenue of the concert-ticket industry in the U.S. reached over three billion dollars,
and more than twenty million consumers in the U.S. have attended at least one concert in that
year.1 Ticketmaster, with an over 80% of the U.S. market share, is the dominant ticket platform in
the primary ticket market (Roberts 2013). It has contracted with 80 out of the top 100 concert
venues, and has become the exclusive ticket outlet for many top musicians (Sisario and Bowley
2018). Ticketmaster mainly profits from the service fees paid by ticket buyers. For example, it
charges a $17.85 service fee for a $61 ticket of Justin Timberlake’s The Man of The Woods Tour
at the Madison Square Garden, New York. The peer-to-peer ticket resale market (a.k.a. the
secondary market) is also growing rapidly. StubHub, with an over 50% share of the ticket resale
market in the U.S., has seen a 30% annual growth rate in revenue in 2015 (Thomas 2016).
Over the past few years, Ticketmaster has expanded its business to the resale market. In 2008,
it acquired TicketsNow, an online ticket resale platform, for $256 million. In 2013, Ticketmaster
introduced its own “Fan-to-Fan” resale system, Ticketmaster Resale (formerly known as TM+).
Musicians can enroll in Ticketmaster Resale so that consumers can resell their tickets on
Ticketmaster. For concerts with Ticketmaster Resale, the primary and resale ticket availability will
be shown on the same seat map (see Figure 1.1 for example). In 2014, Ticketmaster received $900
million from the ticket resale market (Ingham 2015). Moreover, Ticketmaster has been trying to
extend its monopoly power in the primary market to the resale market by blocking competing
resale platforms. For example, after signing on as the exclusive resale partner of the Golden State
1

Warriors (GSW) in 2012, Ticketmaster warned GSW season-ticket owners that their tickets could
be revoked if they resold the tickets outside Ticketmaster. Consequently, StubHub saw an 80
percent decrease in resale transactions of GSW season tickets. Ticketmaster also introduced the
“Paperless Ticket” system (also known as Credit Card Entry) for some events, which requires
consumers to show the credit card used to buy the ticket and a photo ID to enter the concert.
Because few consumers would like to give their credit card and photo ID to others, Paperless
Ticket system make it very difficult for consumers to resell tickets via other resale platforms, e.g.,
StubHub. Consumers can resell their paperless tickets only through Ticketmaster’s resale system.

Figure 1.1 Seat Map of a Concert with Ticketmaster Resale
The public reacted negatively to Ticketmaster’s “anti-competitive” practices. StubHub sent emails to its customers to caution that “companies ‘like Ticketmaster’ are moving to restrictive
paperless systems, which could kill the secondary market for tickets” (Indiviglio 2011). StubHub
also sued Ticketmaster and GSW in 2015 for creating illegal market conditions, although the
lawsuit was later dismissed (Rovell 2015). The Paperless Ticket system has also led to a drastic
dispute among consumers. For example, a spokesman for Consumer Action argues that “[it] is
wrong to deprive consumers of the right to fairly sell, trade or give away the ticket” (Pender 2017).
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A news article in The Atlantic also blames Ticketmaster for “extend[ing] its near monopoly of
ticketing to the secondary market” (Indiviglio 2011). Several states in the U.S., including Colorado,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia, have passed or are
debating bills requiring ticket issuers to offer tickets in a freely transferable format that can be sold
on any resale sites. The Virginia bill, the Ticket Resale Rights Act, was proposed by state delegate
David B. Albo, who lost $400 because he was unable to resell his two paperless tickets for Iron
Maiden (Vozzella 2017). Albo argues that Ticket Resale Rights Act “would help consumers, given
Ticketmaster’s near-monopoly over big-venue ticket sales nationwide.” It is generally believed
that Ticketmaster’s entry into the resale business will create a ticket-intermediary monolith and
will harm the welfare of musicians and consumers.
This paper builds an analytical framework to examine how the primary ticket platform’s entry
into the resale market and its attempts to block competing resale platforms will affect the musicians,
the primary ticket platform, the resale platform, and the consumers. In the main analysis, we
consider two scenarios. In the independent-platforms case, the primary ticket platform and the
resale platform are owned by independent parties. This scenario reflects the situation in which
Ticketmaster has not entered the resale market controlled by independent platforms such as
StubHub. In the integrated-platform case, an integrated platform monopolizes both the primary
and the resale markets. This setting captures the situation in which Ticketmaster enters the resale
market and uses Paperless Ticket to prevent consumers from reselling tickets on other resale
platforms. In Section 5.3, we examine a third case, where the integrated platform competes with
an independent resale platform in the resale market (i.e., the integrated platform does not preclude
other resale platforms). See Figure 1.2 for an illustration of the market structures in these three
cases.
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Three Types of Market Structures

We consider a two-period model where some consumers are uncertain of whether they will
have a time conflict with the concert in the first period, and the uncertainty is resolved in the second
period. Consumers are heterogeneous in their probability of being able to attend the concert and
their valuation of the concert. If a consumer buys a ticket in the first period, she can resell the ticket
to other consumers on the resale platform in the second period. Consumers can buy tickets from
either the primary platform or the resale platform, but if the demand for a concert exceeds its
supply on one platform, consumers may be unable to get a ticket from that platform. The musician
chooses the ticket’s face price and the venue size (i.e., the number of available tickets) in the first
period. In the independent-platforms case, the primary platform and the resale platform set their
service fees respectively. In the integrated-platform case, the integrated platform sets service fees
on both platforms altogether. The final price paid by consumers on the primary market is the sum
of the face price and the service fee on the primary platform. The equilibrium resale price is jointly
determined by the demand and supply in the resale market. Consumers have rational expectations
on the future prices and the probabilities of being able to get a ticket from either the primary or the
resale markets.
The conventional wisdom would predict that if the primary ticket platform (Ticketmaster) has
better control of the resale market, it will have stronger pricing power. As a result, the service fees
4

in the primary and resale markets will be higher and the consumers and the musician will become
worse off. However, we show that the conventional wisdom may not hold in some situations: both
the consumers and the musician can be better off when the primary and the resale platforms are
owned and operated by one firm (as in the integrated-platform case) compared with when the two
platforms are independent (as in the independent-platforms case). The intuition hinges on the
spillover effect from the primary market to the resale market. When the ticket primary-market
price is lower, consumers with lower likelihood of attending the concert will buy tickets in the first
period. These consumers are more likely to resell tickets, so the transaction volume in the resale
market will increase. In other words, lowering the price in the primary market has a positive
spillover to the resale market, leading to higher profits from the resale market. By contrast, in the
integrated-platform case, the integrated platform will internalize the positive spillover by lowering
the final price in the primary market. As a result, the profit in the resale market increases. Hence,
the double-marginalization problem in the primary retail channel will be alleviated. The final price
will be lower, leading the musician to choose a larger venue size, so more consumers will be served.
As a result, both the musician and consumers can be better off. We also find that when the
integrated platform competes with a third-party resale platform whose market share is significant,
the musician and consumers can become better off if the integrated platform can successfully block
its competitor and thus monopolize both the primary and the resale markets. Furthermore, we show
that an integrated platform tends to choose a lower resale percentage fee in order to boost sales in
the primary market. To summarize, when the primary platform also controls the resale market, it
tends to charge lower price and service fee on both the primary and the resale market due to the
spillovers between these two markets. The double-marginalization problem in the primary market
can be alleviated, and both the musician and consumers can become better off. We also discuss
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how our insights can be generalized to other markets, e.g., used-goods and peer-to-peer productsharing markets.
We also demonstrate that, interestingly, consumers could be worse off when the final ticket
price or the resale percentage fee decreases. This is because low prices and service fees can attract
consumers with a lower probability of attending the concert to buy tickets early. Therefore, more
consumers with a higher likelihood to attend the concert will be crowded out from the primary
market and have to buy tickets from the resale market, in which case some consumer surplus will
be seized by the resale platform via the resale service fee.
Finally, we discuss the impact of the presence of some scalpers, who buy tickets with the sole
intention of reselling them at higher prices. We also show that in the integrated-platform case, the
existence of a small group of scalpers may lead to lower ticket prices and higher musician’s profit
and consumer surplus. This is because scalpers are more likely to resell tickets than ordinary
consumers. Thus, the integrated platform can earn more profit from the resale market by selling
tickets to scalpers, so it has an incentive to keep the ticket price in the primary market low enough
to make it profitable for scalpers to scalp tickets. The integrated platform’s extra incentive to
reduce the final ticket price will further alleviate the double-marginalization problem in the
primary market, which may potentially make the musician and the consumers better off.
We provide some suggestive empirical support for some of our theoretical predictions from
the data collected on Ticketmaster.com and StubHub.com. Some musicians enroll in the
Ticketmaster Resale system which allows consumers to resell tickets on Ticketmaster. Others do
not enroll, so consumers cannot resell tickets on Ticketmaster. For concerts with Ticketmaster
Resale, Ticketmaster tends to charge a lower resale percentage fee than StubHub for the same
concert. Ticketmaster is also more likely to charge a lower service fee for primary tickets of
6

concerts with Ticketmaster Resale than concerts without Ticketmaster Resale. This is consistent
with our theoretical prediction that Ticketmaster’s optimal service fee in the primary market is
lower when it also operates its own resale platform, and that Ticketmaster’s optimal service fee
for resale transactions is lower than that of an independent resale platform.

1.2 Literature Review
This paper contributes to the economics and marketing literature on secondary markets for
event tickets. Most of the studies focus on whether allowing consumers or scalpers to resell tickets
is beneficial to event organizers and consumers. Courty (2003a) shows that, in a setting where
consumers are uncertain about their valuations at the time of purchase, allowing reselling cannot
strictly increase the ticket agency’s profit. Geng et al. (2007) examine a similar setting and show
that “partial allowance” of resales, i.e., allowing consumers to resell only before the event
organizer’s announcement of the second-period price, can strictly increase the event organizer’s
profit. Courty (2003b) shows that the existence of ticket brokers will reduce the primary event
organizer’s profit because brokers can arbitrage when the event organizer raises its price over time,
which limits the event organizer’s ability to exercise intertemporal price discrimination. Karp and
Perloff (2005) find that the primary event organizer can benefit from the entry of resellers if they
can perfectly price-discriminate consumers. Su (2010) shows that the presence of speculators will
increase an event organizer’s expected profit because the event organizer can sell tickets to
speculators early and transfer the inventory risk to them. Cui et al. (2014) find that an event
organizer can benefit from lower transaction costs in the resale market and further improve its
profit by selling consumers an option for buying tickets later.
Several studies have empirically examined how the existence of resale markets can affect the
primary market. Cusumano et al. (2008) show that the entry of Craigslist into the musical ticket
7

resale market raises the prices of popular musicians but lowers the prices of less popular ones.
They also argue that musicians will be better off if the primary market and the secondary market
have separate opening time windows. Leslie and Sorensen (2014) find that the existence of resale
markets can on average increase the allocation efficiency by 5% for major rock concerts, but a
third of the increase is offset by the ticket brokers’ costly efforts of getting tickets early and the
transaction costs in the resale market. Lewis et al. (2018) show that the presence of a secondary
market for season tickets of a Major League Baseball team increases the season ticket purchase
rate in the primary market. By contrast, secondary-market regulations, such as minimum list price
policies, will reduce the purchase rate of season tickets.
Our paper differs from the aforementioned literature in two fundamental aspects. First, all of
those papers consider a direct selling setting. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first
to consider how the resale market can influence the strategic interaction between different channel
members in the primary market, i.e., the (upstream) musician and the (downstream) ticket
platform. Second, most of the extant studies focus on whether the firm or the social planner should
allow consumers or scalpers to resell tickets. By contrast, our research examines how the musician
and consumers are affected by whether the primary platform and the resale platform are owned
and operated by the same entity or independent entities. We find that the integration of the primary
and the resale platforms can lead to lower equilibrium service fees on both platforms and can
benefit all channel members (i.e., the musician, the primary platform and consumers) at the same
time.
Our paper also relates to the literature on retail competition. The general finding of this
literature is that a merger between retailers will reduce the competition between retailers, so the
final retail price will increase. Reduced retail competition can exacerbate the double-
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marginalization problem in the distribution channel, making both the upstream manufacturers and
the consumers worse off (Harutyunyan and Jiang 2018; Li 2002; Padmanabhan and Png 1998;
Tirole 1988; Zhang 2002). This is the rationale for some anti-trust regulations against horizontal
mergers that would give the merged firm too much market power. In contrast, our paper shows
that when the primary platform and the resale platform are integrated rather than independent, the
final ticket price in the primary market can be lower and the musician and consumers can be better
off. Furthermore, we also find that consumers can actually be better off when the primary platform
deprives them of their ability to resell tickets on other resale platforms. The difference in results
reflects that the relationship between primary platforms and resale platforms is fundamentally
different from the relationship between competing retailers. The spillover effect between the
primary and the resale markets are positive: a lower price in one market can lead to more
transactions in the other market. By contrast, the spillover effect between retailers are negative: a
lower price of one retailer will reduce the sales of competing retailers.
This paper also contributes to the general literature on secondary markets for used goods. Swan
(1970, 1972, 1975) prove that the existence of the secondary market will not limit a monopoly
seller’s profits. Rust (1986) shows that if consumers endogenously decide when to resell their
durable goods, the monopolist firm may have an incentive to purposely reduce the durability of its
product. Anderson and Ginsburgh (1994) find that when consumers have heterogeneous
preferences over new and used goods, a used-goods market can benefit a monopoly seller because
it allows the seller to achieve a form of second-degree price discrimination. Purohit and Staelin
(1994) consider a car manufacturer selling to both end consumers and rental companies, both of
whom resell their used cars on the resale market. They compare the manufacturer’s and the dealer’s
profits under different market structures, and show that in general a higher substitutability between
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used rental cars and new cars will reduce the manufacturer’s profit, but dealers are generally better
off. Desai and Purohit (1998) consider a car manufacturer’s leasing and selling decisions where
consumers can resell their used cars and find that the manufacturer may choose leasing, selling or
both, depending on the depreciation rates of sold versus leased cars. Hendel and Lizzeri (1999)
find that a monopolist can benefit from the secondary market even though the used-goods market
will compete with the new-goods product. Shulman and Coughlan (2007) study a monopoly
manufacturer’s optimal pricing decision in a market where the retailer can buy back and resell
used products. They find that under certain conditions, the manufacturer may find it optimal not
to sell any new goods in the second period. Jiang and Tian (2018) show that, similar to secondary
markets, consumer-to-consumer product sharing has a value-enhancement effect, which can
increase a monopolist’s optimal quality and price of its product. Tian and Jiang (2018) find that
the consumer-to-consumer sharing market is more likely to benefit the downstream retailer than
the upstream manufacturer. These papers mostly consider that consumers use a durable product
for a period time before they resell it. By contrast, in our model, concert tickets can be used only
once even though they may be purchased at different times. More importantly, we model a new
market dynamic that has not been studied. Consumers are uncertain about their valuations in the
early period (i.e., whether they can attend the concert); some earlier buyers may want to resell their
tickets in the later period if they find out that they will not be able to attend the concert. In addition,
we study a novel research question not studied by past research: how the integration of the primary
and the resale platforms will affect the musician, the platform, and the consumers.

1.3 Model
Consider a musician who plans to organize a concert for his performance in a city at some time
in the future. The musician (denoted by 𝑀) will sell the tickets via a primary ticket platform (e.g.,
10

Ticketmaster), denoted by 𝑃.2 The musician needs to choose the size of performance venue to rent;
his cost for renting the venue is 𝑐 ⋅ 𝑁, where 𝑁 is the venue size (total number of available seats)
̅ denote the size of the largest venue in the city, so 𝑁 ≤ 𝑁
̅ . As is typically
and 𝑐 is a constant. Let 𝑁
the case on Ticketmaster in practice, the musician will choose the (ticket’s) face price 𝑓 for the
tickets, and then the primary platform will charge consumers a service fee for the ticket. Let 𝑝
denote the final price that a consumer pays for a ticket. Equivalently, the primary platform’s perticket service fee is 𝑝 − 𝑓.3
Without loss of generality, we assume that there is a unit mass of consumers (indexed by 𝑖) in
the market. Consumers are heterogeneous in their valuations of the concert. There are two types
of consumers. A fraction 𝛼 of consumers are “avid fans,” denoted by 𝐴, who have valuation 𝑉𝐴 for
the concert if they can attend it. The rest of the consumers (a fraction 1 − 𝛼) are “casual fans,”
denoted by 𝐶, whose valuation for the concert conditional on attending, is 𝑉𝐶 < 𝑉𝐴 . Consumers ex
ante may be uncertain about whether they will be able to go to the concert, e.g., there could be
other activities in the future that may conflict with the concert (e.g., a friend’s party). Since avid
fans value the concert more than casual fans, they are probably more likely than casual fans to
attend the concert rather than other activities. Let 𝜌𝑖 be the probability that consumer 𝑖 can attend
the concert. For tractability, we assume that 𝜌𝑖 = 1 for avid fans and 𝜌𝑖 ~uniform(0,1) across the
population of casual fans. Each consumer knows ex ante her own 𝜌𝑖 , but the platforms cannot
identify each consumers’ type. If a consumer does not attend the concert, her utility from the
concert is normalized to zero. Therefore, a type-𝑖 consumer has probability 𝜌𝑖 of having 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝑖 ,
and a probability 1 − 𝜌𝑖 of having 𝑣𝑖 = 0, where 𝑖 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐶}. Each consumer buys at most one
ticket.
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To capture the reality that consumers’ uncertainty about whether they can attend the concert
may get resolved over time, we model two distinctive time periods in which consumers can buy
tickets. In the first period, casual fans are uncertain about whether they can attend the concert, but
in the second period they will know whether they can attend it. Consumers who bought tickets in
the first period can choose to resell their tickets on the resale platform (denoted by 𝑅) in the second
period, even if they can attend the concert themselves. Let 𝑟 denote the resale price of tickets on
the resale platform. Consumers can buy a ticket from the primary platform by paying the final
price 𝑝, or buy a ticket from the resale platform by paying the resale price 𝑟, if tickets are not sold
out on these platforms. In practice, the resale platform (e.g., StubHub) charges a percentage fee
for transactions on it. Let 𝑘 ∈ [0,1] denote the resale platform’s percentage service fee, so a
consumer will receive (1 − 𝑘)𝑟 for reselling her ticket. Section 4 analyzes the case of exogenous
service fee 𝑘 and discusses the main insights. In Section 5.2, we consider the endogenous decisions
on 𝑘 by the independent resale platform and by the integrated platform. Most results from our main
model will remain qualitatively the same when the service fee 𝑘 is endogenously decided.
Next we introduce how the equilibrium resale price 𝑟 ∗ is determined in our model. An intuitive
candidate for 𝑟 ∗ is the market-clearing resale price, i.e., at this price, the number of consumers
willing to resell their tickets (the supply) is equal to the number of those willing to buy resale
tickets (the demand). However, such a market-clearing resale price may not exist in our setting.
This is because in the second period, consumers will know whether they can attend the concert
and their ex post valuations of attending the concert can only possibly be 𝑉𝐴 , 𝑉𝐶 , or zero. Hence,
neither the demand function nor the supply function in the resale market is continuous in general.
To determine the unique equilibrium resale price, we use an alternative notion that is conceptually
similar to the market-clearing price. Specifically, we assume that the equilibrium resale price 𝑟 ∗ is
12

the maximum resale price that clears the supply in the resale market, and that all resale tickets are
sold at 𝑟 ∗ . Although this is a simplifying assumption, we suggest that it is reasonable. On the one
hand, if the resale price is higher than 𝑟 ∗ , there will be excess supply in the resale market, so some
consumers unable to resell their tickets may have an incentive to lower their listed resale price to
guarantee a sale. On the other hand, if the resale price is lower than 𝑟 ∗ , a reseller may want to raise
her listed resale price slightly and still be guaranteed to successfully resell her ticket. We further
assume 𝑟 ∗ = 0 if there will be some resale tickets unsold for any positive 𝑟, and 𝑟 ∗ = 𝑉𝐴 if there
will be no consumers willing to resell tickets at any 𝑟 ≤ 𝑉𝐴 . Note that consumers’ realized
valuation 𝑣𝑖 in the second period is either 𝑉𝐴 , 𝑉𝐶 or 0, so 𝑟 ∗ will be one of these three values in
equilibrium. Table 1.1 exhibits several examples of the equilibrium resale price in different
scenarios.
Table 1.1 Examples of Equilibrium Resale Prices 𝒓∗
Demand of resale tickets

Supply of resale tickets

Equilibrium 𝑟 ∗

10 fans with willingness-to-pay $10;

5 fans want to resell tickets

$10

25 fans want to resell tickets

$5

35 fans want to resell tickets

$0

20 fans with willingness-to-pay $5.

̅ ≤ 𝛼, i.e., the largest venue in the city cannot hold all avid
When the maximum venue size 𝑁
fans, one can show that the musician will set the ticket’s face price 𝑓 to be the avid fan’s valuation,
𝑉𝐴 , and the primary platform and the resale platform will always receive zero surplus. We will
̅ > 𝛼 in the rest of the paper. For closed-form solutions, we
focus on the more interesting case of 𝑁
̅ ≤ 2𝛼 .4
also assume that the maximum venue size is not too large such that 𝑁
1+𝛼
The timeline of the game is as follows. Prior to the first period, the musician decides the venue
̅] and the ticket face price 𝑓. The primary platform subsequently sets the final ticket
size 𝑁 ∈ [0, 𝑁
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price 𝑝, (i.e., it effectively charges a service fee 𝑝 − 𝑓 per ticket). In the first period, consumers
will decide whether to buy the ticket from the primary platform. In the second period, consumers
learn whether they can attend the concert. Those who bought tickets in the first period can choose
to resell their tickets in the resale market. Those without a ticket can choose to buy a ticket from
either the primary platform (if tickets have not sold out) or from the resale market. On either the
primary platform or the resale platform, if there are more consumers demanding the ticket than the
total number of tickets available, tickets will sell out, in which case consumers are assumed to
have equal chances of getting a ticket. If the price on one platform is lower than the other platform,
consumers will first try to buy tickets from the cheaper platform. Consumers who fail to get a
ticket from that platform can then decide whether to buy from the other platform.
In the main analysis, we consider two cases regarding whether the primary and the resale
platforms are operated by the same entity. In the case of independent platforms (denoted by IDP),
the primary and the resale platform are operated by independent entities who maximize their
respective profits. This case reflects the situation where Ticketmaster (the primary platform) has
not entered the resale market. In the case of integrated platform (denoted by INT), the primary and
the resale platforms are owned by the same entity that maximizes the joint profit of two platforms.
This case reflects the situation where Ticketmaster enters the resale market and can use its
Paperless Ticket system to prevent consumers from reselling on other platforms. Comparing these
two cases helps us to examine how Ticketmaster’s entry and control of the resale market will affect
the musician and consumers. In Section 5.3, we will also examine the case of competing resale
platforms where an integrated platform and an independent resale platform compete with each
other in the resale market.
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1.4 Analysis
We solve for rational expectation subgame-perfect equilibria. In such equilibria, the musician,
the primary platform, the resale platform and consumers have rational expectations about the resale
price and the consumers’ probability of getting a ticket from a platform. There may exist multiple
rational expectation subgame-perfect equilibria differing in consumers’ belief on how many
consumers will buy tickets in the first period, given the final price 𝑝 and the venue size 𝑁. If all
consumers believe that many consumers will buy tickets in the first period, they may also want to
buy tickets early because they believe that there will be few tickets left in the second period.
However, if all consumers believe that only a small number of consumers will buy tickets in the
first period, they may also postpone buying the ticket, anticipating that there will be many leftover
tickets in the second period. To pin down the unique equilibrium outcome when multiple rational
expectation equilibria exist, we introduce the concept of the “buying-spree equilibrium” to our
setting. We define the buying-spree equilibrium as the rational expectation subgame-perfect
equilibrium that, among all possible rational expectation subgame-perfect equilibria, has the
highest number of consumers trying to buy tickets in the first period. This is a reasonable scenario,
especially for more popular concerts. In reality, consumers often rush to buy tickets as soon as
tickets are released and many concerts sell out in the first few hours. For example, The Rolling
Stone sold out 75,000 tickets in 51 minutes for their “14 on Fire” tour in Paris in 2014.5
LEMMA 1. The buying-spree equilibrium in our setting is unique.
Lemma 1 shows that the buying-spree equilibrium is unique. All proofs are relegated to
Appendix A.
One can easily show that it is not optimal to choose 𝑁 < 𝛼, i.e., a venue that cannot contain
all avid fans, because the musician can receive a strictly higher profit by choosing 𝑁 = 𝛼 and 𝑓 =
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𝑉𝐴 to reap all the surplus of avid fans. For the rest of this section, we will analyze the more
2𝛼
̅ ≥ 𝑁 ≥ 𝛼.
interesting parameter range of 1+𝛼 ≥ 𝑁

One can find the derivation of consumers’ utility function in Appendix A. We now examine
𝑉

the consumer’s buying and reselling decisions. Note that when 𝑘 < 1 − 𝑉𝐶 , or equivalently
𝐴

(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 > 𝑉𝐶 , a casual fan will resell her ticket when the resale price is 𝑟 = 𝑉𝐴 , even if her
𝑉

realized 𝑣𝑖 is 𝑉𝐶 . By contrast, when 𝑘 ≥ 1 − 𝑉𝐶 , or equivalently (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 ≤ 𝑉𝐶 , a causal fan will
𝐴

never resell her ticket when she has 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶 . In this section, we assume the resale percentage fee
𝑘 to be exogenous, and divide our analysis into the case of a high resale percentage fee (𝑘 ≥ 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴

𝑉

) and that of a low percentage fee (𝑘 < 1 − 𝑉𝐶 ). We show that both the musician and the
𝐴

consumers can be better off under the integrated platform than under the independent platforms.
In Section 5.2, we analyze the case of endogenous resale percentage fee 𝑘 and show that the
primary platform’s entry into the resale market can lower 𝑘 in equilibrium, which can even further
increase the musician’s profit and the consumer surplus.
1.4.1 The Case of High Resale Percentage Fee
𝑉

This section considers the case with 𝑘 ≥ 1 − 𝑉𝐶 . In this case, the casual fans will not resell
𝐴

their tickets when their realized valuation is 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶 . With a final ticket price 𝑝 ∈ (𝑉𝐶 , 𝑉𝐴 ], avid
fans will buy tickets in the first period and casual fans will not buy tickets from the primary market
because 𝑝 > 𝑉𝐶 . Thus, there will be no transactions in the resale market.
We proceed to consider the case of 𝑝 ∈ [(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 , 𝑉𝐶 ]. Part (a) of Lemma 2 summarizes the
equilibrium outcome with the ticket’s final price 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 , and part (b) of Lemma 2 characterizes
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the range of 𝑝 where the concert is expected to sell out in the first period and the equilibrium resale
price is 𝑟 ∗ = 𝑉𝐴 .
2𝛼

LEMMA 2. Suppose that (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑉𝐶 and 𝛼 < 𝑁 < 1+𝛼.
(a) When 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 , there exists a unique equilibrium: all avid fans buy tickets from the primary
market in the first period, and all casual fans with realized valuation 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶 will try to buy tickets
in the second period. Tickets do not sell out in the primary market and no consumer will resell
tickets.
(b) There exists an equilibrium in which the concert will sell out in the first period and the
equilibrium resale price is 𝑟 ∗ = 𝑉𝐴 if and only if (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝜃𝑉𝐶 + (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 ,
where 0 < 𝜃 =

(1−𝛼)(𝑁−𝛼)+√(1−𝛼)𝛼[𝛼(1+2𝑁)−𝛼2 −2𝑁2 ]
(1−𝛼)𝑁

< 1.

In Appendix A, we show that if there is an equilibrium in which the concert sells out in the
first period and the equilibrium resale price is 𝑟 ∗ = 𝑉𝐴 , this equilibrium is the (unique) buyingspree equilibrium. Therefore, the equilibrium described in part (b) of Lemma 2 is the buying-spree
equilibrium. For conciseness, we will use “equilibrium” to refer to the “buying-spree equilibrium”
for the rest of the paper.
Lemma 2 characterizes the equilibrium consumer choice when 𝑝 belongs to the intervals
[(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 , 𝜃𝑉𝐶 + (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 ] or [𝑉𝐶 , 𝑉𝐴 ]. In Appendix A, we show that it is not optimal
for the primary platform to choose any 𝑝 outside these two intervals. Thus, we will discuss the
consumer’s choice decisions only in the subgame with 𝑝 being inside these intervals.
Decisions of the platform and the musician
Having discussed the consumers’ buying and reselling decisions, we will now examine the
optimal strategies of the primary platform (or the integrated platform) and the musician. We
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compare the equilibrium outcomes under two platform structures. In the independent-platforms
case, the primary and the resale platforms are operated by independent entities. In the integratedplatform case, an integrated platform operates in both the primary and the resale markets and
maximizes their joint profit.
We start with the case of independent platforms. In this case, the primary platform maximizes
its own profit 𝜋𝑃 , and the musician maximizes his profit 𝜋𝑀 . Note that 𝜋𝑃 = 𝑁(𝑝 − 𝑓) when 𝑝 ≤
𝑉𝐶 and 𝜋𝑃 = min{𝛼, 𝑁} ⋅ (𝑝 − 𝑓) if 𝑉𝐴 ≥ 𝑝 > 𝑉𝐶 . Hence, in equilibrium, the primary platform’s
optimal final price 𝑝 will be either 𝑉𝐶 or 𝑉𝐴 , at which no casual fans will buy tickets in the first
period, therefore precluding any resale transaction in the second period. We will show later that
an integrated platform can have incentives to set 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶 , which will induce some casual fans to
buy in the first period. In that case, there may be resale transactions in the second period, since
some casual fans who bought tickets may not be able to attend the concert and some fans who can
go to the concert may not have successfully bought a ticket in the first period.
̅ (1 − √𝑉𝐴−𝑉𝐶 ). In the independent-platforms (IDP) case:
LEMMA 3. Let 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃 ≡ 𝑁
𝑉 −𝑐
𝐴

∗
∗
(a) If 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃 , the musician will choose the venue size 𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑃
= 𝛼 and the face price 𝑓𝐼𝐷𝑃
=
∗
∗
𝑉𝐴 . The primary platform will set the final price 𝑝𝐼𝐷𝑃
= 𝑓𝐼𝐷𝑃
= 𝑉𝐴 . Avid consumers will buy tickets

from the primary platform and casual fans will not buy tickets in either periods. Consumer surplus
is zero.
∗
∗
̅ and 𝑓𝐼𝐷𝑃
(b) If 𝛼 < 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃 , the musician will choose 𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑃
=𝑁
=

̅ 𝑉𝐶 −𝛼𝑉𝐴
𝑁
.
̅ −𝛼
𝑁

The primary

∗
platform will set 𝑝𝐼𝐷𝑃
= 𝑉𝐶 . All avid fans will buy tickets from the primary platform in the first

period. Casual fans with realized 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶 will try to buy tickets from the primary platform in the
second period. Consumer surplus is 𝛼(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑉𝐶 ).
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Lemma 3 summarizes the equilibrium outcome in the independent-platforms case. Note that a
large number of avid fans will give the primary platform a stronger incentive to serve only the avid
fans and extract all their surplus by setting 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 . Anticipating this, the musician would rather
himself set a high face price 𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴 to extract the avid fans’ surplus. Lemma 3 shows that when
∗
𝛼 > 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃
, the musician will indeed find it optimal to choose such a high face price (𝑉𝐴 ). In this

̅) and only avid fans will be served.
case, the musician will choose a small venue size (𝑁 = 𝛼 < 𝑁
∗
By contrast, if there are not many avid fans (when 𝛼 < 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃
), the primary platform is more

inclined to choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 < 𝑉𝐴 to serve both the avid and the casual fans. Thus, anticipating the
primary platform’s optimal targeting decision, the musician will choose a low 𝑓 (lower than 𝑉𝐶 )
̅.
and a large venue size 𝑁 = 𝑁
We want to point out that Lemma 3 indicates that regardless of the value of 𝛼, the primary
market will choose the final price 𝑝 ≥ 𝑉𝐶 so no casual fans will buy tickets in the first period. As
a result, there will be no transactions in the resale market in the second period. Note that this result
relies on our assumption that avid fans will always be able to attend the concert. In Section 5.2.,
we examine an extension in which the avid fans also have a small probability of unable to attend
the concert. We find that, in that extension, some avid fans who find themselves unable to attend
the concert in the second period will resell their tickets in the case of independent platforms. One
should interpret the “no resale” result in Lemma 3 as that in the independent-platforms case the
primary platform will have a limited incentive to encourage first-period purchase from casual fans.
We will see how this result is different in the integrated-platform case.
We proceed to discuss the integrated-platform case. Let 𝜋𝐼 ≡ 𝜋𝑃 + 𝜋𝑅 be the total profit of the
integrated platform. Define 𝛼0 ≡

(2−𝑘)𝑉𝐴 −2𝑉𝐶
𝑘𝑉𝐴

. We begin by analyzing the subgame where the
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musician has already chosen 𝑁 and 𝑓, and the integrated platform is making its optimal final price
decision.
PROPOSITION 1. When 𝑁 > 𝛼, 𝑓 <

𝑁[1−

𝑘(1+𝛼)
]−𝛼
2

𝑁−𝛼

𝑉𝐴 , and 𝛼 < 𝛼0 , the integrated platform will

set 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 < 𝑉𝐶 so all consumers will try to buy tickets in the first period. A strictly
positive number of casual consumers will resell their tickets in the second period at resale price
𝑟 ∗ = 𝑉𝐴 .
Proposition 1 shows that different from the case of independent platforms, if the musician
chooses a low enough face price 𝑓 and a large enough venue size 𝑁, it is possible for the integrated
platform to choose some 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶 . At this price point, some casual consumers will want to buy
tickets in the first period and resell their tickets if they cannot attend the concert in the second
period. The intuition hinges on the spillover effect from the primary market to the resale markets.
In particular, in our framework, a lower final price 𝑝 will attract more casual fans with a lower
likelihood to attend the concert (𝜌𝑖 ) to buy tickets in the first period (from the primary market).
These casual fans are more likely to resell their tickets, so there will be more transactions in the
resale market. To put it differently, lowering 𝑝 will have a positive spillover effect into the resale
market. When the population of casual fans is larger (i.e., 𝛼 is smaller), the positive spillover is
more significant. Therefore, when 𝛼 < 𝛼0 , the integrated platform may want to reduce its final
ticket price 𝑝 in the primary market to reap the benefit from more transactions in the resale market,
provided that the musician chooses a large enough venue size 𝑁 > 𝛼 and a low enough face price
𝑓<

𝑁[1−

𝑘(1+𝛼)
]−𝛼
2

𝑁−𝛼

𝑉𝐴 . This contrasts with the case of independent platforms, where the primary

platform charges a high final price (𝑝 ≥ 𝑉𝐶 ) that precludes resale transactions. This happens
because the primary platform cannot directly receive profits from the resale transactions and will
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hence have limited incentives to lower its price to convince casual consumers to buy in the first
period (i.e., before they know whether they can attend the concert). To summarize, Proposition 1
shows that, compared with the case of independent platforms, an integrated platform will be more
likely to reduce 𝑝 to attract early purchase from casual consumers. Corollary 1 shows that this
result is more likely to be true when the resale percentage fee (𝑘) is smaller.
2𝛼

COROLLARY 1. A lower resale percentage fee (𝑘) will expand the parameter region (1+𝛼 >
𝑁 > 𝛼, 𝑓 <

𝑁[1−

𝑘(1+𝛼)
]−𝛼
2

𝑁−𝛼

𝑉𝐴 , and 𝛼 < 𝛼0 ) in which the integrated platform will choose 𝑝 =

(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 < 𝑉𝐶 to induce first-period purchases from casual consumers.
Intuitively, when the resale percentage fee (𝑘) is larger, the integrated platform can keep a
great portion of the resale transaction price, so it will be more likely to set 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶 to induce more
casual consumers buying in the first period and thus generate more resale transactions.
Interestingly, Corollary 1 shows the opposite: A smaller 𝑘 makes the integrated platform more
likely to choose 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶 . The intuition is as follows. When 𝑘 is smaller, casual consumers will tend
to buy tickets in the first period (from the primary market), because they will pay a lower resale
service fee if they cannot attend the concert. As a result, the integrated platform can convince the
casual fans to buy tickets in the first period by only slightly reducing 𝑝 (to (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 ), which will
not negatively affect its profit in the primary market too much. Hence, the integrated platform is
more likely to set 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 < 𝑉𝐶 .
Next, we investigate the musician’s optimal decisions on the face price 𝑓 and the venue size
̅ 2 +8(1+𝑁
̅ )(𝑉𝐴 −𝑐)]−𝑉𝐴 𝑘𝑁
̅

̅ [1 − √𝑉𝐴 𝑘[𝑉𝐴𝑘𝑁
𝑁. Let 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 ≡ 𝑁

4(𝑉𝐴 −𝑐)

]. If 𝛼0 ≤ 0, the integrated platform will

never choose 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶 , and the equilibrium outcomes in the integrated-platform case will be the
same as those for the independent-platforms case (as described in Lemma 3). If 𝛼0 > 0, the
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musician’s decisions and the equilibrium outcome depend on the relative magnitude of 𝛼, 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 ,
𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃 and 𝛼0 . Table 2 summarizes the optimal decisions of the musician and the integrated platform
as well as the equilibrium outcomes. An important observation is that when 𝛼 < min{𝛼0 , 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 },
∗
corresponding to the first and the fourth rows of Table 2, the equilibrium final price 𝑝𝐼𝑁𝑇
< 𝑉𝐶 and

the integrated platform will receive a strictly positive profit from the resale market. By contrast,
as shown in Lemma 3, in the case of independent platforms, the resale platform’s equilibrium
profit is zero regardless of the value of 𝛼.
An interesting finding from Table 1.2 is on how the resale percentage fee 𝑘 will affect the
consumer surplus. Intuitively, when 𝑘 decreases, consumers can pay less for buying and reselling
tickets. Moreover, more consumers will want to buy tickets, and the musician tends to choose a
larger venue size to serve more consumers. As a result, consumers should be better off. However,
Proposition 2 shows that if the musician has already chosen the largest possible venue size 𝑁 =
̅ , a further drop in 𝑘 can reduce the consumer surplus.
𝑁
𝟐

Table 1.2 Equilibrium Outcomes of the Integrated Platform Case with 𝑽𝑨 > 𝟐−𝒌 𝑽𝑪
𝛼∈

(0, 𝛼0 ]

∗
𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑇

̅
𝑁

𝛼0
< 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇

𝛼0
≥ 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇

(𝛼0 , 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃 ]

̅
𝑁

(𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃 , 1)

𝛼

(0, 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 ]

̅
𝑁

(𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 , 1)

𝛼

∗
𝑓𝐼𝑁𝑇

[1 −
̅𝑘(1+𝛼)
𝑁
]𝑉
̅ −𝛼) 𝐴
2(𝑁

∗
𝑝𝐼𝑁𝑇

𝑉𝐶

𝑉𝐴

𝑉𝐴

[1 −

(1
− 𝑘)𝑉𝐴

𝑉𝐴

∗
𝜋𝐼,𝐼𝑁𝑇

∗
𝜋𝑅,𝐼𝑁𝑇

̅𝑉𝐴 𝛼(1+𝛼)
𝑘𝑁
̅ −𝛼)
2(𝑁

̅ (1−𝛼)
𝑘𝑉𝐴 𝑁

{[1 −
(1
− 𝑘)𝑉𝐴

̅𝑉𝐶 −𝛼𝑉𝐴
𝑁
̅ −𝛼
𝑁

̅𝑘(1+𝛼)
𝑁
]𝑉
̅ −𝛼) 𝐴
2(𝑁

∗
𝜋𝑀,𝐼𝑁𝑇

𝑉𝐴

̅𝑘(1+𝛼)
𝑁
]𝑉
̅ −𝛼) 𝐴
2(𝑁

2

̅
𝑐}𝑁
̅ 𝑉 −𝛼𝑉
𝑁
[ 𝐶̅ 𝐴
𝑁−𝛼

̅
− 𝑐] 𝑁

(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑐)𝛼
{[1 −
̅𝑘(1+𝛼)
𝑁
]𝑉
̅ −𝛼) 𝐴
2(𝑁

̅𝛼
𝑁
(𝑉𝐴
̅−𝛼
𝑁

−

0

𝑉𝐶 )

̅
− 𝑐}𝑁

(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑐)𝛼

* The intervals 𝛼 belongs to (the second column) may or may not be empty.
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−

0

0

̅𝑉𝐴 𝛼(1+𝛼)
𝑘𝑁
̅ −𝛼)
2(𝑁

̅ (1−𝛼)
𝑘𝑉𝐴 𝑁

0

0

2

PROPOSITION 2. A lower resale percentage fee (𝑘) can possibly lead to a lower consumer
̅)
surplus. The result happens only if the musician chooses the largest possible venue size (𝑁 = 𝑁
before 𝑘 decreases.
Corollary 1 has shown that 𝛼0 decreases with 𝑘. Thus if 𝛼0 < 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 , it is possible that when 𝑘
is relatively high, 𝛼0 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃 , but 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼0 after 𝑘 declines. In this case, when 𝑘 is relatively
high such that 𝛼0 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃 , in equilibrium the musician will choose the largest-possible venue
∗
̅ , the integrated platform will choose the final price 𝑝𝐼𝑁𝑇
size 𝑁 = 𝑁
= 𝑉𝐶 so casual fans will buy

tickets only in the second period if their realized valuation 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶 , and the consumer surplus is
̅ (𝑉𝐴 − 𝑉𝐶 ). After 𝑘 decreases such that 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼0 , the musician will still choose 𝑁 = 𝑁
̅ , the
𝑁
∗
integrated platform may find it optimal to choose 𝑝𝐼𝑁𝑇
= (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 so all casual fans will try to

̅ ⋅ [𝛼𝑉𝐴 𝑘 + (1−𝛼)[𝑉𝐶 −(1−𝑘)𝑉𝐴]],
buy tickets in the first period, and the consumer surplus becomes 𝑁
2
which may be lower than its value before 𝑘 drops.
The underlying reason of Proposition 2 is that when the musician has already chosen the
̅ , although a further decrease in 𝑘 can make more casual fans with
largest-possible venue size 𝑁
lower probability of attendance (𝜌𝑖 ) willing to buy tickets, the musician will not be able to choose
a larger venue size to serve all of them. These consumers will also try to buy tickets in the first
period, reducing the chance that the (high-valuation, high-attendance-probability) avid fans can
successfully get tickets from the primary market. Hence, more avid fans need to buy tickets from
the resale market, so some consumer surplus will be extracted by the integrated platform via the
resale service fee.
Comparison of the independent-platforms case and the integrated-platform case
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Having characterized the equilibrium outcomes in the independent-platforms case and in the
integrated-platform case, we now proceed to compare the equilibrium outcomes to determine how
the integration of the primary and the resale platforms will affect the market. The following
proposition summarizes the comparison of the equilibrium outcomes between the two cases.
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that 𝛼 ∈ (𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃 , min{𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 , 𝛼0 }) . 6 Compared to the independentplatforms case (IDP), in the integrated-platform case (INT):
(a) The musician will choose a strictly lower ticket face price and a strictly larger venue size
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
(𝑓𝐼𝑁𝑇
< 𝑓𝐼𝐷𝑃
and 𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑇
> 𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑃
) and the final price will be strictly lower (𝑝𝐼𝑁𝑇
< 𝑝𝐼𝐷𝑃
).
∗
∗
(b) The musician’s profit is strictly higher (𝜋𝑀,𝐼𝑁𝑇
> 𝜋𝑀,𝐼𝐷𝑃
) and the platform’s profit in both
∗
∗
∗
∗
markets are strictly higher, i.e., 𝜋𝑃,𝐼𝑁𝑇
> 𝜋𝑃,𝐼𝐷𝑃
and 𝜋𝑅,𝐼𝑁𝑇
> 𝜋𝑅,𝐼𝐷𝑃
.

(c) Consumer surplus is also strictly higher in the integrated-platform case than the
independent-platforms case.
At a first glance, since the integrated platform controls both the primary and the resale markets,
it can raise the final price in the primary market with less concern about losing consumers to the
resale market. So, in the integrated-platform case, the equilibrium final price will tend to be higher,
and as a result, fewer consumers will be served and the musician’s profit and consumer surplus
will decrease relative to the independent-platforms case. Our analysis reveals that this is not
necessarily true if the number of avid fans is in the intermediate range. As Proposition 3 shows,
the integration of the primary and the resale platforms can actually lead to a lower final ticket
price, more consumers attending the concert, a higher profit for the musician, and a higher
consumer surplus. This is because the integrated platform has an incentive to lower the final price
𝑝 to internalize the positive spillover effect, i.e., to create more transactions in the resale market
(as shown in Proposition 1). This will reduce the double-marginalization problem in the
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distribution channel of the primary market, so the musician is more likely to choose a larger venue
size 𝑁 to serve more consumers. As a result, the integration of the primary and resale platforms
can lead to a win-win-win outcome for the musician, the platforms, and the consumers.
The analysis in this section has focused on the case of high resale percentage fee, i.e., 𝑘 ≥ 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴

. Under this condition, the resale percentage fee 𝑘 is high enough such that the casual fans will

not want to resell their tickets if their realized valuation is 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶 . Next, we analyze the
𝑉

complementary case of low resale percentage fee, i.e., 𝑘 < 1 − 𝑉𝐶 .
𝐴

1.4.2 The Case of Low Resale Percentage Fee
𝑉

This section considers the case of 𝑘 < 1 − 𝑉𝐶 . In this case, all casual fans will be willing to
𝐴

resell their tickets when 𝑟 = 𝑉𝐴 even if they can attend the concert, i.e., even when their realized
valuation is 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶 . However, if 𝑟 ≤ 𝑉𝐶 , casual fans will not resell their tickets if they can attend
the concert (𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶 ).
𝑉

LEMMA 4. If 𝑘 < 1 − 𝑉𝐶 and 𝑁 > 𝛼, the equilibrium resale price 𝑟 ∗ ≤ 𝑉𝐶 as long as some
𝐴

consumers will resell their tickets in equilibrium.
𝑉

Lemma 4 reveals that with the percentage resale fee 𝑘 < 1 − 𝑉𝐶 , the equilibrium resale price
𝐴

𝑟 ∗ will also be no higher than 𝑉𝐶 . This is because a lower 𝑘 will allow consumers to keep more of
their resale revenue, leading to more consumers buying tickets in the first period. Thus, more
consumers will resell the ticket on the resale market, which will reduce the equilibrium resale price
𝑟 ∗ , specifically 𝑟 ∗ ≤ 𝑉𝐶 . Note that the resale platform’s profit per resale transaction is 𝑘 ⋅ 𝑟 ∗ . If
𝑉

𝑘 < 1 − 𝑉𝐶 , 𝑟 ∗ ≤ 𝑉𝐶 . Thus the integrated platform will have limited interest in lowering 𝑝 ,
𝐴

because doing so can only slightly increase the profit from the resale market per resale transaction.
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∗
It turns out that it is optimal for the integrated platform to choose 𝑝𝐼𝑁𝑇
≥ 𝑉𝐶 so that no casual fans

will buy tickets in the first period. Therefore, the equilibrium outcomes of the independentplatforms case and of the integrated-platform case will be identical.
𝑉

LEMMA 5. If 𝑘 < 1 − 𝑉𝐶 , the equilibrium outcome in the independent-platforms case is
𝐴

identical to that in the integrated-platform case, which has been characterized in Lemma 3.

1.5 Extensions
Thus far, we have demonstrated that when the primary platform controls the resale market, the
integrated platform has an extra incentive to lower the final price. The price drop will alleviate the
double-marginalization problem in the primary-market distribution channel, which can induce the
musician to choose a larger venue size to serve more consumers. The musician and the consumers
can be better off as a result. In this section, we consider three model extensions. In the first
extension, we examine how the presence of scalpers will affect the market outcome. In the second
extension, we study the optimal resale percentage fee for the resale platform in the independentplatforms case and for the integrated platform in the integrated-platform case. In the last extension,
we consider the scenario that the integrated platform competes with an independent resale platform
in the resale market.
1.5.1 The Impact of Scalpers
Oftentimes, many scalpers buy tickets from the primary market and resell them at higher prices.
According to Scott Cutler, CEO of StubHub, nearly half of ticket resales on StubHub come from
“professional” traders (Sullivan 2017). It is generally believed that the musician and consumers
are worse off with scalpers in the market because they will raise the effective price paid by
consumers. The official Twitter account of the rock band LCD Soundsystem derogated scalpers as
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“parasites” (Horowitz 2017). Scalpers usually use computer bots to buy hundreds of tickets within
minutes after concerts start to sell. To combat scalpers, former President Barack Obama signed the
Better Online Ticket Sales Act in 2016, which restricts the use of software bots to obtain and resell
event tickets. Many states have also passed legislations banning or restricting scalping behaviors.
Ticketmaster has also introduced the Verified Fan system, which can block 90% of buying
attempts from ticket scalpers (Brooks 2017). In this section, we investigate how the existence of
scalpers affects ticket prices, profits of the musician and platforms, and the consumers under
different market structures, i.e., whether the primary and the resale platforms are independent or
integrated.
In this extension, we assume that besides the unit mass of regular consumers (avid and casual
fans), there are 𝛽 number of scalpers who can also buy tickets from the primary platform and resell
them on the resale platform. Scalpers have zero valuation for attending the concert, but move
earlier than regular consumers in the first period when buying tickets from the primary platform.
The main model in the previous section is the special case of 𝛽 = 0. For closed-form analytical
solutions, we focus on the parameter region of 𝛽 ≤

̅
2𝛼−(1+𝛼)𝑁
1−𝛼

, i.e., there are only a small group of

scalpers. To illustrate the most interesting result, in this extension, we analyze the case with 𝑘 ≥
𝑉
̅ ≤ 2𝛼 . We will show that, even if scalpers have the ability to buy tickets earlier
1 − 𝑉𝐶 and 𝛼 ≤ 𝑁
1+𝛼
𝐴

than regular consumers, the scalpers’ presence can still result in lower ticket prices and higher
consumer surplus, and make both the musician and the integrated platform better off. 7 This
contrasts with the independent-platforms case, where one can show that, in the above assumed
parameter region, the presence of scalpers has no effect on the market outcome, because the
primary platform will find it optimal to set a high enough final ticket price (𝑝) so that no scalpers
will buy tickets in equilibrium.
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First we analyze the case of integrated platform. We begin by examining the subgame where
the musician has chosen 𝑁 and 𝑓 and the integrated platform is going to choose its optimal final
price 𝑝. Similar to the previous section, it is not optimal for the musician to choose a venue size
̅ ≥ 𝑁 ≥ 𝛼. Note that the scalpers will want to buy tickets
𝑁 < 𝛼, so we focus on the case with 𝑁
from the primary market only if 𝑝 is low enough so they can make positive profit from reselling,
specifically when 𝑝 ≤ (1 − 𝑘)𝑟̂∗.8 Lemma 6 shows that, in the integrated-platform case, it may be
optimal for the integrated platform to choose 𝑝 low enough such that scalpers will buy tickets in
the primary market.
LEMMA 6. Given the musician’s choices of 𝑁 and 𝑓, the integrated platform will choose 𝑝 =
(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 if and only if 𝛼 <

2𝑁(𝑉𝐴 −𝑉𝐶 )
(𝑁−𝛽)𝑘𝑉𝐴

− 1 and 𝑓 < 𝑉𝐴 [1 −

𝑘(1+𝛼)(𝑁−𝛽)
2(𝑁−𝛼)

] . In that case, all

scalpers and regular consumers will try to buy tickets in the first period, and the equilibrium resale
price is 𝑟 ∗ = 𝑉𝐴 . The integrated platform’s total profit is 𝜋𝐼 =

1+𝛼
2

𝛽𝑘𝑉𝐴 + 𝑁 [𝑉𝐴 (1 −

𝑘(1+𝛼)
2

)−

𝑓].
It is worth of mentioning that when the conditions in Lemma 6 are satisfied, the integrated
platform’s profit, 𝜋𝐼 , increases with the number of scalpers (𝛽). The presence of scalpers tends to
increase resale transactions in the market. This is because scalpers are more likely (with probability
one) to resell the tickets compared to avid and casual fans, thus in expectation selling a ticket to a
scalper will generate more profit in the resale market for the integrated platform than selling it to
a regular consumer, i.e., the presence of the scalpers can strengthen the spillover effect. Therefore,
the integrated platform has an incentive to let scalpers buy tickets from the primary market to
create transactions in the resale market. To attract scalpers, the integrated platform needs to keep
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𝑝 ≤ (1 − 𝑘)𝑟̂∗ so scalpers can make a profit. In other words, the integrated platform will have an
extra incentive to lower the final price on the primary platform.
Let us use a numerical example to illustrate why the integrated platform may want to lower its
final price 𝑝 when there are scalpers. Suppose that there are 1,000 regular consumers, 500 of whom
are avid fans (with 𝑉𝐴 = 100) and the rest 500 of them are casual fans (with 𝑉𝐶 = 80), i.e., 𝛼 =
0.5.9 To illustrate the key intuition, we consider the subgame where the musician has chosen 𝑓 =
̅ = 600), and the integrated platform is to choose the final
20 and a venue with 600 seats (𝑁 = 𝑁
price 𝑝. Suppose 𝑘 = 0.25. One can show that when there are no scalpers (i.e., 𝛽 = 0), the
integrated platform’s optimal price is 𝑝 = 100. By contrast, suppose that the market also has 200
scalpers (i.e., 𝛽 = 0.2); in this case, one can show that it is optimal for the platform to choose 𝑝 =
75, which is lower than the platform’s optimal price 𝑝 = 100 in the absence of scalpers. Note that,
in this example, either when 𝛽 = 0 or when 𝛽 = 0.2, the equilibrium resale price will be 𝑟 ∗ =
𝑉𝐴 = 100 if the platform chooses 𝑝 = 75.
To delineate the insight of how the integrated platform finds it optimal to reduce its price (𝑝)
when scalpers are present, Table 1.3 compares the platform’s profit decompositions under the
cases of 𝛽 = 0 and 𝛽 = 0.2. Note that if the platform charges 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 = 100, the market outcomes
are the same under the two cases of 𝛽, and the platform’s profit will be 40,000. Now, we examine
why charging a lower final price of 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 = 75 can have different profit implications to
the platform depending on the presence of scalpers. Note that if the platform lowers its final price
from 𝑝 = 100 to 𝑝 = 75, its profit from the primary market will drop by 40,000-33,000=7,000.
When 𝑝 = 75, all regular consumers and scalpers (if they exist) will try to buy tickets in the first
period. Without scalpers (𝛽 = 0), 600 regular consumers will get the tickets from the primary
market, and in expectation, 150 casual fans will not be able to attend the concert and hence will
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resell tickets. The integrated platform’s expected profit from the resale market is 3,750, which is
not enough to compensate the profit loss from the primary market. Thus, without scalpers (𝛽 = 0),
the integrated platform will find it optimal to choose the high final price 𝑝 = 100 and serve only
the avid fans. By contrast, with scalpers in the market (𝛽 = 0.2), among 600 consumers and
scalpers who get tickets from the primary platform, in expectation, 100 casual fans who will find
themselves unable to attend the concert and 200 scalpers will resell their tickets. So, the integrated
platform’s profit from the resale market is 7,500, which is much more than the platform’s resalemarket profit in the absence of scalpers (𝛽 = 0) and can more than cover the platform’s 7,000
profit loss from the primary market (due to the lowered final price 𝑝). Thus, with scalpers in the
market, the platform will find it optimal to choose the lower final price 𝑝 = 75.
Table 1.3 Profit Decomposition with 𝜷 = 𝟎 and 𝜷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 (𝒇 = 𝟐𝟎, 𝑵 = 𝟔𝟎𝟎)
𝜷=𝟎

Number of
Avid fans
consumers
Casual
who get
fans
tickets from
Scalpers
primary
Total
market
Integrated platform’s
profit from primary
market
Avid fans
Number of
Casual
consumers
fans
reselling
tickets in the
Scalpers
second period
Total
Integrated platform’s
profit from resale market
Integrated platform’s total
profit

𝜷 = 𝟎. 𝟐

𝒑 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎
(optimal)

𝑝 = 75

𝑝 = 100

𝒑 = 𝟕𝟓
(optimal)

500

300

500

200

0

300

0

200

0

0

0

200

500

600

500

600

500 × (100 − 20)
= 40,000

600 × (75 − 20)
= 33,000

500 × (100 − 20)
= 40,000

600 × (75 − 20)
= 33,000

0

0

0

0

0

150

0

100

0

0

0

200

0

150

0

300

0

150 × 0.25 × 100
= 3,750

0

300 × 0.25 × 100
= 7,500

40,000

36,750

40,000

40,500
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Another way to explain why the presence of scalpers can induce the integrated platform to
charge lower prices is that scalpers can help the platform exercise partial price discrimination in
the primary market. Without scalpers, if the platform wants to target more consumers, it has to
lower the final price for all targeted customers, in which case the avid fans who can get the tickets
will enjoy a large surplus (relative to casual fans). In contrast, with scalpers in the market, when
the platform charges the low final ticket price, more avid fans will not be able to get tickets in the
first period compared to the case without scalpers. Note that the avid fans who failed to obtain
tickets from the primary market will turn to the resale market to acquire tickets at higher prices
(from scalpers or casual fans who cannot attend the concert). Since the integrated platform receives
service fees for resale transactions, it in essence has charged these avid fans higher prices for the
tickets than those consumers who successfully obtained tickets in the primary market. Hence, the
presence of scalpers will help the platform increase the expected number of avid fans who will end
up paying higher prices for the tickets. Put differently, scalpers can effectively increase integrated
platform’s ability to exercise price discrimination. The integrated platform can take advantage of
this potential benefit from the presence of scalpers only if it charges a low enough ticket price 𝑝 ≤
(1 − 𝑘)𝑟̂∗ to ensure some profit for the scalpers. Therefore, the presence of scalpers tends to
induce lower final ticket prices in the primary market.

̅ [1 −
Define 𝛼𝑆𝐶𝑃 ≡ 𝑁

𝛽
̅ (𝑁
̅ −𝛽)+8(1+𝑁
̅ )(𝑉𝐴 −𝑐)]−𝑉𝐴 𝑘(𝑁
̅ −𝛽)
√1− ̅ √𝑉𝐴 𝑘[𝑉𝐴 𝑘𝑁
𝑁

4(𝑉𝐴 −𝑐)

] and 𝛼1 ≡

̅ (𝑉𝐴 −𝑉𝐶 )
2𝑁
̅ −𝛽)𝑉𝐴 𝑘
(𝑁

− 1.

We characterize the impact of scalpers on the final prices and different parties’ surplus in
Proposition 4.
2

PROPOSITION 4. Suppose 𝑉𝐴 > 2−𝑘 𝑉𝐶 , min{𝛼0 , 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 } < 𝛼 ≤ min{𝛼1 , 𝛼𝑆𝐶𝑃 } and 𝛽 <
̅
2𝛼−(1+𝛼)𝑁
1−𝛼

. In the integrated-platform case, compared to the case without scalpers (𝛽 = 0), the
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presence of scalpers will strictly reduce the final ticket price 𝑝∗ , and strictly increase the
musician’s profit, the integrated platform’s profit and the consumer surplus in equilibrium.
Contrary to the conventional belief that scalpers will raise the effective ticket prices paid by
consumers and thus reduce consumer surplus, Proposition 4 shows that scalpers can possibly result
in lower final prices and higher consumer surplus if the musician’s and the platform’s strategic
pricing decisions are taken into account. Moreover, because the presence of scalpers can make the
integrated platform more inclined to charge a lower final price, the musician will be more willing
to increase the venue size. As a result, the double-marginalization problem in the primary market
can be alleviated, making the platform, the musician, and the consumers possibly all better off.
We want to point out that Proposition 4 does not suggest that scalpers will always benefit
consumers and the musician. Indeed, there are several boundary conditions for the presence of
scalpers to be beneficial. For example, if the segment size of avid fans is smaller than a threshold
(𝛼 < min{𝛼0 , 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃 }), the platform will find it optimal to set a low final price to target both casual
fans and avid fans even when there are no scalpers. Under this condition, scalpers will strictly
reduce the consumer surplus. Moreover, the segment size of scalpers (𝛽) cannot be too high. If
there are too many scalpers, consumers are worse off because fewer tickets will be available for
regular consumers in the primary market, forcing more consumers to buy resale tickets at higher
prices. It is also important to point out that scalpers can benefit the consumers only when the
primary and the resale platforms are integrated. In the independent-platforms case, the primary
platform does not take the resale platform’s profit into account, so it will not bother lowering the
final ticket price to attract scalpers. Thus, with an independent resale platform, the presence of
scalpers will not facilitate the channel coordination in the primary market and consumer surplus
will generally decrease.
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1.5.2 Endogenous Resale Percentage Fee
In our main model, we have assumed the resale percentage fee 𝑘 to be exogenous. In this
section, we will analyze the optimal choice of 𝑘 for the resale platform. In the independentplatforms case, after the musician chooses the venue size 𝑁 and the face price 𝑓, the primary
platform will set the final price 𝑝 and the resale platform will set the resale percentage fee 𝑘
simultaneously. In the integrated-platform case, the integrated platform jointly chooses 𝑝 and 𝑘 to
maximize its profit. Under the original assumption that avid fans are always able to attend the
concert, in the independent-platforms case, the primary platform will always find it optimal to
choose 𝑝 high enough such that only avid fans will buy in the first period. Thus the resale platform
will receive zero profit regardless of its choice of 𝑘. Therefore, to allow for a more meaningful
comparison of how different market structures affect the equilibrium resale percentage fee 𝑘 ∗ , we
need both avid consumers and casual consumers to have some probability of not being able to
attend the concert. One way to revise the model is to introduce another random interruption that
can prevent a consumer from attending the concert (in addition to the random factors in the main
model). Suppose that the new interruptive events (e.g., mandatory out-of-town travel or family
emergency) have a probability 𝛿 of occurrence, in which case the consumer (whether avid or
casual) will be unable to attend the concert. Thus, one can show that overall, avid fans can attend
the concert with probability 𝜌𝐴 = 1 − 𝛿 , and the casual fans can attend with probability
𝜌𝐶 ~uniform(0,1 − 𝛿). Under this assumption, even if only avid fans will buy tickets in the first
period, there can still be resale transactions because some avid fans unable to attend the concert
will resell their tickets in the second period. To concisely present the results, we consider the case
of 𝛿 → 0+ . The qualitative results will still hold true as long as 𝛿 is not too large. Define 𝛼2 ≡
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̅2

̅

̅

̅ [1 − √(𝑉𝐴 −𝑉𝐶 )[(𝑉𝐴−𝑉𝐶 )𝑁 +8(1+𝑁)(𝑉𝐴−𝑐)]−(𝑉𝐴−𝑉𝐶 )𝑁]. The next proposition reveals which platform
𝑁
4(𝑉 −𝑐)
𝐴

will choose a lower resale percentage fee.
PROPOSITION 5. When 𝛼 < 𝛼2 , the integrated platform will choose a strictly lower resale
∗
∗
percentage fee (𝑘) than the independent resale platform will choose, i.e., 𝑘𝐼𝑁𝑇
< 𝑘𝐼𝐷𝑃
.

Proposition 5 reveals that when the population of avid fans is not too large (i.e., 𝛼 < 𝛼2 ), the
∗
integrated platform’s optimal resale percentage fee 𝑘𝐼𝑁𝑇
will be lower than an independent resale
∗
platform’s choice, 𝑘𝐼𝐷𝑃
. The intuition is as follows. A lower resale percentage fee can incentivize

consumers to buy tickets in the primary platform, because they expect to pay a lower resale service
fee if they cannot attend the concert and need to resell their tickets. In other words, lowering 𝑘 will
have a positive spillover effect from the resale market to the primary market. An integrated
platform can internalize the spillover and tends to charge a lower resale percentage fee in the resale
market, unless the population of avid fans is very large (𝛼 ≥ 𝛼2 ), in which case the integrated
platform will set 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 and target only the avid fans.
1.5.3 Competition between Resale Platforms
Finally, we examine the case where the integrated platform competes with an independent
resale platform in the resale market. The platform competition in the resale market will tend to
reduce the resale percentage fee 𝑘. For tractability, we assume that the integrated platform and the
independent resale platform have the same resale percentage fees 𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 with 𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 < 𝑘 . A
fraction 𝜙 of resale-ticket buyers buy from the integrated platform, and a fraction 1 − 𝜙 of resaleticket buyers buy from the independent resale platform. While we do not model how 𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 and
𝜙 are endogenously determined in equilibrium, our assumptions reflect that the resale service fee
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will decrease under competition in the resale market, so we can analyze how competition in the
resale market will affect the equilibrium prices, profits and consumer surplus.
𝑉

One can show that when 𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 < 1 − 𝑉𝐶 , the integrated platform will choose a final ticket
𝐴

price such that only avid fans will buy in the primary market in the first period, so there will be no
resale transactions in the second period. In other words, if the integrated platform anticipates that
the presence of a competing resale platform would reduce the resale service fee from 𝑘 to some
𝑉

𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 < 1 − 𝑉𝐶 , then the integrated platform will not want to reduce its price in the primary
𝐴

market to attract casual fans in the first period. Below, we analyze the more interesting case of
𝑉

𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 ≥ 1 − 𝑉𝐶 .
𝐴

𝑉

Our analysis shows that when 𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 ≥ 1 − 𝑉𝐶 , the integrated platform may choose 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶 ,
𝐴

and some casual fans will want to buy tickets in the first period and resell their tickets in the second
period. Specifically, under the conditions of
𝑁[1−𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 (1−
𝑁−𝛼

1−𝛼
𝜙)]−𝛼
2

𝑉𝐴 , and 𝛼 < 1 −

2𝛼

> 𝑁 > 𝛼 , 𝑉𝐴 > 2−𝑘
1+𝛼

2[𝑉𝐶 −(1−𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 )𝑉𝐴 ]
𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 𝜙𝑉𝐴

2
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 (2−𝜙)

𝑉𝐶 , 𝑓 <

, we find that the integrated platform will

choose 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 )𝑉𝐴 ≤ 𝑉𝐶 with a corresponding total profit 𝜋𝐼 = 𝑁 [𝑉𝐴 (1 − 𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 (1 −
1−𝛼
2

𝜙)) − 𝑓]. In this case, all consumers will try to buy tickets in the first period with a successful

probability of 𝑁. In expectation

𝑁(1−𝛼)
2

casual consumers will resell their tickets at resale price

𝑟 ∗ = 𝑉𝐴 .
Note that a smaller 𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 will make the parameter conditions above more likely to hold. In
other words, the integrated platform is more likely to set a final price 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶 to induce some casual
consumers to buy tickets in the first period and resell their tickets in the second period when they
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cannot attend the concert. We also show that, as expected, when the integrated platform’s market
share in the resale market, 𝜙, is larger, the parameter region in which the conditions above are
satisfied will be larger. This is because if a higher fraction of consumers resell their tickets on the
integrated platform, the integrated platform will have a stronger incentive to reduce its price in the
primary market (𝑝) to increase the transaction volume in the resale market.
In the integrated-platform case, consumers can resell their tickets only through the integrated
platform. By contrast, in the presence of a competing independent resale platform, consumers will
face a lower resale service fee. One may expect the consumers to become worse off when the
integrated platform can block the competing resale platforms and monopolize the resale market.
Proposition 6 shows that, counterintuitively, the musician and the consumers can be possibly better
off.
PROPOSITION 6. In equilibrium, in the integrated-platform case, the final price 𝑝 may strictly
be lower and the musician’s profit and consumer surplus may be strictly higher than in the
competing-resale-platforms case if 𝜙 < 1 −

𝑘−𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃
𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃

1+𝛼

⋅ 1−𝛼.

When there is competition in the resale market and if the integrated platform’s market share
in the resale market is low (i.e., 𝜙 < 1 −

𝑘−𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃
𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃

1+𝛼

⋅ 1−𝛼), the integrated platform will have little

incentive to choose a low final price 𝑝 to facilitate transactions in the resale market. Anticipating
this, the musician will be more likely to choose a higher face price 𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴 and a smaller venue
size 𝑁 = 𝛼 to target only the avid fans. In this case, the musician’s profit and the consumer surplus
will be lower.
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1.6 Discussion
One key message of this paper is that when the primary platform also controls the resale market,
it is more likely to lower the final price 𝑝 in the primary market to create more transactions in the
resale market, and also to set a lower percentage fee 𝑘 in the resale market to attract more buyers
in the primary market. Moreover, because the integrated platform is more willing to choose a lower
price in the primary market to target low-valuation casual fans, the double-marginalization
problem in the primary-market channel tends to be alleviated (relative to the case of independent
platforms). As a result, the musician is also willing to choose a larger venue size to serve more
consumers, making both the musician and the end consumers better off as a result. A scenario that
might seem similar to the integration of the primary and the resale ticket platform is a merger of
two retailers who sell products from a common upstream manufacturer. However, the market
outcome tends to be quite different. A merger between retailers generally increases the retail price
and reduces the number of consumers served, making the consumers and the upstream
manufacturer worse off. The key difference between these two settings is whether the spillover
effect is positive or negative. Lowering the price or the service fee in the primary market will have
a positive spillover to the resale market, and vice versa. An integrated platform operating in both
markets will internalize the positive cross-market externalities and become more willing to charge
lower prices and service fees in both markets than independent platforms would. Conversely, in a
retail market with multiple retailers, one retailer’s reduction of its retail price will generate a
negative spillover to other competing retailers, i.e., reducing their sales. Hence, after the merger
of retailers, the merged retailer tends to charge higher prices.
This paper focuses on the ticket market for concerts (or other performing arts), but the
qualitative insight can be applied to other markets with similar spillover features, e.g., sports ticket
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markets, used product market, and peer-to-peer product-sharing market. For example, when a book
retailer sells both new and used books, it may have an incentive to lower the retail price for new
books so more people will buy new books and resell them later. Thus, the double-marginalization
problem in the primary-market channel of the publisher and the retailer can be alleviated. However,
we expect the effect of cross-market spillover effect in the physical publishing industry will be
smaller than that in the concert ticket industry. First, reselling physical books usually involves
some transaction costs, e.g., shipping and handling, which can prevent some consumers from
reselling their books. By contrast, the transaction cost for reselling concert tickets is generally
much lower. Resellers usually only need to upload a photo of the ticket to resell it on StubHub or
Ticketmaster. Second, competition among new-book retailers and competition among used-book
marketplaces are much more intense than that in the concert ticket industry. A retailer operating
in both the new-book and the used-book markets is less willing to lower the primary market price
because its new-book buyers may resell the books at other resale marketplaces. With some caution,
our qualitative findings can also be applied to peer-to-peer product-sharing markets. Some car
manufacturers provide their own peer-to-peer car-sharing services. For example, owners of
Mercedes-Benz cars in Germany can rent out their cars to others on Croove, Mercedes-Benz’s own
peer-to-peer sharing platform. The insight of our research will predict that the car manufacturers
with their own peer-to-peer sharing platforms may also have extra incentives to set a lower dealer
price so more consumers will buy cars and rent them out on the manufacturers’ sharing platforms,
increasing the car manufacturer’s profit from the sharing platform. We acknowledge that such
markets have some differences from the concert ticket markets, e.g., cars are not single-use
products and car buyers themselves may use the cars some of the time (with possible depreciation
of value). Nevertheless, our qualitative insight that an integrated platform can be beneficial relative
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to independent platforms may still be useful since there exists some degree of cross-market
spillover in those markets.

1.7 Empirical Study
In this section, we will provide some suggestive support for our theoretical findings with the
data collected from Ticketmaster.com and StubHub.com. At the outset, we want to acknowledge
that our empirical results only suggest correlational association rather than causal relationships.
When musicians contract with Ticketmaster to sell tickets on its platform, they can choose
whether to enroll in Ticketmaster Resale. If they enroll their concerts in Ticketmaster Resale, then
consumers will be able to resell their tickets on Ticketmaster in addition to third-party resale
platforms such as StubHub. If they do not enroll in Ticketmaster Resale, then consumers will not
be able to resell their tickets on Ticketmaster but can still resell on third-party resale platforms.
Many musicians do not enroll in Ticketmaster Resale because they worry that doing so can
encourage scalping and result in higher prices. For example, musician Tom Waits claimed that he
“would not take advantage of Ticketmaster Resale because he does not want to take all of a
person’s disposable income just to go to one show” (Knopper 2014). Some other musicians, such
as Ed Sheeran and Sigur Rós, do not enroll in Ticketmaster Resale and express similar concerns.
It is plausible that many musicians’ decisions on whether to enroll in Ticketmaster Resale are not
always due to their profit-oriented concerns.
Ticketmaster can profit from both the primary market and the resale market for concerts with
Ticketmaster Resale, but can profit only from the primary market for concerts without
Ticketmaster Resale. Based on our theoretical predictions, Ticketmaster will set lower service fees
in the primary market for concerts with Ticketmaster Resale than those without Ticketmaster
Resale. Moreover, Ticketmaster’s resale percentage service fee (for concerts with Ticketmaster
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Resale) will be lower than that on StubHub for the same concert. We propose the following two
hypotheses.
HYPOTHESIS 1. Ticketmaster will set lower service fees on the primary platform for concerts
with Ticketmaster Resale than for concerts without Ticketmaster Resale.
HYPOTHESIS 2. For concerts with Ticketmaster Resale, Ticketmaster will set lower resale
percentage service fees than StubHub’s for the same concerts.
Table 1.4

Summary Statistics

Variable

Mean

Std. dev.

Median

Min

Max

Ticket face price

81.75

63.51

59.00

15.00

345.00

Primary-market service fee

12.26

5.37

10.35

4.85

29.80

Last.fm followers

898731

949743

635605

0

4328799

Songkick.com followers

513086

663277

222592

0

1791395

0.508

0.501

1

0

1

Ticketmaster Resale enrolled*
*

Dummy variable, equaling to 1 if true, 0 otherwise.

We collected data for all pop and rock concerts in Missouri in 2018 that were on sale at
Ticketmaster.com on Dec 20th, 2017. We excluded musicians promoted by Live Nation, which is
the parent company of Ticketmaster. We also excluded concerts with general admission because
the total number of available tickets is not explicitly determined. We obtained data for 62 concerts
that satisfy the conditions above, 34 of which enrolled in Ticketmaster Resale. A concert usually
has multiple ticket price levels. In our dataset, there are 199 price levels in total for all concerts,
and we treat each price level of a concert as an observation in our empirical analysis. For each
observation, we have the data on the ticket’s face price and the primary-market service fee on
Ticketmaster, whether the concert is enrolled in Ticketmaster Resale, and information on the
concert’s promoter and venue. In addition, we use, as a proxy for the musician’s popularity, his or
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her numbers of followers on Last.fm—an online radio website—and on Songkick.com—an online
music community. Table 1.4 presents the summary statistics of some variables.
Figure 1.3 compares the ratios of the ticket’s primary-market service fee to its face price based
on whether concerts are enrolled in Ticketmaster Resale. One can observe that, for concerts with
Ticketmaster Resale, Ticketmaster tends to charge lower service fees as a portion of the ticket face
price in the primary market, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1.

Figure 1.3 Primary-Market Service Fee Divided by Face Price10
We have confirmed the correlation with the following regression:
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + ℎ(𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 ) + 𝑋𝑖 𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖 .
𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if concert 𝑖 enrolled in
Ticketmaster Resale, and 0 if not. ℎ(⋅) is a polynomial of the ticket’s face price. More specifically,
we specify ℎ(⋅) as either a linear function or the polynomial leading to the lowest Bayesian
Information Criterion. 𝑋𝑖 represents control variables such as the musician’s number of followers
on Last.fm or on Songkick.com, and the event-promoter and venue dummies. Hypothesis 1
predicts that 𝛽1 should be negative.
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Table 1.5 Estimation Results
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

OLS

OLS

OLS

Robust Std. Dev.

Intercept

7.21***
(0.4269)

8.48***
(0.7944)

-

-

Ticketmaster Resale
Enrolled?

-0.88*
(0.4967)

-1.77***
(0.5548)

-1.15**
(0.4825)

-1.15**
(0.4611)

Face price

0.06***
(0.0039)

0.06***
(0.0029)

-

-

Higher-order polynomial
of face price

No

No

Yes

Yes

Last.fm follower

-

Songkick.com follower

-

-1.6×10-7
(3.4×10-7)
7.0×10-7
(8.8×10-7)

-1.6×10-7
(2.8×10-7)
7.2×10-7
(7.5×10-7)

-1.6×10-7
(3.2×10-7)
7.2×10-7
(8.3×10-7)

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

199

199

199

199

0.963

0.963

Variables

Promoter and venue fixed
effect
Number of Obs.
𝑅

2

0.606
∗

Standard deviation in parenthesis. 𝑝 < 0.1,

0.946
∗∗

𝑝 < 0.05,

∗∗∗

𝑝 < 0.01.

Table 1.5 summarizes the estimation results. The results suggest that a concert’s enrollment in
Ticketmaster Resale is negatively correlated to its primary-market service fee charged by
Ticketmaster. Enrollment in Ticketmaster Resale is associated with a $1.15 lower ticket service
fee on the primary platform, which translates to 11.1% of the median primary-market service fee
on Ticketmaster. The finding is consistent with Hypothesis 1 that Ticketmaster will set a lower
service fee for concerts that are enrolled in Ticketmaster Resale.
We also collected the resale percentage fees on Ticketmaster and on StubHub for all concerts
with Ticketmaster Resale between April 27th, 2018 and Dec 31st, 2018. 11 There are 16 such
concerts. Figure 1.4 compares their resale percentage fees on Ticketmaster and on StubHub. For
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all these concerts, Ticketmaster charges lower percentage fees than StubHub does. A paired t-test
also confirms that Ticketmaster’s resale percentage fee is lower than StubHub’s:
mean(𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟) = 0.180 , mean(𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑏𝐻𝑢𝑏) = 0.219 , 𝑡 = 16.19 , 𝑝 < 0.001 . This is
consistent with Hypothesis 2—for concerts with Ticketmaster Resale, Ticketmaster will charge a
lower resale percentage fee than StubHub will.

Percentage Resale Fee (%)

25
20

15
Ticketmaster

10

StubHub
5
0
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Concert ID

Figure 1.4 Resale Percentage Fee: Ticketmaster vs. StubHub

1.8 Conclusion
The main message of this paper is that musicians and consumers can benefit from the primary
ticket platform’s control of the resale market. This is due to the cross-market spillover effect
between the primary market and the resale market: lowering the price or the service fee on one
platform will lead to more transactions on the other platform. The integrated platform will tend to
internalize the positive spillover effect by lowering the price and the service fee in both markets,
which can alleviate the double-marginalization problem in the primary market channel so the
musician is more willing to choose a larger venue size to serve more consumers. Consequently,
the price in the primary market and the service fee in the resale markets are lower, more consumers
will be served, and the musician, and consumers can be better off at the same time. We also find
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that lower service fees in the resale market may surprisingly reduce the consumer surplus, because
more tickets will be misallocated to consumers who are less likely to attend the concert. Moreover,
the presence of a small group of scalpers can lead to lower ticket prices, higher musician’s profit,
and higher consumer surplus. Using data from Ticketmaster and StubHub, we provide some
empirical support for some of our theoretical predictions.
The result has important implications for legislation on restricting a primary ticket platform’s
ability to block competitors in the resale market, e.g., the Tickets Resale Rights Act banning
Ticketmaster’s Paperless Ticket system. Such legislation usually reasons that when the primary
platform has more control of the resale market, it will have a stronger pricing power in the primary
and the resale markets, thus will charge higher prices and service fees, making consumers and
musicians worse off. In this paper, we argue that such reasoning may be flawed because it neglects
the spillover effect between the primary and the resale markets and how the doublemarginalization problem in the primary market can be alleviated with the integration of the primary
and the resale platforms. Our policy suggestion is that legislation should be careful in restricting
the primary platform’s practices in controlling the resale market or the collusion between primary
and resale platforms.
This paper is also related to anti-scalping laws. It has been long debated whether allowing
scalping could benefit the ticket sellers and consumers or not. This paper provides another reason
why scalpers could potentially be beneficial, i.e., they may incentivize the primary platform to set
a lower final price if it also has a presence in the resale market. The double-marginalization
problem in the primary market can be alleviated as a result, making the musician, the integrated
platform, and the consumers better off.
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This paper establishes an analytical framework to analyze the interaction among the musician,
the primary platform, and the resale platform in the concert ticket market. The framework provides
a foundation for future research on related topics. For example, although dynamic pricing is
currently uncommon in concert ticket industry, it is used by several sports teams in National
Football League and Major League Baseball. One can investigate how the primary ticket
platform’s optimal dynamic pricing decision would change when the platform also controls the
resale market. We conjecture that an integrated platform has an incentive to increase its primarymarket price over time, which can attract consumers who are uncertain of whether they can attend
the concert to buy tickets early, leading to more transactions in the resale market. Our paper also
provides some correlational empirical support for our theoretical prediction of the pricing patterns.
Future empirical research could validate our predictions with more generalized methods and can
further explore how the welfare of the musician and consumers will be affected.
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Endnotes:
1

https://www.statista.com/outlook/264/109/event-tickets/united-states#market-users

2

For ease of exposition, we will refer to a platform as “it,” the musician as “he,” and the consumer

as “she.”
3

In practice, the prices of most tickets for most concerts are fixed over time. To be consistent, we

also assume in our model that the ticket price is constant over time.
4

Note that in the second period, all avid fans and half of casual fans, whose population adds up to

1+𝛼
2

, will have strictly positive valuations of attending the concert. Since

1+𝛼
2

2𝛼

> 1+𝛼, the venue will

not be able to hold all these consumers.
5

http://y101fm.com/features/lifestyle/entertainment/5603-check-it-out-top-quickest-selling-

concert-tickets-ever?limitstart=0
6

̅<
The interval is non-empty if and only if 𝑁

2(𝑉𝐴 −𝑉𝐶 )−𝑘𝑉𝐴
𝑉 −𝑉
(1−√ 𝐴 𝐶 )𝑘𝑉𝐴

.

𝑉𝐴 −𝑐

7

Our results are qualitatively the same if scalpers and regular consumers have equal probability

of getting tickets.
8

We use “ ̂” over a variable indicates a consumer’s rational prediction of a variable that has not

realized yet.
9

Note that in this example, without loss of generality, we use the total market size of 1,000 rather

than 1 to keep the figures integers.
10

In the box plot, the minimum (maximum) of a group is represented by the end point of the lower

(upper) whisker. The 25th-percentile (75th-percentile) is represented by the lower (upper) edge of
the box. The median is represented by the bold line in the center of a box.
11

We collected these data on April 26th, 2018, so we were unable to find the resale service fee on

StubHub.com before this date.
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Chapter 2 Consumer Search on Online Retail Platforms
2.1 Introduction
Online retailing is growing rapidly. In the United States, online retail sales as a percent of
total retail sales have more than tripled from 2.7% in 2006 to 9.5% in 2018, and the estimated sales
on online retail platforms (e.g., Amazon.com, eBay.com, and Taobao.com) reached $124 billion
in Q1 2018.1 In a survey covering 19 countries and territories, more than 95% of some 19,000
respondents have online shopping experience, and more than half of them shop online at least once
a month (PwC 2015). Consumers often buy products from independent sellers on retail platforms.
Take Amazon.com, which accounts for 43% of United States online retail sales.2 In 2015, over
two million independent sellers sold products on Amazon.com worldwide, contributing to 83% of
revenue of Amazon.com. 3 A platform’s profit typically comes from the referral fees, a.k.a.
commissions paid by independent sellers, most commonly a percentage of the product prices. In
Q1 2017, Amazon.com received $8 billion from referral fees collected from independent sellers.
Consumers search for products that match their preferences better or have lower prices.
Consumers’ search cost for product information on online retail platforms has significantly
dropped in recent years. One driving force is technology advancements. Wider adoptions of highspeed Internet have significantly reduced the amount of time of loading webpages. The increasing
popularity of smartphones and tablet computers has also lowered consumers’ perceived search
cost. In addition, many retail platforms also invest in reducing the search cost of their customers.
Amazon has been continually improving its webpage design, thereby enabling its independent
sellers to demonstrate their products with multimedia content formats (e.g., info-graphics, audios,
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and videos). For example, Amazon permitted some qualified independent sellers to upload “video
shorts” to their product pages in 2014, and opened up this function to all independent sellers in
2017.4 In 2009, Amazon debuted the camera search function in its mobile app, enabling consumers
to shoot a photo of an item to search for similar products on Amazon.com. In 2017, Amazon
partnered with Samsung to incorporate camera search in the camera app of Samsung’s
smartphones.5 Amazon has also been developing its augmented-reality view technology, which
allows consumers to see, for example, how a watch on Amazon.com would look like around their
wrists before buying it.6 Retail platforms invest billions of dollars in reducing consumers’ search
cost. For instance, in Q1 2016, Amazon spent over $1.2 billion on augmented reality and virtual
reality, and a considerable fraction of this investment intended to improve consumers’ search
experience.7
Empirical academic research also suggests that consumers’ online search cost has decreased
over time. Many studies have estimated consumers’ online search cost for hotels, books, tablets,
computer parts, etc. (Bajari et al. 2003, Blake et al. 2016, Chen and Yao 2016, De los Santos 2008,
De los Santos et al. 2017, Ghose et al. 2013, Hong and Shum 2006, Jiang et al. 2017, Jolivet and
Turon 2017, Koulayev 2014, Moraga-Gonzaíez and Wildenbeest 2008, Moraga-González et al.
2013, Santos et al. 2012). Most of these studies indicate that consumers’ online search cost per
item is between 1 and 10 US dollars. Figure 2.1 plots their estimated search costs8 against the years
of their datasets used for estimation. The estimated search costs tend to decrease over time,
although they are for different product categories on different platforms and are obtained with
different methods.

51

log(estimated search cost) vs. Year of Dataset
Estimated search cost (USD)

4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Year of Dataset

Figure 2.1 Estimated Search Cost vs Dataset Time
It is not obvious why retail platforms would spend billions of dollars on reducing consumers’
search cost. Although doing so can attract more consumers, it will intensify the competition among
sellers and hence reduce the platform’s revenue from its referral fees. Extant literature provides
little explanation on why and when a platform should invest in lowering consumers’ search cost.
Extant literature also provides little insight on how the consumer’s search cost will influence
the platform’s optimal referral-fee decisions. Most studies either assume the sellers sell directly to
consumers—completely ignoring the retail platform—or treat the platform’s referral fee as an
exogenous variable. Because the referral fee is a major contributor to a retail platform’s profit, it
is practically important for a platform to understand how to optimally adjust its referral fee when
the consumer’s search cost changes.
Besides reducing the consumer’s search cost for product information, online retail platforms
also utilize other instruments to make consumer search easier. For example, many platforms allow
consumers to filter the search results based on certain product attributes, e.g., shoe size and color
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when searching for shoes. However, consumers still need to search the information for other
attributes that are harder to filter, e.g., shoe design and style. To our knowledge, the extant
literature either ignores the filtering function or treats its effect on consumer search simply as a
reduction in the consumer’s search cost, except that Zhong (2017) considers a related setting of
targeted search (We will discuss the difference between our paper and Zhong (2017) in the next
section.). No research has studied how filtering affects the platform, independent sellers, and
consumers and how its effect is different from that of a reduction in the search cost.
In summary, several important questions have not been well studied by the previous research:


Why have many retail platforms been heavily investing in reducing the consumer’s search
cost, even though the lowered search cost may intensify sellers’ competition and hurt
platforms’ profit?



How will the consumer’s search cost affect optimal pricing decisions of the sellers and the
platform? How will their profits be influenced?



How will filtering affect the platform, the sellers, and consumers? How is its impact different
from that of a reduction of the consumer’s search cost?
We develop a game-theoretic framework to address these research questions. In our model,

many independent sellers sell horizontally differentiated products on a retail platform where
consumers sequentially search for these products. Similar to Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and
Renault (1997), consumers initially do not know product prices or match levels—how well a
product matches their preferences—and can learn a product’s price and match level after incurring
a search cost. The retail platform sets a percentage referral fee (also known as “commission” or
“final value fee” in practice) that is charged to sellers. The sellers then simultaneously set their
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retail prices. We also model the filtering function on the platform. A product’s (aggregate) match
level consists of two parts: the filterable match level and the unfilterable match level. Filtering
allows consumers to costless learn a product’s filterable match level, but they still need to search
for its unfilterable match level. In the analysis, we derive the equilibria in two scenarios. The first
scenario constitutes our benchmark, where the platform’s referral fee is exogenous, i.e., the
platform does not adjust its fee when the consumer’s search cost changes. This setting is more
reasonable in the short term when the platform has not adjusted its referral fee after the search cost
changes. In the second scenario, the referral fee is endogenously decided by the platform, i.e., the
platform optimally chooses its referral fee as the consumer’s search cost changes. This setting is
more reasonable in the long term when the platform can adjust its referral fee responding to the
change in search cost. By comparing the equilibrium outcomes in these two scenarios, we can
determine how the effects of a search-cost decrease differ in the short term versus in the long term.
We highlight several interesting findings. First, contrary to the conventional wisdom that a
lower search cost will reduce sellers’ profits because it intensifies competition among them, we
show that a decrease in the search cost can actually increase the sellers’ profits, although the sellers
receive less profit per unit sale. This is because a decrease in the search cost can attract more
consumers to the platform (rather than choosing the outside option) and hence expand the market
demand.
Second, we find that the retail platform can always benefit from a decrease in the consumer’s
search cost when it optimally sets the referral fee, although its profit may decrease when the
referral fee is exogenous. When the referral fee is exogenous, a lower search cost will attract more
consumers to the platform, but also intensify price competition between sellers and reduce the
platform’s referral fee revenue per unit sale. Therefore, the platform’s profit can either increase or
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decrease in equilibrium. By contrast, by optimally adjusting the referral fee, the platform can
expand its demand without heavily hurting its profit margin, so its profit always increases when
the search cost declines. Our finding potentially explains why many retail platforms invest large
amounts of money to reduce the consumer’s search cost in reality.
Third, we investigate how the platform should adjust its referral fee as the consumer’s search
cost changes. One may expect that because a lower search cost tends to intensify sellers’
competition and reduce the platform’s profit margin, the platform should compensate it by raising
its referral fee. Interestingly, we find that in equilibrium the platform may choose to lower its
referral fee if the reduction in search cost significantly increases the demand elasticity of the
referral fee. In this case, a lower the search cost makes the platform, the sellers, and the consumers
all better off. By contrast, when a search-cost reduction does not significantly increase the demand
elasticity, the platform will find it optimal to increase its referral fee. In this case, the decrease in
the search cost can counterintuitively lead to higher retail prices. This result provides a possible
explanation to the empirical puzzle that the prices in very competitive markets can be maintained
much higher than marginal costs even when the search cost is sufficiently low (Clemons et al.
2002, Hortaçsu and Syverson 2004).
Fourth, we show that filtering has two opposite effects on how well the product bought by
consumers matches their preferences in equilibrium. On the positive side, consumers can narrow
their search set down to the products with better match on filterable attributes. On the negative
side, because filtering has revealed the filterable match levels to consumers, conducting a search
will uncover less information in expectation and bring less benefit to consumers. The negative
effect makes consumers search fewer products and offsets the partially benefit of filtering in
expectation. We also study how filtering will change the sellers’ pricing strategies. We find that
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filtering will reshape the demand function for a product. Intuitively speaking, if the market demand
tends to have a relatively longer (shorter) tail after filtering becomes available, the competition
between sellers will be alleviated (intensified) and the equilibrium retail price is likely to increase
(decrease). In other words, filtering can either strengthen or soften the competition between sellers.
These results suggest that filtering can have very different marketing consequences compared to a
search-cost reduction, which will encourage consumers to search more and always intensify the
competition between sellers.
Lastly, we show that our results are robust when consumers have heterogeneous search costs,
when products have heterogeneous quality levels, and when the platform charges a fixed (instead
of percentage) referral fee. We also provide guidance on how the sellers should optimally choose
their prices when consumers have heterogeneous search costs, and investigate how the distribution
of the consumer’s outside options will affect the profits of the platform and sellers, as well as the
platform’s incentive to invest in reducing the consumer’s search cost.

2.2 Literature Review
Our research is closely related to the literature on consumer search. Extensive literature has
studied how the decrease in the consumer’s search cost can influence product prices, firm profits,
and consumer welfare. Many theoretical studies show that prices will drop to the marginal cost
when the consumer’s search cost diminishes to zero (Anderson and Renault 1999, Salop and
Stiglitz 1977, Stahl 1989, Stigler 1961, Wolinsky 1986). Their predictions are supported by several
empirical studies showing that the Internet has intensified price competition and reduced prices in
markets for insurance (Brown and Goolsbee 2002), books and CDs (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000),
and prescription drugs (Sorensen 2000). To frustrate consumer search, some sellers engage in
obfuscation (Ellison and Ellison 2009) to blur the product’s price information. By contrast, there
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is evidence showing that many firms can still sell at prices considerably higher than marginal costs
even in very competitive markets with low search costs (Clemons et al. 2002, Hortaçsu and
Syverson 2004). Some of more recent analytical research finds that a decrease in search cost may
not always lead to more intense market competition or lower profits. Kuksov (2004) suggests that
a search-cost reduction may facilitate product differentiation and lead to higher prices and industry
profit. Cachon et al. (2008) show that when consumers’ search cost decreases, sellers may expand
their product assortments, which can increase consumers’ willingness-to-pay for their mostdesired products, leading to higher equilibrium price and profit. Some research on consumer search
studies different features in search markets. Armstrong et al. (2009) study the implication of
“prominence” in a search market. A prominent seller will be searched first by all consumers in the
search process. They show that the highest-quality sellers will have the highest incentive to become
prominent. Recent research (Branco et al. 2012, 2016, Ke et al. 2016) has also considered
consumers’ decision on how much information to acquire for a single product or for a multi-period
scenario.
An important research question of this paper is that how changes in search cost on the platform
will affect the retail platform’s optimal referral fee and market competition. By contrast, most of
these studies assume that firms sell directly to consumers. An exception is Janssen and Shelegia
(2015), who study consumer search in a distributional channel. In their model, a single
manufacturer sells its product to two symmetric competing retailers at the same wholesale price,
and consumers have perfect knowledge of product quality but need to search to find out the
retailers’ prices. They show that consumers’ lack of knowledge about the manufacturer’s
wholesale price will make both the consumer and the manufacturer worse off. Our article is
different from Janssen and Shelegia (2015). First, we consider a very different market setting. In
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their model, the manufacturer sells its homogeneous product to two symmetric retailers on the
same wholesale-price contract, whereas in our model many sellers sell their respective
differentiated products on the retail platform which charges the sellers a percentage fee for access
to customers. Second, in our framework, consumers know neither the product’s match level nor
its price before searching, whereas in Janssen and Shelegia (2015) only price is not known ex ante
(because both retailers sell the same product of known valuation).
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two analytical studies about how consumer search
on retail platforms. Dukes and Liu (2016) examine how a platform should choose the optimal
search cost level when the consumer optimally decides how many sellers to search and how deeply
to evaluate each of them. However, they do not consider the platform’s optimal referral-fee
decision. By contrast, one of our main research questions is how the change in search cost will
affect the platform’s optimal referral fee. In addition, in our framework, consumers conduct
sequential search for products, rather than simultaneous search in Dukes and Liu (2016). Zhong
(2017) considers the setting where the platform knows partially about how products match each
consumer’s preference and adopts targeted search technology to show a consumer only products
whose match levels are above a certain threshold. Zhong (2017) shows that an increase in the
threshold is equivalent to a decrease in the search cost when the threshold is not too high, which
will intensify price competition and decrease the price. By contrast, if targeted search is very
precise, consumers will have no need to search in equilibrium, making sellers essential
monopolists and leading to higher equilibrium prices and lower demand. Therefore, the platform
wants to limit the precision of its targeted search, even if increasing the precision incurs no direct
cost. Our paper proposes that filtering can be a very different mechanism than targeted search in
Zhong (2017). Filtering will reduce the products’ match-level uncertainty so consumers will enjoy
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less benefit per search. Conversely, targeted search technology will exclude less-relevant products
from the search set so consumers will enjoy more benefit per search. Filtering and targeted search
can also affect the equilibrium prices differently. Targeted search will be equivalent to a reduction
in search cost and intensify competition between sellers for most of cases and will alleviate
competition only in the extreme case where all consumers search only one product in equilibrium.
In contrast, filtering is different from a reduction in search cost and can alleviate competition
between sellers in more general situations where some consumers search multiple products in
equilibrium. We also analyze research questions not considered by Zhong (2017), such as the
effects of the consumer’s search cost and the platform’s optimal referral fee decision.
Our research also contributes to the general literature on online retail platforms. Research on
retail platforms mainly focuses on two-sided markets (Armstrong 2006, Hagiu 2006, Rochet and
Tirole 2003, 2005). Our research contributes to this literature by explicitly studying how the
consumer’s search cost will influence the platform’s pricing decision and profitability. We show
that as the consumer’s search cost decreases, the platform’s profit always increases if the platform
optimally adjusts its fee. Whether the platform should raise or reduce its fee depends on how the
change in search cost affects demand elasticity.

2.3 Model Setup
There are 𝑛 independent sellers selling differentiated products on an online retail platform,
which charges a percentage referral fee (𝑟) for these sellers. We focus on the case when 𝑛 is large,
so the probability that consumers run out of sellers to search is negligible. Consumer 𝑗’s utility of
buying seller 𝑖 ’s product is 𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 𝑀𝑖𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖 , where 𝑀𝑖𝑗 is the “match level” of product 𝑖 to
consumer 𝑗, measuring how well product 𝑖 matches consumer 𝑗’s preference, and 𝑝𝑖 is the price of
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product 𝑖. There are no systematic differences among sellers ex ante. All sellers have the same
marginal production cost 𝑐. Consumer 𝑗 also has an outside option with utility 𝑢0𝑗 , distributed with
the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) 𝐹0 (𝑢) and the probability distribution function (p.d.f.)
𝑓0 (𝑢). Without loss of generality, we normalize the total number of consumers to 1.
Filtering
Many retail platforms allow their customers to filter products based on certain product
attributes. For example, if a consumer wants to buy a pair of Nike Lunarglide 8 running shoes,
Amazon allows her to filter the search outcomes based on attributes such as shoe size, width, and
color (See Figure 2.2 for an example.). Filtering enables consumers to find products that match
their preferences better on these attributes. We define these attributes as a product’s filterable
attributes. In practice, however, filtering usually cannot exhaust all product attributes. There are
some unfilterable attributes, e.g., shoe design and style, which consumers can learn only through
searching.

Figure 2.2 Screenshot of Search Results of “Nike Lunarglide 8” on Amazon.com
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We decompose a consumer’s match level, 𝑀𝑖𝑗 , into two parts: 𝑀𝑖𝑗 = 𝜇𝑖𝑗 + 𝑚𝑖𝑗 . The filterable
match level, 𝜇𝑖𝑗 , captures how well the filterable attributes match a consumer’s preference. The
unfilterable match level, 𝑚𝑖𝑗 , reflects how well the unfilterable attributes match the consumer’s
preference. The filtering function on the platform enables consumers to costless learn the filterable
match level, 𝜇𝑖𝑗 , before searching a product. However, consumers still need to search for a
product’s unfilterable match level, 𝑚𝑖𝑗 . 𝜇𝑖𝑗 and 𝑚𝑖𝑗 are independently and identically distributed
across products and consumers. To avoid confusion, we refer to 𝑀𝑖𝑗 as the product’s aggregate
match level henceforth.
In practice, the filters on the platform usually classify each filterable attribute into a finite
number of categories. For example, Amazon classifies the color of men’s running shoes into 12
categories. In our model, 𝜇𝑖𝑗 follows a discrete distribution with 𝐾(≥ 2) possible outcomes. 𝜇𝑖𝑗 is
equal to the 𝑘-th-lowest-possible filterable match level, 𝜇𝑘 , with probability 𝜙𝑘 , where 𝜇1 < 𝜇2 <
⋯ < 𝜇𝐾 and ∑𝐾
𝑘=1 𝜙𝑘 = 1. The c.d.f. and p.d.f. of 𝑚𝑖𝑗 are 𝐹(𝑚) and 𝑓(𝑚), respectively. Without
loss of generality, we assume 𝐄[𝜇𝑖𝑗 ] = 0, 9 which implies that 𝜇1 < 0 and 𝜇𝐾 > 0.
We make several technical assumptions on the distributions of 𝑚𝑖𝑗 and 𝑢0𝑗 . First, 𝑓(𝑚) and
𝑓0 (𝑢) have supports (𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) and (𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥 ), where −∞ ≤ 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≤ +∞ and
−∞ ≤ 𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≤ +∞ , are twice continuously differentiable and strictly positive. Second,
to guarantee existence of a unique pure-strategy equilibrium, 𝐹(𝑚) is assumed to have a
decreasing inverse hazard rate ℎ(𝑚) =

1−𝐹(𝑚)
𝑓(𝑚)

. Many commonly used distributions, e.g., normal

distributions, uniform distributions, exponential distributions, and logistic distributions, satisfy
these properties above. Third, we assume 𝜏 < 𝐄[𝑚] − max{𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑛 } to exclude the trivial
case in which no consumers will search after the first search.
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Consumer search
Each consumer buys at most one product, and will either purchase from a seller on the
platform or choose the outside option (not buying from any seller). A consumer a priori does not
know a product’s unfilterable match level, 𝑚𝑖𝑗 , nor its price, 𝑝𝑖 . We assume that consumers do not
know 𝑝𝑖 ex ante (even after filtering) because in practice many online sellers do not immediately
show their final transaction price until after a consumer visits their product pages or until the
product is put in the shopping cart. For example, Ellison and Ellison (2009) document that many
online sellers of computer parts on retail platforms post low prices to attract consumers to visit
their product pages and postpone showing consumers the shipping-and-handling cost, taxes or addon fees. The final transaction price can be much higher than the posted price that consumers see
in the beginning. Moreover, a seller may set different prices for different variants of a product
(e.g., the same design of shoes with different colors), and sometimes the platform will put all these
variants together within the same webpage and only show their price range or the minimum price.
Consumers can find the exact price of a specific product variant only after further searching.
Moreover, filtering and sorting by product prices are often ineffective in practice. For example, if
one sorts the search results of “Nike Lunarglide 8” by prices from low to high (see Figure 2.3),
many irrelevant results appear at the top of the page. 20 out of the top 24 results are either nonNike-Lunarglide-8 running shoes, or irrelevant products such as running socks and T-shirts.
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Figure 2.3 Screenshot of Search Results of “Nike Lunarglide 8” on Amazon.com,
Sorted by Option “Price: Low to High”
Each consumer 𝑗 a priori knows her utility of her own outside option 𝑢0𝑗 and the filterable
match level of every product, 𝜇𝑖𝑗 . To find out 𝑝𝑖 and the exact value of 𝑚𝑖𝑗 for a product, the
consumer needs to incur a search cost 𝜏. The search cost may include the consumer’s time and
effort in reading product introduction, understanding the information, and evaluating the product,
etc. A consumer can decide whether to shop on the platform. If she does, she search the sellers
sequentially. Specifically, after each search, the consumer learns the exact value of 𝑚𝑖𝑗 and 𝑝𝑖 for
the searched product 𝑖, then she can decide whether to buy it. If the consumer buys a product, she
will stop searching and exit the market, otherwise she can continue searching another seller or
leave the market without buying anything. If the consumer continues searching, one can show that
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she will next search the seller with the highest 𝜇𝑖𝑗 not yet searched. If there are multiple unsearched
sellers with the highest 𝜇𝑖𝑗 , she will be equally likely to choose one from them to search.
Sellers, retail platform and time sequence
The timing of the game is as follows: First, the retail platform sets a percentage referral fee
𝑟 ∈ (0,1) for all sellers. We assume that the platform’s marginal cost is zero. Then, given 𝑟, all
sellers simultaneously decide their retail prices. For each unit of product 𝑖 sold at retail price 𝑝𝑖 ,
the retail platform earns 𝑟𝑝𝑖 and seller 𝑖’s profit is (1 − 𝑟)𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐. Last, consumers make search
and purchase decisions.
Using backward induction, we determine the symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium:
given the platform’s referral fee 𝑟, in equilibrium all sellers will charge the same retail price, 𝑝∗ .
Let 𝑝∗ (𝑟) denote the seller’s equilibrium retail price given the referral fee 𝑟, and let 𝑟 ∗ denote the
platform’s optimal percentage referral fee. Consumers have rational expectations about sellers’
prices, i.e., prior to a search they expect that the next seller’s retail price will be 𝑝∗ (𝑟).

2.4 Equilibrium Analysis
We start by analyzing the consumer’s searching and purchasing strategies. Suppose that the
platform’s referral fee is 𝑟 and the equilibrium retail price is 𝑝∗ (𝑟). Let product 𝑖 be the last
product that consumer j has just searched and her utility of buying it is 𝑢𝑖𝑗 . Because the number of
sellers (𝑛) is large, consumers will only search sellers with the highest possible filterable match
level, 𝜇𝐾 . It follows from Wolinsky (1986) that consumer 𝑗’s optimal sequential-search strategy is
to stop searching and purchase the last searched product 𝑖 if and only if conducting another search
will increase her expected utility beyond 𝑢𝑖𝑗 by an amount lower than the search cost 𝜏; otherwise
she will continue searching. We have the following two results.
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RESULT 1. In a symmetric equilibrium where all sellers charge prices 𝑝∗ (𝑟), if consumer 𝑗
faces product 𝑖 with 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝∗ (𝑟) and 𝑚𝑖𝑗 , she will purchase product 𝑖 if and only if 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑚
̅ (𝜏),
𝑚

𝑚𝑎𝑥
where 𝑚
̅ (𝜏) is defined by ∫𝑚̅(𝜏)
(𝑚 − 𝑚
̅ (𝜏))𝑑𝐹(𝑚) = 𝜏.

RESULT 2. 𝑚
̅ strictly decreases in the consumer’s search cost 𝜏.
Result 1 suggests that 𝑚
̅ (𝜏) is essentially the equilibrium acceptance threshold of the
unfilterable match level. Note that the threshold is uniquely determined by the search cost, 𝜏. In
the rest of the article, we use 𝑚
̅ to represent 𝑚
̅ (𝜏) for conciseness. Result 2 shows that when the
search cost (𝜏) declines, searching another product becomes less costly to consumers. Therefore,
they will have a higher purchase threshold 𝑚
̅.
It follows Wolinsky (1986) that seller 𝑖’s profit as a function of its price 𝑝𝑖 is:
𝜙𝐾 𝐹0 (𝑚
̅ + 𝜇𝐾 − 𝑝∗ (𝑟))
[1 − 𝐹(𝑚
[(1 − 𝑟)𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐]
⋅ ⏟
̅ − 𝑝∗ (𝑟) + 𝑝𝑖 )] ⋅ ⏟
̅ ))
⏟ 𝜙𝐾 𝑛 ⋅ (1 − 𝐹(𝑚

𝜋𝑖𝑆 =

Prob(a consumer visit seller 𝑖)

Prob(Consumer buys from seller 𝑖)

Profit per sale

(1)

where the superscript 𝑆 represents the seller.
The platform’s total demand, the number of consumers buying on the platform, is 𝐷 =
𝐹0 (𝑚
̅ + 𝜇𝐾 − 𝑝∗ (𝑟)) . The expected consumer surplus is 𝐶𝑆(𝜏, 𝑟) = 𝐄𝑢0 [max{𝑢0 , 𝑚
̅ + 𝜇𝐾 −
𝑝∗ (𝑟)}].
2.4.1 Exogenous Referral Fee
We first analyze the benchmark case when the referral fee 𝑟 is exogenous, that is, the
platform’s referral fee does not change with the search cost. In practice, platforms do not adjust
the referral fee levels frequently. One reason is that platforms usually need to make announcements
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months before the fee change becomes effective. For example, on November 9th, 2016, Amazon
announced that it would increase the referral fee for media products starting March 1st, 2017.10
Similarly, on February 26th, 2017, eBay announced an increase in its fee for certain products to be
effective after May 1st, 2017. Another reason is that frequently changing the referral fee will
increase sellers’ risk selling on the platform and lead to confusion, distrust, and frustration among
them. Therefore, it is more reasonable to assume an exogenous referral fee in the short term.
Sellers’ optimal decisions
We use “̃” over variables to indicate the exogenous-referral-fee case.
LEMMA 1. Given the platform’s referral fee 𝑟, the sellers’ equilibrium retail price is 𝑝̃∗ =
𝑐
1−𝑟

+ ℎ(𝑚
̅ ) , a seller’s per-unit-sale profit and total profit are (1 − 𝑟)ℎ(𝑚
̅ ) and 𝜋̃𝑖𝑆∗ =

̅ +𝜇𝐾 −
𝐹0 (𝑚

𝑐
̅ ))
−ℎ(𝑚
1−𝑟

𝑛

̃∗ =
(1 − 𝑟)ℎ(𝑚
̅ ) , respectively. The total demand on the platform is 𝐷

𝑐

𝐹0 (𝑚
̅ + 𝜇𝐾 − 1−𝑟 − ℎ(𝑚
̅ )).
Lemma 1 summarizes the equilibrium retail price, the sellers’ profit, and the total demand
given the percentage referral fee 𝑟. When 𝑟 increases, the platform charges a higher mark-up for a
unit sale, so the retail price will increase in equilibrium. Thus, the total market demand on the
platform and the sellers’ profit will both decrease. Note that a seller’s per-unit-sale profit is
proportional to ℎ(𝑚
̅ ). Intuitively, a higher ℎ(𝑚
̅ ) corresponds to more intense competition among
the sellers. If a consumer is searching a seller charging the equilibrium price, 𝑝̃∗ , she will buy the
product if and only if 𝑚𝑖𝑗 > 𝑚
̅. If this seller increases its price by a small amount to 𝑝̃∗ + Δ𝑝, then
the consumer will buy the product if and only if 𝑚𝑖𝑗 > 𝑚
̅ + Δ𝑝. Thus, the small increase in price
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̅ )Δ𝑝
𝑓(𝑚

Δ𝑝

will reduce the seller’s unit sales approximately by a fraction of 1−𝐹(𝑚̅) = ℎ(𝑚̅). When ℎ(𝑚
̅ ) is
high, a seller will have stronger incentives to increase its price because doing so will only reduce
sales slightly.
LEMMA 2. When the consumer’s search cost decreases, given that a consumer searches on
the platform, the expected number of products that she will search before purchase will increase,
and the expected aggregate match level of the product that she will purchase will also increase.
When searching for another product becomes less costly, a consumer will stop searching at a
higher match-level threshold, 𝑚
̅ ,. Hence, she will search more products and purchase a product
with higher 𝑀𝑖𝑗 in expectation.
Proposition 1 summarizes how the equilibrium retail price, the market demand, and a seller’s
profit will change as the search cost (𝜏) decreases.
PROPOSITION 1. When the referral fee (𝑟) is exogenous, as the consumer’s search cost (𝜏)
𝜕𝑝̃∗

decreases, (1) the equilibrium price 𝑝̃∗ decreases ( 𝜕𝜏 > 0), (2) the equilibrium total market
̃
𝜕𝐷

demand strictly increases ( 𝜕𝜏 < 0) , (3) each seller’s expected profit 𝜋̃𝑖𝑆∗ and the platform’s
expected profit 𝜋̃ 𝑃∗ may either increase or decrease.
One might intuit that a lower search cost will intensify the competition between sellers and
reduce their prices and profits. We find that when the search cost decreases, although sellers’
equilibrium prices decrease, they may receive higher profits. This is due to a market expansion
effect: a decrease in the search cost will make consumers more likely to choose to shop on the
platform rather than choosing the outside option, so a seller’s market demand will increase. The
platform’s profit may either increase or decrease in equilibrium.
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Example 1. To explore in detail how the consumer’s search cost affects the sellers and the
platform, we consider a special example where 𝜇𝐾 = 0.5, 𝑚𝑖𝑗 follows the uniform distribution
between -0.5 and 0.5, and the utility of the outside option 𝑢0𝑗 is uniformly distributed between 0
and 1. The inverse hazard function of 𝑚𝑖𝑗 is ℎ(𝑚) = 0.5 − 𝑚. We consider the case with the
consumer’s search cost 𝜏 <

(1−

𝑐 2
)
1−𝑟

8

, otherwise all consumers will search at most one product in

equilibrium. One can easily show that 𝑚
̅ = 0.5 − √2𝜏 and the equilibrium retail price is 𝑝̃∗ =
𝑐
1−𝑟

+ √2𝜏.

A seller’s expected profit increases with 𝜏 when 𝜏 <
(1−

𝑐 2
)
1−𝑟

32

≤𝜏<

with 𝜏 when

(1−

𝑐 2
)
1−𝑟

8

(1−

3𝑐 2
)
1−𝑟

32

(1−

𝑐 2
)
1−𝑟

32

and decreases with 𝜏 when

. The platform’s profit increases with 𝜏 when 𝜏 <

≤𝜏<

(1−

𝑐 2
)
1−𝑟

8

(1−

3𝑐 2
)
1−𝑟

32

, and decreases

. Therefore, in the case where the referral fee 𝑟 is exogenous,

both the firm’s profit and the sellers’ profit first increase and then decrease with 𝜏 (See Figure 2.4).

Figure 2.4 Seller’s and Platform’s Profits
Note. This figure is plotted using 𝑐 = 0.05, and 𝑟 = 0.2. The curves are rescaled to be fit in the
same figure.
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2.4.2 Endogenous Referral Fee
In this subsection, we study the case where the retail platform endogenously chooses its
referral fee to maximize its expected profit. In the long term, the platform can strategically adjust
its referral fee when the search cost changes, so it is more reasonable consider the case of
endogenous referral fee. Denote 𝑟 ∗ (𝜏) the platform’s optimal percentage fee and 𝜋 𝑃∗ =
𝜋 𝑃 (𝑟 ∗ (𝜏)) the platform’s optimal profit when the consumer’s search cost is 𝜏.
PROPOSITION 2. When the platform endogenously sets the referral fee 𝑟, a decrease in the
search cost will strictly increase the platform’s expected profit, i.e.,

𝑑𝜋 𝑃∗
𝑑𝜏

< 0.

A lower search cost may have either positive or negative impacts on the platform’s profit. On
the one hand, a lower search cost can benefit the platform because it expands market demand. On
the other hand, it tends to intensify price competition among sellers, which can reduce the
platform’s per-unit-sale profit. Proposition 1 has shown that when the platform’s referral fee is
exogenous, a search-cost reduction can either increase or reduce the platform’s profit. In contrast,
Proposition 2 shows that the platform will always benefit from a lower search cost when it
optimally chooses its referral fee because it can expand the total demand without heavily reducing
its profit margin.
Proposition 2 suggests that if the retail platform can optimally adjust its referral fee in the long
term, it should always try to reduce the consumer’s search cost if doing so is not too costly. The
result potentially explains why retail platforms, such as Amazon.com, have invested millions of
dollars in improving consumers’ search experience and reducing their search cost on the platform.
Although the platform may see a profit drop in the short term (with the referral fee fixed), it will
see a profit increase in the long term when it optimally adjusts its referral fee level.
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Next, we study how the retail platform should optimally adjust its referral fee with the
consumer’s search cost. Intuitively, a reduction in the search cost tends to intensify the competition
among sellers and hence reduce the platform’s profit margin, so the platform would mitigate its
profit-margin decrease by raising the referral fee. However, Proposition 3 shows that under some
conditions, it may be optimal for the platform to reduce its referral fee as the consumer’s search
cost decreases. Let 𝜖𝐷,𝑟 (𝑟) ≡

𝜕𝐷
𝜕𝑟

𝑟

⋅ 𝐷 be the platform’s demand elasticity of referral fee 𝑟.

PROPOSITION 3. When the consumer’s search cost 𝜏 decreases (i.e., when 𝑚
̅ increases), the
platform’s optimal referral fee 𝑟 ∗ will increase if
𝜕|𝜖𝐷,𝑟 (𝑟 ∗ )|
̅
𝜕𝑚

>

̅ )ℎ′ (𝑚
̅)
−𝑐𝑟 ∗ (𝑚
(𝑐𝑟 ∗ (𝑚
̅ )+ℎ(𝑚
̅ ))

2

𝜕|𝜖𝐷,𝑟 (𝑟 ∗ )|
̅
𝜕𝑚

<

̅ )ℎ′ (𝑚
̅)
−𝑐𝑟 ∗ (𝑚
(𝑐𝑟 ∗ (𝑚
̅ )+ℎ(𝑚
̅ ))

2

, and will decrease if

.

Proposition 3 characterizes the conditions under which the platform should raise or reduce its
referral fee when the search cost decreases. If a decrease in the search cost significantly increases
the (absolute value of) demand elasticity, the platform will find it optimal to reduce its referral fee
because doing so can significantly increase the total demand. Note that the lowered referral fee
will reduce the equilibrium retail price but could actually increase the sellers’ profit margin. As a
result, a lower search cost can be all-win for the platform, sellers and consumers if the platform
chooses to reduce its referral fee in equilibrium.
Similarly, if a decrease in the search cost does not significantly raise the (absolute value of)
demand elasticity, then the platform will find it optimal to raise its referral fee, leading to an
increase in its profit margin. In this case, a decrease in the search cost can reduce sellers’ profits
and increase the equilibrium retail prices, making the consumers possibly worse off as well.
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Proposition 3 suggests that when consumers’ search cost declines, whether the retail platform
should reduce or raise its referral fee depends on how the demand elasticity changes. If a decrease
in the search cost will attract new customers who are relatively more price-sensitive compared to
the platform’s existing customers, the platform will have a more elastic demand, so the platform
tends to reduce its referral fee. In reality, this can happen for a high-end platform (relative to other
competing platforms) with a wealthier, price-insensitive customer base. By lowering consumers’
search cost on the platform, it can attract some marginal consumers, who are relatively more pricesensitive than the platform’s existing customers, from competing low-end platforms. In this case,
the platform’s demand elasticity will increase, so the platform may want to lower its referral fee
to boost its sales volume. Conversely, if the decrease in the search cost will attract new customers
who are less price-sensitive compared to the existing customer base, the platform’s demand tends
to become increasingly inelastic so the platform should increase its fee. In reality, this could
happen for a relatively budget-friendly platform (compared to its competitors). A decrease in the
search cost will help the platform to attract some wealthier customers from its competitors, which
reduces the platform’s overall demand elasticity.
In practice, it is easy for the platform to reduce the referral fee. However, the platform may
receive complaints from sellers and consumers when raising the referral fees. In practice, when
the platform finds it optimal to raise the referral fees, it should try to alleviate the sellers’ and
consumers’ dissatisfaction. For example, the platform may want to announce a soon-to-be-ineffect fee increase at the same time as it introduces new search features and technologies on its
website (e.g., augmented-reality technologies), and the platform can communicate to sellers and
consumers that the fee increase will enable the platform to cover the cost of developing and
offering such new technologies.
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Example 2. To further study how the search cost’s impact may be different when the referral
fee is endogenous versus when it is exogenous, we consider the numerical example with the same
distributions and parameters as those in Example 1 (the exogenous-referral-fee case), but allow
the platform to endogenously choose its referral fee.

(b) Seller’s and Platform’s Profit

(a) Equilibrium Referral Fee and Retail Price

Figure 2.5 Numerical Example with Endogenous Referral Fee

Note. This figure is plotted using 𝑐 = 0.05. The curves are rescaled to be fit in the same figure.
Figure 2.5(a) plots how the platform’s optimal referral fee and the equilibrium retail price
changes with the search cost 𝜏. In Example 1 where the referral fee is exogenous, the reduction in
𝜏 will always reduce the equilibrium retail price, 𝑝∗ , because it intensifies the seller competition.
Conversely, in Example 2 with endogenous referral fee, when 𝜏 is already low, further decreasing
𝜏 can lead to a higher 𝑝∗ . This is because the platform will increase its referral fee when 𝜏 becomes
lower, forcing the sellers to charge higher prices to cover their cost. Despite the increase in retail
price, the sellers’ profit per unit sale will decrease. In other words, the reduction in the consumer’s
search cost may intensify the double-marginalization problem in the channel and lead to higher
final prices. Figure 2.5(b) depicts how the platform’s and the sellers’ profits will change with the
consumer’s search cost, 𝜏 . Echoing Proposition 2, although the decrease in 𝜏 can lower the
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platform’s profit in the case with exogenous referral fee, 𝑟, the platform’s profit will always
increase if it can optimally adjust 𝑟.

2.5 Filtering
This section studies how the filtering function on the platform can affect the consumer’s
optimal search and the seller’s pricing strategies, and how its effects can be different from that of
a reduction in search cost. To this end, we compare the equilibrium outcome of the no-filtering
case with that in the main model where filtering is available. In the no-filtering case, consumers
do not observe a product’s filterable match level (𝜇𝑖𝑗 ) before searching, and searching a product
informs a consumer of the aggregate match level 𝑀𝑖𝑗 = 𝜇𝑖𝑗 + 𝑚𝑖𝑗 .
Let 𝐹𝑀 (𝑀) and 𝑓𝑀 (𝑀) denote the c.d.f. and p.d.f. of 𝑀𝑖𝑗 . Note that 𝜇𝑖𝑗 = 𝜇𝑘 with probability
𝜙𝑘 and the c.d.f. of 𝑚𝑖𝑗 is 𝐹(𝑚) , so 𝐹𝑀 (𝑀) = Pr(𝑀𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑀) = Pr(𝜇𝑖𝑗 + 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑀) =
𝐾
∑𝐾
𝑘=1 Pr(𝜇𝑖𝑗 = 𝜇𝑘 ) ⋅ Pr(𝑚𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑀 − 𝜇𝑘 ) = ∑𝑘=1 𝜙𝑘 𝐹(𝑀 − 𝜇𝑘 ) ,

or

equivalenty 𝐹𝑀 (𝑀) =

𝐄𝜇 [𝐹(𝑀 − 𝜇)]. This equation reveals the relationship between the distributions of 𝑀𝑖𝑗 , 𝜇𝑖𝑗 , and
𝑚𝑖𝑗 . Intuitively, when the filterable match level is 𝜇𝑘 , the aggregate match level (𝑀𝑖𝑗 ) exceeds 𝑀
if and only if the corresponding unfilterable match level (𝑚𝑖𝑗 ) exceeds 𝑀 − 𝜇𝑘 . Hence, the overall
probability of 𝑀𝑖𝑗 > 𝑀 will be the expected probability of 𝑚𝑖𝑗 > 𝑀 − 𝜇, where the expectation is
taken with respect to the filterable match level, 𝜇.
Notice that 𝐹𝑀 (⋅) is a convex combination of 𝐹(⋅), so 𝐹𝑀 (𝑀) will be greater (smaller) than
𝐹(𝑀) when 𝐹(⋅) is “convex (concave) enough” around 𝑀. Similarly, 𝑓𝑀 (𝑀) = ∑𝐾
𝑘=1 𝜙𝑘 𝑓(𝑀 −
𝜇𝑘 ) = 𝐄𝜇 [𝑓(𝑀 − 𝜇)], which will be greater (less) than 𝑓(𝑀) when 𝑓(⋅) is “convex (concave)
enough” around 𝑀. The inverse hazard rate of 𝑀 is:
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ℎ𝑀 (𝑀) =

𝐄𝜇 [1 − 𝐹(𝑀 − 𝜇)] 𝐄𝜇 [1 − 𝐹(𝑀 − 𝜇)]
𝑓(𝑀)
=
⋅
⋅ ℎ(𝑀)
𝐄𝜇 [𝑓(𝑀 − 𝜇)]
1 − 𝐹(𝑀)
𝐄𝜇 [𝑓(𝑀 − 𝜇)]

(2)

We assume 𝐹𝑀 (𝑀) is twice continuously differentiable and ℎ𝑀 (𝑀) is decreasing. A casual
observation from Equation 2 is that ℎ𝑀 (𝑀) is greater than ℎ(𝑀) if 1 − 𝐹(⋅) is “sufficiently
convex” and 𝑓(⋅) is “sufficiently concave”, i.e., 𝑓′(⋅) and 𝑓′′(⋅) are sufficiently small. Similarly,
ℎ𝑀 (𝑀) is smaller than ℎ(𝑀) if 𝑓′(⋅) and 𝑓′′(⋅) are sufficiently large. As we will show later, the
relative magnitude between ℎ𝑀 (𝑀) and ℎ(𝑚) plays an important role in determining how filtering
affects the sellers’ pricing strategies.
Consumer’s optimal search strategy
First, we examine the consumers’ optimal search strategy under the no-filtering case. Similar
to the main model, consumers will stop searching and buy the last product they searched if and
̅𝑁 , where
only if its aggregate match level, 𝑀𝑖𝑗 , exceeds the equilibrium acceptance threshold, 𝑀
̅𝑁 is uniquely and implicitly defined by
the subscript 𝑁 indicates the no-filtering case. 𝑀
𝑀𝑚𝑎𝑥

∫𝑀̅

𝑁

̅𝑁 )𝑑𝐹𝑀 (𝑀) = 𝜏.
(𝑀 − 𝑀

In the scenario without filtering, the consumer’s acceptance threshold for the aggregate match
̅𝑁 . In the scenario with filtering, the threshold is 𝑀
̅ = 𝜇𝐾 + 𝑚
level is 𝑀
̅ . Proposition 4 compares
̅ and 𝑀
̅𝑁 and illustrates how the filtering function on the platform affects the consumer’s optimal
𝑀
searching strategy.
PROPOSITION 4. Filtering will increase the consumer’s acceptance threshold of aggregate
̅ −𝑀
̅𝑁 < 𝜇𝐾 .
match level, but by less than 𝜇𝐾 , i.e., 0 < 𝑀
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Filtering affects on the consumer’s acceptance threshold for a product’s aggregate match level
in two opposite ways. First, filtering informs consumers of a product’s filterable match level and
narrows their consideration set down to those products with the best filterable attributes (𝜇𝑖𝑗 =
𝜇𝐾 ). This effect raises the consumer’s acceptance threshold for the aggregate match level by 𝜇𝐾 ,
so a consumer is more likely to end up buying a product with a better match level. Second, filtering
reduces the direct benefit of searching. Because filtering has already revealed the filterable match
level and resolved some of the consumer’s uncertainty, conducting a search will uncover less
information of match levels and thus bring less benefit to consumers, ceteris paribus. As a result,
consumers tend to search less, stopping searching at lower acceptance thresholds. Overall, the
second effect only partially offsets the first effect, so the consumer’s acceptance threshold for 𝑀𝑖𝑗
will increase but by less than 𝜇𝐾 .
Sellers’ pricing decisions
Next, we investigate how filtering affects the sellers’ pricing. We show that the equilibrium
𝑐
̅𝑁 ), as compared to 𝑝̃∗ = 𝑐 + ℎ(𝑚
retail price in the no-filtering case is 𝑝̃𝑁∗ = 1−𝑟 + ℎ𝑀 (𝑀
̅ ) when
1−𝑟

filtering is available. Filtering will reduce the equilibrium price (𝑝̃∗ < 𝑝̃𝑁∗ ) when
̅𝑁)
ℎ(𝑀
̅)
ℎ(𝑚

> 1. Earlier discussions reveal that, when 𝑓′(⋅) and 𝑓′′(⋅) are low,

̅𝑁)
ℎ𝑀 (𝑀
̅)
ℎ(𝑚

̅𝑁)
ℎ𝑀 (𝑀
̅𝑁)
ℎ(𝑀

=

̅𝑁)
ℎ𝑀 (𝑀
̅𝑁)
ℎ(𝑀

⋅

is higher, so 𝑝̃∗ <

𝑝̃𝑁∗ is more likely. Conversely, filtering tends to increase the equilibrium retail prices if 𝑓′(⋅) and
𝑓′′(⋅) are large.
To formally illustrate this point, we consider the “marginal” effect of filtering on the seller’s
optimal pricing strategies, i.e., where filtering reveals only an infinitesimal amount of product
match level information to consumers. In such a scenario, the magnitude of the filterable match
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level, 𝜇𝑖𝑗 , is very small such that max |𝜇𝑘 | → 0. Proposition 5 characterizes when filtering can
1<𝑘≤𝐾

increase or decrease the equilibrium retail price.
PROPOSITION 5. Suppose max |𝜇𝑘 | → 0.
1<𝑘≤𝐾

(1) If ℎ2 (𝑚
̅ )𝑓 ′′ (𝑚
̅ ) + 2ℎ(𝑚
̅ )𝑓 ′ (𝑚
̅ ) + 𝑓(𝑚
̅ ) < 0, filtering will increase the equilibrium retail
prices, i.e., 𝑝̃∗ > 𝑝̃𝑁∗ .
(2) If ℎ2 (𝑚
̅ )𝑓 ′′ (𝑚
̅ ) + 2ℎ(𝑚
̅ )𝑓 ′ (𝑚
̅ ) + 𝑓(𝑚
̅ ) > 0 , filtering will decrease the equilibrium
retail prices, i.e., 𝑝̃∗ < 𝑝̃𝑁∗ .
How to interpret the conditions about 𝑓(⋅) , 𝑓′(⋅) and 𝑓′′(⋅) in Proposition 5 in business
practice? Mathematically, a low 𝑓′′(⋅) indicates that 𝑓′(⋅) will not increase fast within a certain
range. Hence, if 𝑓(𝑥), 𝑓′(𝑥) and 𝑓′′(𝑥) are low at point 𝑥, 𝑓(𝑥) is low at 𝑥 and will stay low when
𝑥 increases. The discussion of Proposition 1 shows that when the filtering is available, if seller 𝑖
marginally increases its price, the corresponding unit-sale decrease of this product is
approximately proportional to 𝑓(𝑚
̅ ). Hence, when filtering is available and ℎ2 (𝑚
̅ )𝑓 ′′ (𝑚
̅) +
2ℎ(𝑚
̅ )𝑓 ′ (𝑚
̅ ) + 𝑓(𝑚
̅ ) < 0 , i.e., 𝑓(𝑚
̅ ) , 𝑓′(𝑚
̅ ) and 𝑓′′(𝑚
̅ ) are sufficiently low, the product’s
demand is insensitive to its price 𝑝𝑖 and this sensitivity will remain low when 𝑝𝑖 further increases.
In other words, under the case of filtering, a product’s demand tends to have a relatively long tail.
Hence, filtering will alleviate competition between sellers and raise the equilibrium prices. An
example product category is one-of-a-kind niche products whose unique features are hard to filter
and some consumers have very high valuation for the unfilterable attributes. For these products,
the platform will be more likely to allow consumers to filter the search results because doing so
can increase the retail prices and the platform’s revenue from the referral fee.
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The reverse will happen when ℎ2 (𝑚
̅ )𝑓 ′′ (𝑚
̅ ) + 2ℎ(𝑚
̅ )𝑓 ′ (𝑚
̅ ) + 𝑓(𝑚
̅ ) > 0, i.e., when 𝑓(⋅),
𝑓′(⋅) and 𝑓′′(⋅) are sufficiently high. In this case, filtering will make a product’s demand more
sensitive to price, i.e., it has a relatively short tail. Hence, competition between sellers will be
stronger and the equilibrium retail price will decrease. An example product category is products
whose major features can be filtered, so the search outcomes are limitedly differentiated on
unfilterable attributes when filters are applied. For these product categories, the platform may be
hesitant to adopt filtering because it would trigger keen competition between sellers and reduce
the profits of sellers and the platform.
Although both filtering and a reduction in search cost make consumer search easier, our
analysis above suggests that they can have very different marketing implications. For example, a
reduction in search cost will always encourage consumers to search more products, but filtering
will reduce the benefit of search and so consumers may search fewer products in expectation.
Moreover, when the search cost decreases, the competition between sellers will always be
intensified and the equilibrium retail price will always decrease (for a given referral fee). By
contrast, filtering can possibly soften competition between sellers and lead to higher retail prices,
which is desirable to the platform.

2.6 Extensions
2.6.1 Heterogeneous Search Cost
Consumers are different in their search efficiency, knowledge of products, and opportunity
cost of searching. In this extension we investigate the case in which consumers are heterogeneous
in their search cost, 𝜏. Specifically, let 𝛷(𝜏) denote the c.d.f. of 𝜏, where 0 < 𝜏𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏𝑚𝑎𝑥 ,
and 𝑝̃∗ denote the equilibrium price when consumers have heterogeneous search costs. 11 In

77

𝑐

addition, let 𝑝̃𝜏∗ = 1−𝑟 + ℎ(𝑚
̅ (𝜏)) denote the equilibrium retail price in the homogeneous-searchcost case where all consumers have the same search cost 𝜏, which we have derived in the previous
section.
How should a seller choose its price when facing consumers with different search costs? A
naïve approach is to “weigh each consumer equally” and set the price to be 𝐄𝜏 [𝑝̃𝜏∗ ], the average of
the homogeneous-search-cost prices (𝑝𝜏∗ ) weighted by the density of 𝜏. By contrast, Proposition 6
suggests that this naïve choice of price is suboptimal for a seller, whose optimal price should
“weigh low-search-cost consumers more” and be lower than 𝐄𝜏 [𝑝̃𝜏∗ ].
PROPOSITION 6. When consumers have heterogeneous search cost, the seller’s optimal retail
price is a weighted average of the homogeneous-search-cost prices, i.e., 𝑝̃∗ = 𝐄𝜏 [𝑎(𝜏)𝑝̃𝜏∗ ]. The
weighting function 𝑎(𝜏) decreases with the consumer’s search cost, i.e., 𝑎′ (𝜏) < 0.12 Moreover,
𝑝̃∗ < 𝐄𝜏 [𝑝̃𝜏∗ ].
Intuitively, because a low-search-cost consumer is more likely to shop on the platform instead
of choosing the outside option, she is more likely to visit a seller than a high-search-cost consumer.
Therefore, the distribution of a seller’s visitors is skewed towards low-search-cost consumers, so
the seller should target these consumers more by charging relatively lower prices.
We also examine a numerical example with heterogeneous consumer search cost, where 𝜏 is
uniformly distributed on the interval (0, 𝜏̅). We show that all the major results in the homogeneoussearch-cost model are qualitatively robust. Please refer to Appendix B for details.
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2.6.2 Heterogeneous Product Quality
Some products are systematically valued more by consumers than other products because of
their better product or service quality. To capture the quality heterogeneity, we assume that there
is one premium seller selling a premium product from which consumers on average derive higher
match levels than the non-premium products sold by the other 𝑛 − 1 non-premium sellers. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the seller 𝑖 = 1 sells the premium product, and sellers 𝑖 =
2, … , 𝑛 sell the non-premium products. For analytical tractability, we consider the case where all
product attributes are unfilterable, i.e., 𝜇𝑖 = 0, ∀𝑖. Specifically, let the aggregate match level of
the premium product (𝑖 = 1) be 𝑀1𝑗 = Δ𝑞 + 𝑚1𝑗 , where Δ𝑞 is the premium product’s quality
premium i.e., the difference between the average aggregate match level of the premium product
and that of non-premium products. The distribution of 𝑚1𝑗 is the same as that of a non-premium
product. The marginal costs of these two types of products are 𝑐𝐻 and 𝑐𝐿 , respectively. We assume
𝑐𝐻 − 𝑐𝐿 < Δ𝑞, so the premium seller is relatively cost effective.
One can show that a consumer’s optimal search strategies depend on her outside options.
Similar to the main model, if a consumer’s outside option is low, she will search the premium
product first and, if its match level is low, continue searching non-premium products. If a
consumer’s outside option is high, she will choose the outside option and not search any product
on the platform. However, the search pattern for consumers with intermediate outside options is
different from the main model where all products have homogeneous base quality. These
consumers will search only the premium product and if its match level is low, they will choose the
outside option. For these consumers, searching the premium product is better than the choosing
the outside option in expectation, but the benefit of searching a non-premium product does not
justify the search cost.
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Next, we examine the sellers’ pricing strategies. Let 𝑝̃1∗ and 𝑝̃∗ be the equilibrium prices of
the premium product (product 1) and the non-premium products, respectively. It is easy to prove
that 𝑝̃∗ < 𝑝̃1∗ (𝑟) < 𝑝̃∗ + Δ𝑞, i.e., the premium seller will charge a higher price than non-premium
sellers, but the price difference will not exceed their quality difference so consumers will search
the premium seller first in equilibrium. This result is similar to Armstrong et al. (2009), who find
that the higher-quality firm has a stronger incentive to become prominent, i.e., being searched first
by consumer. However, their paper assumes that consumers will always search the prominent
product first, even though the consumers could be strictly better off in expectation by searching
other items first. By contrast, the search sequence in our model is not exogenously imposed but
endogenously determined by consumers’ optimal decisions. Next, we examine the non-premium
sellers’ pricing strategies.
𝑐

RESULT 3. The equilibrium retail price of the non-premium products is 𝑝̃∗ (𝑟) = 1−𝑟 + ℎ(𝑚
̅ ),
which is independent of the quality premium of the premium product, Δ𝑞.
Result 3 suggests that 𝑝̃∗ is independent of Δ𝑞. The intuition is as follows. The consumer’s
optimal search strategy indicates that consumers will always search the premium seller before they
search any non-premium ones. Moreover, if a consumer has already searched the premium product
and decided to continue searching the non-premium products, she will never go back to and buy
the premium product in equilibrium. Thus, for consumers who have decided to search nonpremium sellers, the premium product’s quality premium and price will not affect their probability
of buying from a specific non-premium seller. For other consumers, they will not search any nonpremium sellers so a change in a seller’s price will not affect the consumers’ search decisions.
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Therefore, the optimal price of non-premium products will be independent of the price and base
quality of the premium product.
One can show that both the premium seller’s and the non-premium sellers’ optimal prices will
decrease when the consumer’s search cost (𝜏) decreases. When the platform’s referral fee is
exogenous, the profits of the premium seller, the non-premium sellers, and the platform can either
increase or decrease with the search cost. When the platform endogenously chooses 𝑟, its optimal
profit will always become higher when 𝜏 decreases. Thus, our results in the main model are robust
when products have heterogeneous base quality levels.
2.6.3 Fixed Referral Fee
In the previous analysis, we assume that the platform charges a percentage referral fee for the
sellers. In practice, some retail platforms may charge a fixed referral fee for each transaction. We
proceed to examine whether our major results are robust to this alternative referral-fee structure.
The platform charges a fixed referral fee per unit of sale, 𝑑 > 0, instead of a percentage fee, 𝑟. All
other model settings remain the same.
In Appendix B, we analytically derive the equilibrium outcome of the fixed-referral-fee setting.
A decrease in the search cost will reduce the equilibrium retail price and increase the demand on
the platform. A seller’s profit can either increase or decrease. When the platform can endogenously
choose the referral fee, 𝑑, a lower search cost will always increase the platform’s profit. Hence,
most results in the percentage-referral-fee setting can be qualitatively replicated in the fixedreferral-fee setting.
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2.6.4 Outside Option and Retail Platform Competition
In practice, a consumer can choose whether to shop on the retail platform that we focus on or
on some other competing platforms, and the latter can be considered as the consumer’s outside
option in our model. In this sense, our analytical framework could partially capture the competition
between different retail platforms (e.g., Amazon.com versus eBay.com) although we do not
explicitly consider the competitor’s pricing decisions. When the focal platform faces stronger
competition, consumers are more likely to have a better outside option. We analyze how the
distribution of outside options affects consumers, sellers, and the platform. For analytical
tractability, we assume that the platform endogenously chooses its fixed referral fee, 𝑑 . We
continue to adopt the distribution assumptions in Example 1 and 2: 𝜇𝐾 = 0.5 and
𝑚𝑖𝑗 ~𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚(−0.5,0.5). The consumer’s outside option, 𝑢0 , follows a uniform distribution
between 𝑙 and 1 + 𝑙. A larger 𝑙 indicates that the outside option tends to be more attractive, i.e.,
the competing platform is stronger. We consider the nontrivial case with −2√2𝜏 − 𝑐 < 𝑙 < 1 −
2√2𝜏 − 𝑐, otherwise either no consumers or all consumers will shop on the platform.
We show that in equilibrium, the platform’s optimal fixed referral fee is 𝑑 ∗ =
seller’s profit is

𝜋𝑖𝑆∗

=

(1−2√2𝜏−𝑐−𝑙)
2𝑛

√2𝜏, and the platform’s profit is 𝜋

𝑃∗

=

1−2√2𝜏−𝑐−𝑙
2

(1−2√2𝜏−𝑐−𝑙)
4

,a

2

. When

the platform faces stronger competition, i.e., 𝑙 is larger, it will charge a lower referral fee, and its
profit as well as the sellers’ will decline. The platform can always benefit from a lower search cost:
𝜕𝜋 𝑆∗
𝜕𝜏

=−

1−2√2𝜏−𝑐−𝑙
√𝜏

< 0.

Note that the absolute value of the above derivative decreases with 𝑙. To put it differently,
when the platform competes with stronger competitors, it will receive less benefit from reducing
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the consumer’s search cost. This result may sound surprising because one might conjecture that a
platform facing stronger competition would be more inclined to lower its search cost in order to
poach customers from competitors. However, our result suggests that it will be a platform facing
weaker competitors (𝑙 is larger) which have a stronger incentive to reduce its search cost. This is
because such a platform has a higher profit per unit sale so it can benefit more from acquiring an
additional customer. This result explains why large retail platforms (e.g., Amazon.com and
Overstock.com) invests heavily in search-cost-reduction technologies, e.g., camera search,
barcode search, and augmented-reality view, whereas smaller shopping sites usually use less
advanced search technologies. This will create a Matthew effect, allowing larger platforms to offer
better search experience and attract even more customers.

2.7 Conclusion
This article studies how the consumer’s search cost influences an online retail platform,
independent sellers on it, and consumers. We explicitly model the consumer’s search process and
the pricing decisions of both the platform and the sellers. When the referral fee is exogenous, a
lower search cost will reduce the equilibrium retail price due to stronger competition, but the
seller’s expected profit may actually increase. This is because a lower search cost attracts more
consumers to shop on the platform instead of choosing the outside option. The platform’s profit
may either increase or decrease as the consumer’s search cost decreases. However, when the
platform endogenously chooses its referral fee, its expected profit will always increase as the
search cost decreases. This result implies that the platform should always try to reduce the
consumer’s search cost as long as doing so is not too costly.
Our analysis shows that when the consumer’s search cost decreases, the platform should
reduce its referral fee to boost its sales volume if the demand elasticity of the referral fee
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significantly increases, otherwise the platform should raise the referral fee to increase its profit
margin. If a lower search cost reduces the platform’s optimal referral fee, sellers will pay less to
the platform for a unit sale, possibly leading to a lower equilibrium retail price yet higher expected
seller profits. In this case, a lower search cost can be all-win for the platform, sellers and
consumers. In contrast, when a lower search cost increases the platform’s optimal referral fee, the
equilibrium retail price may increase but the seller’s profit margin will shrink. Hence, a lower
search cost can make both sellers and consumers worse off.
We also consider how the filtering function affect the consumer’s search and the sellers’
pricing decisions. We show that, after filtering becomes available, a consumer can filter out the
products with better filterable attributes and hence is more likely to find a product with a better
match level. At the same time, because filtering has already partially resolved the consumer’s
uncertainty, conducting a search will uncover less amount of information and generate less benefit
for the consumer. Hence, she tends to search fewer products and buy a product with less good
match. We also characterize the conditions when filtering will increase or reduce the sellers’
equilibrium prices. If a product’s demand tends to have a relative longer (shorter) tail when
filtering is available, the competition between sellers will be alleviated (intensified) and the
equilibrium retail price tends to increase (decrease). These results suggest that filtering can be very
different from a search-cost reduction, for the latter always induces the consumers to search more
and leads to stronger price competition among sellers.
Even though we assume that sellers sell differentiated products, our model can conceptually
apply to the case where some sellers sell a common branded product. In essence, a product in our
model is the totality of the core product and any seller attributed together as a whole. So, the
differentiation among “products” comes from not only the core product attributes (e.g., shoes of
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different brands, style, color, size, etc.) but also the sellers’ attributes (e.g., service, return policy,
existence of physical stores close to the customers, etc.). For example, sellers on the east coast of
the U.S. can ship their products to New York City within two days, but it may takes longer to ship
to Los Angeles. Similarly, sellers on the west coast of the U.S. can ship products to Los Angeles
faster than to New York City. Furthermore, whether the sellers have physical stores close to the
customers can differentiate the sellers among consumers, because consumers may have more
convenient options for product returns or exchanges if there is a physical store nearby.
This paper mainly focuses on the online context, but many results, including how the search
cost will affect sellers and retail platforms’ pricing strategies and profits, can be generalized to
offline settings with caution. However, our research also captures several features that are unique
to the online shopping environments. First, our paper analyzes the impact of filtering, which is
commonly used on online retail platforms but is rarely adopted in offline stores. Second, most
previous studies on consumer search in offline channels assume that the retailer carries a limited
number of products (usually two) and consider the setting with wholesale contracts: the
manufacturers first set the wholesale price and then the retailer determines the final retail prices
(e.g., Gu and Liu 2013). Thus, the retailer will always benefit when the manufacturers charge lower
wholesale prices. These assumptions are more reasonable for offline retail stores where the retailer
can carry only limited product varieties due to the shelf-space restriction and is able to determine
the final retail prices for each product. However, an online platform has very low operational costs
of including an additional seller, so it usually carries a large assortment. As a result, the retail
platform usually cannot optimize the final prices for each individual product. In practice, retail
platforms usually charge a percentage referral fee applied to all sellers and let the sellers decide
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their final prices. Contrary to the offline setting, an online platform may benefit from a higher final
price of sellers because it can lead to a higher referral-fee revenue.
We would like to point out a few caveats about our model. In our analysis, we do not explicitly
study how sellers’ entry decisions can be affected when the consumer’s search cost changes.
However, one can easily extend our model to analyze how the search cost affects sellers’ entry on
the platform. For example, one can assume that a seller needs to incur some positive fixed cost to
sell on the platform. If in our model a seller’s expected profit increases when the consumer’s search
cost decreases, then in that parameter region it will be more likely to observe sellers entering the
market. Similarly, if a lower search cost reduces the seller’s expected profit, then it is likely that
some sellers will exit the market. We have assumed that each seller sells only one product. In
practice, a seller may sell multiple differentiated products on the platform. One can study how the
consumer’s search cost affects the seller’s product assortment decisions. Cachon et al. (2008) show
that when sellers sell directly to the consumer, they will increase their product assortments when
the consumer’s search cost decreases. We conjecture that if the sellers sell their products through
a retail platform, a decrease in the consumer’s search cost will increase sellers’ product assortments
when the referral fee is exogenous. However, when the referral fee is endogenous, if a lower search
cost induces the platform to increase the referral fee, sellers may provide fewer assortments as a
result.
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Chapter 3
The Bright Side of Cost Transparency:
Facilitating Product Innovation
3.1 Introduction
A firm’s cost information for its products is increasingly transparent to consumers. Many thirdparty infomediaries publish the cost information of products in the market. For example,
consumers can get good estimates of car dealers’ cost of a vehicle by referring to the factory
invoice price disclosed by truecar.com. Many other websites provide cookbook guides or online
calculators to help consumers gauge the dealer’s true cost of getting a car from the manufacturer.
Consumers can also find cost-breakdown reports for many electronic devices. For example,
Electronics360 provides a detailed cost-breakdown analysis of Jawbone Mini Jambox, a Bluetooth
speaker, suggesting that a Mini Jambox, sold at $179.99, costs Jawbone only $24.32 to produce.24
In addition to these third-party infomediaries, many firms, including Everlane, Oliver Cabell, and
HonestBy, voluntarily disclose their own cost information. For example, Everlane reveals on its
website that the cost of a $100 cashmere crew sweater is around $52 ($34.05 for materials, $1.90
for hardware, $13.00 for labor, $1.96 for duties, and $0.60 for transportation). Everlane also
discloses the detailed information of the factories for each of its products. New technologies, e.g.,
blockchain, enable the firms to further convincingly communicate with their customers about their
cost information. A survey of supply chain professionals shows that 56% of the respondents
believe that firms should use blockchain to share information (such as production cost) with
customers (Weinswig 2018).
It has been long debated whether cost-information transparency is a boon or a bane for firms.
On the negative side, Sinha (2000) argues that cost transparency can be harmful because it can
lower the firm’s profit margin, reduce products and services differentiation, weaken customer
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loyalty, and create perceptions of price unfairness. Zhu (2002, 2004) show that cost transparency
can reduce the high-cost firms’ incentive to participate in the market, hence may reduce the profit
of these firms and the total social welfare. On the positive side, Mohan et al. (2016) show that
firms disclosing its cost can attract more consumers and raise their willingness-to-buy. On how
cost transparency can affect consumers, Simintiras et al. (2015) argue that unit-cost transparency
can help consumers make judgement on price fairness and product quality. By contrast, Kuah and
Weerakkody (2015) state that unit cost are often hard to define in practice and thus can mislead
the consumers. Our paper adds to the discussion above by building an analytical model to
investigate how cost transparency affects consumer purchase timing, the firm’s innovation and
pricing decisions, and the consumer surplus. Specifically, we show that cost transparency has a
bright side on firms and consumers: when the firm sells a durable product and can change the price
dynamically, cost transparency can foster product innovation and therefore benefit consumers and
firms.
We start with why and how cost transparency can affect a durable good producer’s dynamic
pricing and the consumer’s purchase timing decisions. After a firm has sold products to consumers
with relatively high valuations, it has an incentive to cut its price to target some low-valuation
consumers. This phenomenon, termed as intertemporal price discrimination, has been well
documented in the literature (e.g., Bridges et al., 1995; Coase, 1972; Conlisk et al., 1984;
Narasimhan, 1989; Stokey, 1979, 1981). Strategic consumers, anticipating the firm’s incentive to
drop future prices, may postpone purchase if they are patient and believe that the price will
significantly decrease in the future. The consumers’ belief about the future price is affected by the
firm’s cost. If consumers know or believe that the firm has a high cost (hence a relatively low
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profit margin), they will expect any dramatic future price drop to be unlikely and thus will be
inclined to buy the product in the current period.
Such consumer behaviors are common in reality. For instance, as a technology blog noted,
“While prices for sub-50-inch HDTVs are flat, prices for displays larger than 60 inches are
already heading down.” It then explained, “TV-makers are looking to stimulate sales at the highend [HDTVs], where profit margins are the greatest, while keeping prices steady for sub-50-inch
models that already have razor-thin margins. On the low-end of the market, the margins are too
small and pricing will stay flat.” 25 On another online tech-forum, one user suggested that
consumers should buy new computers right away rather than wait because “… with hardware
profit margins already pretty low, I wouldn’t expect massive reductions [of computer prices].”26
Without cost transparency, consumers do not know the firm’s cost and their belief about the
future price will depend on the firm’s current price. Intuitively, a high-cost firm tends to charge a
high price. When a consumer sees a high price, she may infer that the firm has a high cost and
expect that the future price will also be relatively high, so she tends to buy the product immediately.
As a result, a low-cost firm may have an incentive to mimic the high price to induce consumers to
buy right away. With cost transparency in the market, the firm’s ability to manipulate consumers’
expectation of future prices will be limited.
We analyze a dynamic model in which a firm first decides whether to make an R&D investment
to develop a new product. If the firm develops the product, the firm can sell to consumers in two
periods. Without cost transparency, the firm’s cost is its private information. In the first period,
consumers may infer the firm’s cost from its current price. This affects their expectation of the
future (second-period) price and thus the current purchase decisions. In this case, the low-cost firm
has an incentive to mimic the high-cost firm by charging the same first-period price as the high-
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cost firm would, and the high-cost firm has an incentive to raise its first-period price, and thus sell
to fewer customers to avoid the low-cost firm’s mimicry. However, with cost transparency, the
firm’s cost is common knowledge and the consumer’s belief about the future price will be based
on the firm’s true cost (rather than the inferred cost) and its current profit margin. In this case,
because the low-cost firm can no longer pretend to be the high-cost firm, it will be worse off
whereas the high-cost firm will be better off.
A firm’s R&D investment for innovation is often made long before the product will be
manufactured and sold to consumers. So, when making an innovation investment decision, the
firm is typically uncertain about the final marginal cost for its product. Thus, the firm’s innovation
investment decision depends on whether its expected profit exceeds the upfront R&D investment.
Our analysis reveals that cost transparency will increase the firm’s expected profit and hence make
the firm more likely to invest in innovation.
We also examine the effect of cost transparency on consumers. Conventional wisdom suggests
that customers will benefit from having more information. However, we show that this is not
always true in the context of cost transparency. When the firm has a high cost, cost transparency
can reduce the consumer’s surplus. This is because the high-cost firm will charge higher prices
since cost transparency prevents a low-cost firm from pooling with the high-cost firm. Although
cost transparency can reduce the consumer surplus in case of a high-cost firm, we show that, in
expectation, cost transparency will benefit the consumer. Thus, in expectation, cost transparency
is a win-win situation for both the firm and the consumers.
We also check the result robustness under different model settings. We show that all the main
results remain qualitatively the same when consumers tend to buy the product early either because
they value the “newness” of the product or their utility is time-discounted. We also consider the
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case where the market has a low entry barrier, i.e., the (incumbent) firm faces competition of
entrants in the second period. We find that most of our results remain qualitatively unchanged in
the low-entry-barrier scenario. Interestingly, when the competition in the second period is perfect,
we show that the incumbent firm’s profit can be independent of its marginal cost (up to a
threshold), when the cost information is transparent to consumers.

3.2 Literature Review
Our research contributes to the literature on intertemporal price discrimination and dynamic
pricing. Coase (1972) proposes that if a monopolist selling durable products is able to decrease its
price on an infinitely frequent basis or on an infinite time horizon, consumers will not accept any
price higher than the product’s marginal cost and the firm will thus make zero profit. However, it
has been shown that when the firm can pre-commit its future price or it has an increasing cost with
respect to time, it can charge prices higher than its marginal cost (Kahn 1986, Stokey 1981).
Several other papers also focus on firms’ optimal intertemporal price discrimination strategies
under different settings (Aviv and Pazgal 2008, Besanko and Winston 1990, Conlisk et al. 1984,
Levin et al. 2008, Narasimhan 1989, Stokey 1979).
Our research complements the aforementioned literature on intertemporal price discrimination
in that we study cost uncertainty and information asymmetry, which this literature has mostly
neglected. Only a few studies investigate the impact of uncertainty and information asymmetry on
the firm’s intertemporal price discrimination decisions. For example, Png (1991) shows that when
the firm has demand uncertainty, high-valuation consumers may gamble on a future price cut. To
mitigate this problem, the firm can offer most-favored-customer protection which guarantees early
buyers the benefit of subsequent reduction in prices. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is
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the first to study how the consumer’s knowledge about the firm’s cost will affect the firm’s
intertemporal price discrimination and innovation decisions.
This paper also relates to the signaling literature in marketing (Desai and Srinivasan 1995,
Jiang et al. 2011, Kuksov 2004, Kuksov and Lin 2017, Moorthy and Srinivasan 1995, Simester
1995, Soberman 2003). One stream of this literature studies why and how a firm signals its cost
information in different contexts. Simester (1995) shows that in a duopoly where firms’ marginal
costs are their private information, the firm with a low marginal cost may advertise low prices for
some products to signal that prices of unadvertised products are also low, since costs of different
products are positively correlated. Shin (2005) examines how a store’s “vague advertisement,”
which commits only the minimum price of a product, may construct a credible price image if
consumers do not know the store’s selling cost. Guo and Jiang (2016) consider the case in which
a consumer feels that it is unfair when the firm’s profit margin is too high relative to her surplus.
Hence, a high-cost firm may have an incentive to use its price and product quality to signal its high
cost. They find that as the expected cost-efficiency in the market decreases, both product quality
and social welfare may increase rather than decrease. In the extant signaling literature, the work
most closely related to our paper is Balachander and Srinivasan (1998). They consider a firm
selling a durable good whose cost decreases over time due to learning-by-doing—the more
products a firm sells in the first period, the lower its unit cost will be in the second period.
Consumers know the firm’s current cost but do not know a priori the firm’s efficiency of learningby-doing. The authors show that a “high-experience” firm tends to charge a lower price to sell
more products in the first period in order to greatly reduce its future cost, which will lower the
consumers’ expectation of the future price. The low-experience firm can charge a high first-period
price to signal that it has low learning efficiency and hence its future price will not drop
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dramatically. Our paper studies a new substantive question of how cost transparency affects firm
innovation through investments in product development, which has not been examined in this
literature. In our model, the cost signaling game in the case without cost transparency is merely a
subgame following the firm’s innovation decision.
This paper is also related to the literature on cost transparency, which is typically focused on whether a
firm shares its private cost information with competitors or within a supply chain (Fried 1984, Gal-or 1986,
Shapiro 1986, Yao et al. 2008). Some recent studies also consider the cost information asymmetry between
the firm and consumers. Mohan et al. (2016) show, through experiments, that a firm’s voluntary disclosure
of its cost information to consumers will increase their trust to the firm and hence their intent to purchase.
Several qualitative studies discuss the potential benefits and problems of cost transparency to the consumers
and the society (Kuah and Weerakkody 2015, Simintiras et al. 2015). Our paper complements this stream
of literature by analytically modeling the effects of cost transparency on firm pricing and innovation.

3.3 Model
We consider a firm deciding whether to invest in R&D to develop a new durable product. If it
does not invest, the product will not be developed and the firm’s payoff is normalized to zero. If it
invests, it incurs a fixed cost 𝐼 > 0 and the product will be developed. Given that the firm invests,
it can sell its developed product in two time periods (𝑡 = 1, 2), and the consumers will buy at most
one unit of the product, either in the first period or the second period. We assume that when the
firm decides whether to invest, it does not know the marginal cost of product. This accommodates
the reality that when making innovation investment decision, the firm typically does not know the
exact technology, materials and production techniques that will be used later. Thus, the firm’s
investment decision will depend on whether its expected future profit exceeds its upfront fixed
cost 𝐼. To capture the uncertainty in the firm’s future cost of production, we assume that the firm’s
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marginal cost will be high (𝑐𝐻 ) with probability 𝛼, or low (𝑐𝐿 ) with probability 1 − 𝛼. When
deciding whether to invest 𝐼, the firm knows only the distribution of its future cost. In essence, the
firm’s cost can be thought of as its type, denoted by 𝑖 ∈ {𝐻, 𝐿}; we will use these terms (e.g., highcost or high-type) interchangeably. We normalize 𝑐𝐿 = 0 and denote 𝑐𝐻 = 𝑐 . Therefore, 𝑐
represents the cost difference between the two types of firms. The firm’s cost is constant across
the two selling periods (please see Section 6 for discussion regarding the possibility of cost
decreases over time, or learning-by-doing). With cost transparency, the consumers can learn the
firm’s marginal cost from the third-party infomediaries before their purchase decisions. Without
cost transparency, consumers do not observe the firm’s marginal cost when making purchase
decisions.
Let 𝑝𝑖,1 and 𝑝𝑖,2 denote the 𝑖 -type firm’s first-period price and second-period price,
respectively. If the consumer does not purchase the product in either period, she gets zero utility
(from the outside option). If consumers buy the product in the first period, they can get a total
usage value of 𝑣. We assume that 𝑣~uniform(0,1) in the consumer population. We normalize the
total population of consumers to 1.
Given our interest in modeling intertemporal price discrimination, we consider two reasons
why a consumer may want to purchase early rather than wait. First, for innovative or fashion
products, consumers tend to derive extra satisfaction from being innovators or early adopters. To
capture this notion, we assume that if consumers buy the product in the second period, they will
derive only a fraction 𝜇 ∈ (0,1) of the total usage value 𝑣, because they no longer enjoy the
“newness” of the product or the satisfaction of being early adopters. Second, consumers may have
a time discount factor 𝛿 on future utility from delaying purchase. Thus, a consumer obtains a net
present utility of 𝑢1 = 𝑣 − 𝑝𝑖,1 if buying the product in the first period; she gets a net present utility
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of 𝑢2 = 𝛿(𝜇𝑣 − 𝑝𝑖,2 ) if buying the product in the second period. In our main analysis, we focus
on the “newness” factor 𝜇 and abstract away from the effect of time discounting by assuming 𝛿 =
1. Section 5 will consider the robustness of the results with the time discount factor.
The game proceeds as follows. First, the firm decides whether to invest 𝐼 to develop the
product. If it does not invest, the firm’s payoff is zero. If the firm invests, it can sell the product in
two periods. In the first period, the firm chooses its price 𝑝𝑖,1 , and consumers decide whether to
purchase the product in the first period based on their expectation about the firm’s second-period
price. In the second period, the firm chooses 𝑝𝑖,2 and consumers who did not buy the product
decide whether to buy it in the second period.

3.4 Analysis
Subsection 4.1 studies the subgame given the firm invests 𝐼 to develop the new product. We compare
the firm’s optimal pricing strategy, profit, and consumer surplus for the cases with and without cost
transparency. Subsection 4.2 examines how cost transparency affects the firm’s innovation decision and
the expected consumer surplus.

3.4.1 Firm Pricing Decisions
Given the firm has invested 𝐼, it can produce and sell its product in two periods. We first consider the
case with cost transparency, i.e., consumers know the firm’s marginal cost (𝑐𝑖 ) and can rationally infer the
firm’s future price based on the firm’s current price and its actual marginal cost. Then, we analyze the case
without cost transparency, i.e., consumers do not know the firm’s actual cost but will infer it from the firm’s
price. We will compare the results to determine the effect of cost transparency on the firm and consumers.

With cost transparency (perfect-information case)
With cost transparency, the firm’s cost is common knowledge and the consumer’s belief about
future prices will be based on the firm’s true cost. We use “ ̃ ” over a variable to indicate this
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perfect-information setting. Using backward induction, one can show that type-𝑖 firm’s optimal
∗
second-period price is 𝑝̃𝑖,2
=

(1−𝜇)𝑐+𝜇𝑝̃𝑖,1
2−𝜇

. One can see that a higher first-period price will lead to

a higher second-period price, because fewer consumers will purchase the product in the first
∗
period. In addition, a higher 𝑐 will lead to a higher 𝑝̃𝑖,2
, which is also intuitive. Substituting the

firm’s optimal second-period price into its profit function, we can derive type-𝑖 firm’s optimal
first-period price and its optimal profit, as shown in lemma 1.
LEMMA 1. When the firm’s cost is common knowledge, its optimal first-period and second(2−𝜇)2

∗
period prices are 𝑝̃𝑖,1
= 2(4−3𝜇) +

𝜋̃𝑖∗ =

(1−𝜇)2
4−3𝜇

+

(𝜇−𝑐𝑖 )2
4𝜇

𝑐𝑖
2

𝜇(2−𝜇)

∗
and 𝑝̃𝑖,2
= 2(4−3𝜇) +

𝑐𝑖
2

, respectively, and its total profit is

, where 𝑖 ∈ {𝐻, 𝐿}.

Without cost transparency
The consumers’ belief about the firm’s cost affects their expectations of the firm’s future price
and will thus influence their current purchase decisions. When consumers do not know the firm’s
cost, a low-cost firm may have an incentive to mimic a high-cost firm’s pricing strategy in the first
period to induce consumers to purchase immediately rather than wait. If the firm has a high cost,
it would want consumers to know its high cost so that they will be less likely to postpone their
purchase.27 To credibly convince consumers that it has a high cost, the firm needs to sufficiently
raise its first-period price such that a low-cost firm would not want to mimic. Note that a low-cost
firm will not choose a very high price even if consumers believe that it has a high cost. Because
the low-cost firm’s optimal price is lower than that of the high-cost firm, the opportunity cost of
choosing a high price is higher for a low-cost firm than for a high-cost firm. Put differently, for a
given price, the low-cost firm’s profit margin is higher, so it loses more profit when losing a sale
(due to the high price) than a high-cost firm.
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Since the firm prefers to be believed to have a high cost, one might wonder whether the firm
may want to intentionally increase its cost. Our analysis reveals that a low-cost firm’s equilibrium
profit is always higher than that of a high-cost firm, and that even if the firm’s cost is directly
observable to consumers, the firm will not be able to improve its profit by wastefully raising its
cost. Thus, although a low-cost firm may want consumers to believe that it has a high cost, it has
no incentive to raise its actual cost.
Two types of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) are possible in our setting. In separating
equilibria, different types of firms charge different 𝑝1 , so consumers can correctly infer the firm’s
type from 𝑝1. In pooling equilibria, both types of firms will choose the same 𝑝1, so consumers will
not be able to tell the firm’s type. There are infinitely many PBE outcomes depending on
consumers’ off-equilibrium beliefs. We use the Lexicographical Maximum Sequential
Equilibrium (LMSE) concept, proposed by Mailath et al. (1993), to refine multiple equilibria.
LMSE and the related Undefeated Equilibrium concepts are widely used in marketing and
management research (e.g., Gill and Sgroi 2012; Jiang et al. 2014; Miklós-Thal and Zhang 2013;
Nan and Wen 2014; Taylor 1999). In our setting, the LMSE refinement selects among all PBE the
outcome that is most profitable for the type of firm that wants its type revealed (i.e., the high-cost
firm), and subsequently, if multiple outcomes persist, then LMSE selects among them the outcome
that is the most profitable for the low-type firm.28
We derive the LMSE of our game in these the following steps: First, we determine the PBE
∗
yielding the highest profit for the high-cost firm among all separating equilibria, 𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑝
. Second, we
∗
find the PBE giving the highest profit to the high-cost firm among all pooling equilibria, 𝜎𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
.
∗
∗
Finally, we compare 𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑝
and 𝜎𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
to determine the LMSE outcome. Throughout this section, we

assume 𝑐 <

(2−𝜇)2
4−3𝜇

𝜇 such that in equilibrium a high-cost firm will serve some consumers in the
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second period. Otherwise, the model will de facto reduce to an uninteresting one-period game. In
practice, firms in an industry often use similar production technology, so the cost difference
between different firms will not be very dramatic. Besides, the consumer’s valuation for the
product’s newness may be relatively small compared with their overall valuation for the product,
so we expect that 𝑐 is low and μ is high in many realistic situations.
LEMMA 2. Suppose that consumers do not know the firm’s cost. A unique LMSE outcome
exists; it is separating if 𝛼 < 𝛼 ∗ , and pooling if 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼 ∗ , where 𝛼 ∗ =
√4−

8𝑐
𝑐 2 4𝑐
𝑐
𝑐
𝑐
−2(
) +
(2+
)−2(1−
)
√
1−𝜇
1−𝜇
1−𝜇 1−𝜇
1−𝜇
1−𝜇
2𝑐
1−𝜇

.

Figure 3.1 Equilibrium Outcome
Figure 3.1 depicts whether the LMSE equilibrium outcome is separating or pooling. Note that
when 𝛼 is low enough, if the high-cost firm pools with the low-cost firm, many consumers may
postpone their purchases because the firm will very likely to have a low cost and will significantly
reduce its price in the second period. In other words, when 𝛼 is low, the high-cost firm will find
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the opportunity cost for pooling very high, so it will prefer the separating outcome, in which it
incurs the signaling cost (of raising its first-period price) to separate itself from the low-cost firm.
Lemma 2 can be equivalently stated as that the equilibrium is separating if and only if 𝑐 is large
enough. Recall that the low-cost firm’s marginal cost is zero, so the high-cost firm’s marginal cost
(𝑐) represents the difference between the two types of firms’ marginal costs. Hence, Lemma 2
suggests that when the difference in costs between the two types of firms is high, the high-cost
firm will prefer separating itself from the low-cost firm.
COROLLARY 1. The high-cost firm’s profit 𝜋𝐻∗ decreases with 𝑐. The low-cost firm’s profit 𝜋𝐿∗
increases with 𝑐 when 𝑐 ≤
of

𝑐

𝑐 > 𝑐∗

when

2𝑐 ∗

1

𝑐∗

2

2(1−𝜇)𝛼
1−𝛼2

,

𝑐∗

, decreases with 𝑐 when

where

𝑐∗

𝑐∗

is

2(1−𝜇)𝛼

implicitly

1−𝛼2

< 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐 ∗ , and is independent

defined

by

1−

(1−𝛼)𝑐 ∗
1−𝜇

=

𝑐∗

√1 −
− 2 (1−𝜇) + 1−𝜇 √1−𝜇 (2 + 1−𝜇).
1−𝜇
As a side note, Corollary 1 shows that the high-cost firm’s profit strictly decreases with 𝑐
whereas the low-cost firm’s profit changes non-monotonically with 𝑐. Note that when 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐 ∗ , the
equilibrium is pooling. Under this condition, a higher 𝑐 has two opposite effects on the low-cost
firm’s profit. First, a higher 𝑐 tends to increase the consumers’ expectation of the second-period
price, hence consumers will be more likely to purchase the product in the first period. Second,
when 𝑐 increases, the high-cost firm tends to increase its first-period price, which the low-cost firm
will mimic under pooling. This higher pooling price will reduce the low-cost firm’s first-period
demand. When 𝑐 ≤

2(1−𝜇)𝛼

𝑐. By contrast, when

1−𝛼2

, the first effect dominates so the low-cost firm’s profit increases with

2(1−𝜇)𝛼
1−𝛼2

< 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐 ∗ , the low-cost firm’s profit decreases with 𝑐. Note that when
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𝑐 > 𝑐 ∗ , the equilibrium is separating so the low-cost firm’s profit does not depend on the high-cost
firm’s marginal cost 𝑐.
Effect of cost transparency
We can determine the effect of cost transparency by comparing the market outcomes with
versus without cost transparency.
PROPOSITION 1. (1) Cost transparency will lower the high-cost firm’s first-period and secondperiod prices when 𝛼 < 𝛼 ∗ , and will increase its first-period and second-period prices when 𝛼 ≥
𝛼 ∗ ; cost transparency will not affect the low-cost firm’s prices when 𝛼 < 𝛼 ∗ and will lower its
first-period and second-period prices when 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼 ∗ . (2) Cost transparency will increase the highcost firm’s total profit and (weakly) reduce the low-cost firm’s total profit.
Proposition 1 examines how cost transparency affects the firm’s pricing strategies and its total
profit. When the firm’s cost is not known to consumers, if 𝛼 < 𝛼 ∗ , the equilibrium is separating.
The high-cost firm has to set a first-period price higher than its perfect-information price to reduce
its demand enough to make mimicking unprofitable for a low-cost firm. Note that under the
separating equilibrium, the high-cost firm’s second-period price is also higher than its secondperiod price under perfect information (i.e., under cost transparency). This is because in the
separating equilibrium the second-period customer base (those consumers who have not purchased
in the first period) has higher valuations than the second-period customer base in the case with
cost transparency. When 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼 ∗ , the equilibrium is pooling. Because consumers cannot tell the
firm’s cost, their expectation of the second-period price is lower than the price that the high-cost
firm will actually charge in the second period. Therefore, consumers are less willing to purchase
the product in the first period, so the equilibrium prices are lower than the high-cost firm’s perfect-
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information prices. With cost transparency, the high-cost firm can charge its perfect-information
prices, making more profits than when its cost is not known to consumers.
By contrast, cost transparency can make the low-cost firm worse off. When 𝛼 < 𝛼 ∗ and
consumers do not know the firm’s cost, the equilibrium is separating, where consumers can
correctly infer the firm’s cost. In this case, the low-cost firm will charge its perfect-information
price. Therefore, cost transparency will not affect its profit when 𝛼 < 𝛼 ∗ . When 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼 ∗ , the
equilibrium is pooling and consumers cannot infer the firm’s cost from 𝑝1. Note that in this case a
low-cost firm can always deviate to its perfect-information price and earn the perfect-information
profit, so its pooling-equilibrium profit must be higher than its profit under cost transparency.
Hence, cost transparency will reduce the low-cost firm’s profit. Proposition 2 summarizes how
cost transparency affects the consumer surplus.
PROPOSITION 2. When 𝛼 < 𝛼 ∗ , cost transparency will increase the consumer surplus if the firm
has a high cost, and it will not affect the consumer surplus if the firm has a low cost. When 𝛼 ≥
𝛼 ∗ , cost transparency will lower (increase) the consumer surplus if the firm has a high (low) cost.
Suppose that the firm has a high cost. When consumers do not know the firm’s cost, if 𝛼 < 𝛼 ∗ ,
the equilibrium is separating. As discussed earlier, the firm’s price will be higher than its perfectinformation price. Hence, cost transparency lowers the high-cost firm’s price and increases the
consumer surplus. When 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼 ∗ , the equilibrium is pooling and the equilibrium price is lower
than the high-cost firm’s perfect-information price. Hence, when consumers know the firm’s cost,
the firm does not need to lower its price anymore, so consumer surplus will decrease. Similarly, in
the low-cost firm case, consumer surplus increases when 𝛼 < 𝛼 ∗ and remains unchanged when
𝛼 ≥ 𝛼∗.
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3.4.2 Firm Innovation Decision
We have so far examined how cost transparency affects the consumer and the profits of both
types of firms. In the case of a high-cost firm, cost transparency will benefit the firm but may either
increase or reduce the consumer surplus. By contrast, if the firm’s cost is low, cost transparency
makes the firm worse off but the consumers better off. Now we analyze the first stage of the game,
in which the firm decides whether to invest in innovation. Since the firm does not know its future
cost at the time of the innovation decision, it will be based on whether its expected profit exceeds
the required fixed-cost investment (𝐼).
LEMMA 3. Cost transparency will lower the expected price in both the first period (𝛼𝑝𝐻,1 +
(1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝐿,1 ) and the second period (𝛼𝑝𝐻,2 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝐿,2 ). However, it will increase both the
firm’s expected profit (𝛼𝜋𝐻 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋𝐿 ) and the expected consumer surplus.
Lemma 3 examines how cost transparency affects the expected price, the expected profit and
the consumer surplus. We find that cost transparency will reduce the expected prices in both
periods. One might intuit that lower expected prices will lead to a lower expected profit for the
firm. However, our analysis reveals that both the firm and consumers will actually be better off in
expectation. In the separating parameter region, without cost transparency, if the firm has a high
cost, it will raise its price to signal its cost, but with cost transparency the firm will choose a lower
price (i.e., its perfect-information price). Note that in the separating parameter region (when 𝛼 <
𝛼 ∗ as shown in Figure 1), if the firm has a low cost, it will charge its perfect-information price
regardless of cost transparency. Thus, overall cost transparency will lower the expected prices in
the separating region. In contrast, in the pooling region (when 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼 ∗ ), cost transparency will
lower the expected price mainly because with cost transparency a low-cost firm will significantly
reduce its price from the high pooling price to its low perfect-information price. Hence, cost
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transparency will lower the firm’s prices in expectation, resulting in a higher expected consumer
surplus.
Cost transparency will also increase the firm’s expected profit. In the separating region, if the
firm has a low cost, cost transparency will have no effect on its profit, but if the firm has a high
cost, cost transparency will allow the firm to make a higher profit (i.e., its perfect-information
profit) since the firm no longer needs to distort its price to separate from a low-cost firm. Thus,
overall, in the separating region, cost transparency will give the firm a higher expected profit.
Similarly, in the pooling region (𝛼 ≥ 𝛼 ∗ ), cost transparency will also increase the firm’s ex ante
expected profit because the firm’s benefit from having a high cost revealed will dominate its profit
loss from having a low cost revealed. Proposition 3 easily follows. It shows that cost transparency
will make the firm more likely to develop a new product. Moreover, because consumers will also
benefit from the development of the new product, cost transparency can be a Pareto improvement
for the society.
PROPOSITION 3. There exist 𝐼 and 𝐼 such that (1) if the firm’s fixed-cost investment 𝐼 ∈ (𝐼, 𝐼),
the firm will develop the product under cost transparency but not develop it without cost
transparency; (2) if 𝐼 ∈ [0, 𝐼], the firm will develop the product regardless of transparency, (3) if
𝐼 ∈ [𝐼 ,̅ ∞), the firm will not develop the product regardless of transparency.
Our results suggest that infomediaries that share cost information with consumers are socially
beneficial. In fact, the firm may a priori have incentives to commit to sharing its cost information
through a credible third-party infomediary that collects and disseminates product-cost information
to consumers. The information-sharing platform can potentially earn a profit through service fees.
Consumer advocacy groups can also help to promote or facilitate such cost transparency.
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Our result may also help to partially explain why in practice a growing number of firms are
building a reputation for making their cost more transparent (e.g., Everlane, Honestby, Oliver
Cabell). Mohan et al. (2016) show through experimental and field studies that a firm’s disclosure
of costs can increase its trustworthiness in consumers’ mind, making consumers more interested
in considering the firm’s product. Our paper provides a direct economic rationale why firms can
benefit from cost transparency.

3.5 Extension
3.5.1 Time Discount
In our main model, the consumer’s “cost” of delaying purchase is the loss of “newness” when
consuming the product in a later period; we have assumed no time-discounting (i.e., 𝛿 = 1). We now assess
the robustness of our results to the alternative assumption that the consumer’s “cost” of delaying purchase
is due to time discounting of future utility (not newness concerns), by considering the case of 𝛿 < 1 and
assuming away the consumer’s “newness” concern (i.e., 𝜇 = 1). That is, the consumer’s present value of
buying the firm’s product in the second period is 𝑢2 = 𝛿(𝑣 − 𝑝𝑖,2 ). Other assumptions are the same as in
the main model. Result 1 summarizes the firm’s optimal prices and profit under cost transparency (i.e., in
the perfect-information case), where “ ̃ ” over a variable indicates the case of cost transparency. Result 2
describes the LMSE equilibrium outcome when the firm’s cost is not known to consumers.

RESULT 1. When the firm’s cost is common knowledge, its first-period and second-period
∗
(perfect-information) prices are 𝑝̃𝑖,1
=

and its total profit is 𝜋̃𝑖∗ =

(2−𝛿)2 (1−𝑐𝑖 )2
4(4−3𝛿)

(2−𝛿)2 +(4−2𝛿−𝛿 2 )𝑐𝑖
2(4−3𝛿)

∗
and 𝑝̃𝑖,2
=

(2−𝛿)+(6−5𝛿)𝑐𝑖
2(4−3𝛿)

respectively,

, where 𝑖 ∈ {𝐻, 𝐿}.

RESULT 2. Suppose that consumers do not know the firm’s cost. When 𝑐 > 𝛿, the equilibrium
is costless-separating, i.e., both types of firms will charge their respective perfect-information
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prices. When 𝑐 < 𝛿 , if 𝛼 < 𝛼 ∗∗ =

2(1−𝛿)−𝑐(2−𝛿)+√2(1−𝑐)[2−(2−𝛿)(2−𝑐)𝛿]+2𝑐(2−𝛿)√𝑐𝛿[4−(4−𝑐)𝛿]
𝑐𝛿

, the

equilibrium is costly-separating, i.e., the high-cost firm’s first-period price is higher than its
perfect-information price and its total profit is lower than its perfect-information profit. When 𝑐 <
𝛿 and 𝛼 > 𝛼 ∗∗ , the equilibrium is pooling.
When consumers have time discounting rather than a “newness” preference, if the cost
difference between the high-cost firm and the low-cost firm is large (i.e., 𝑐 is high), the high-cost
firm does not need to distort its price to signal its high cost to prevent the low-cost firm’s mimicry
and can earn a profit as high as its perfect-information profit, even if consumers do not know the
firm’s cost a priori. This is because when the cost difference between the two types of firms is
large, the low-cost firm needs to greatly increase its price from its perfect-information price in
order to be believed as having a high cost, which significantly reduces its unit sales. Note that the
result is qualitatively similar to that in our main model with consumer “newness” preference,
where the separating parameter region is the largest when 𝑐 is high (illustrated in lemma 2). Also
similarly, when 𝑐 < 𝛿, the equilibrium is separating when the prior probability of the firm’s cost
being high, 𝛼, is low.
PROPOSITION 4. If 𝑐 > 𝛿 , the firm’s innovation decision will not be affected by cost
transparency. If 𝑐 < 𝛿, there exist 𝐼′ and 𝐼′ such that (1) if the firm’s fixed-cost investment 𝐼 ∈
(𝐼′, 𝐼′), the firm will develop the product under cost transparency but not develop it without cost
transparency; (2) if 𝐼 ∈ [0, 𝐼′], the firm will develop the product regardless of transparency, (3) if
𝐼 ∈ [𝐼 ′̅ , ∞), the firm will not develop the product regardless of transparency.
Proposition 4 examines how cost transparency affect the firm’s innovation decision. When 𝑐 >
𝛿, the equilibrium is costless-separating, so cost transparency will not affect the firm’s expected
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profit, nor its decision of whether to invest the fixed-cost 𝐼 to develop the product. By contrast,
when 𝑐 < 𝛿, cost transparency will increase the firm’s expected profit, so it will increase the firm’s
incentive to develop the product, i.e., expanding the parameter region in which the firm will
develop the product. This is consistent with proposition 3, where consumers have “newness”
concerns but no time discounting.
3.5.2 Market with Low Entry-barriers
Our main model has implicitly assumed a very high entry barrier in the market such that the
firm is a monopoly in both periods, so the intertemporal price decrease is mainly due to the firm’s
intertemporal price discrimination rather than increasing future competition. In some markets,
firms can maintain their monopoly power for a long time because they are protected by high entry
barriers such as patents, government policies, or geographical barriers. In such markets,
intertemporal price discrimination may be the main driving force of the over-time price decrease.
But some markets may have very low entry barrier, stronger competition can also drive the future
price down, and it may be the main factor for the firm’s price intertemporal decrease. In this
subsection, we check whether the findings from our main model are robust when the market entry
barrier is low.
We analyze a limiting case where the entry barrier is very low so that the market becomes
perfectly competitive in the second period. This contrasts our assumption in Section 4 that the firm
remains a monopoly in the second period, which represents the other limit of prohibitively high
entry barrier. In reality, future entry barriers or the level of competition in the market may lie
somewhere between these two cases; analyzing these two limits will help better gauge the
boundary of our results.
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We assume the firm to be a monopoly for its new product in the first period, but in the second
period new entrants will enter to produce the product at the same marginal cost (𝑐𝑖 ). Thus, the
second-period equilibrium price will drop to 𝑐𝑖 . Other aspects of the model are the same as in the
main model. We focus on the interesting case of 𝑐 ≤

𝜇
2

such that in equilibrium the high-cost firm

will serve some consumers in the second period. Lemma 4 presents the equilibrium results when
consumers do not know the firm’s cost.
LEMMA 4. Suppose that the firm’s cost is not known to consumers. The unique LMSE outcome
∗
∗
∗
is separating if 𝛼 < 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
, and pooling if 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
, where 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
is given in Appendix C.

Figure 3.2 Equilibrium Outcome – Market with Low Entry Barriers
∗
When the prior probability of the firm having a high cost is low (i.e., 𝛼 < 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
), the LMSE

outcome is separating, otherwise it is pooling. Figure 3.2 illustrates the equilibrium outcome in
different parameter regions. One can see that the boundary between the pooling and separating
parameter regions is qualitatively the same as that in Figure 3.1. Corollary 2 shows that when the
market has low entry barriers, the high-cost firm’s profit decreases with its marginal cost (𝑐), but
interestingly, 𝑐 has a non-monotonic effect on the low-cost firm’s profit. This is qualitatively
similar to Corollary 1 in the main model.

111

COROLLARY 3. The high-cost firm’s total profit 𝜋𝐻∗ decreases with 𝑐. The low-cost firm’s total
profit 𝜋𝐿∗ increases with 𝑐 if 𝑐 ≤
independent

of

𝑐

∗
∗
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝

√1 − (√

1−𝜇

(

1−𝜇

if

(1−𝜇)𝛼
1−𝛼2

∗
𝑐 > 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
,

+ 2) −

∗
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝

1−𝜇

, decreases with 𝑐 if
where

2

) = (1 − 𝛼)

∗
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝

1−𝜇

∗
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝

is

(1−𝜇)𝛼
1−𝛼2

∗
< 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
, and is

implicitly

defined

by

.

∗
RESULT 3. With cost transparency, the firm’s optimal first-period price and profit is 𝑝̃𝑖,1
=

𝑐𝑖 +

1−𝜇
2

, and its total profit is 𝜋̃𝑖∗ =

1−𝜇
4

.

Result 3 summarizes the equilibrium outcome under cost transparency. Interestingly, the firm’s
profit is independent of its marginal cost. This is because a higher marginal cost has two opposing
effects on the firm. On the one hand, it tends to lower the firm’s profit margin. On the other hand,
it raises the consumers’ expected second-period price (𝑝̅2 ), which tends to make consumers more
likely to buy the product in the first period. Note that when consumers know the firm’s cost, 𝑝̅2
will be equal to the firm’s marginal cost 𝑐𝑖 (since the market is perfectly competitive in the second
period). One can also show that the consumer’s first-period purchase decision will remain
unchanged if both the first-period price 𝑝1 and the expected second-period price 𝑝̅2 increase by the
same amount (not too large). So, when 𝑐𝑖 increases, the firm can raise its first-period price by the
same amount, making the firm’s profit margin and its market coverage stay the same in the first
period. Since the firm earns zero profit in the second period, the firm’s total profit is just its firstperiod profit, which will not be affected by the change in marginal cost. In other words, when the
market has very low entry barriers, the two opposing effects of a cost increase can cancel out when
there is cost transparency in the market, so the firm’s total profit will be unchanged.
Result 3 shows the invariance of the firm’s profit with respect to its marginal cost under cost
transparency, assuming perfect competition in the future. In practice, the level of competition in
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the market is often not perfect, so the two effects of a cost change may not perfectly cancel out,
and the firm’s profit can decrease with its marginal cost. We cautiously interpret our result as that
under cost transparency the negative effect of an increase in a firm’s marginal cost may be
significantly mitigated because it can reduce the consumer’s strategic delay of product purchase.
Our analysis shows that all other results in section 4 remain qualitatively the same in the current
case of very low entry barrier. That is, the qualitative effects of cost transparency on the firm’s
profit and consumer surplus are robust to different levels of entry barriers in the market.

3.6 Conclusion
This paper examines the effects of cost transparency on firm innovation, pricing, profits, and
the consumer surplus. Our analysis shows that although cost transparency may ex post make the
firm or consumers worse off, it ex ante makes both the firm and the consumers better off in
expectation. This suggests that cost transparency can encourage more innovation by the firm and
increase the overall consumer surplus. Moreover, cost transparency reduces the expected firstperiod and second-period prices in the market.
Our results provide insight on why a high-cost firm may seek to reveal its high cost to
consumers on its own or facilitate the sharing of cost information through third-party
infomediaries. For example, Xiaomi, a Chinese electronics company, has been actively informing
consumers of its low profit margin. Some fashion firms, such as Everlane and Oliver Cabell,
disclose the detailed cost breakdown of their products on their own websites. However, a firm’s
own claim of high costs may sometimes lack credibility. Many consumers question Xiaomi’s own
claim of its high cost (or low margins),29 and the third-party’s cost estimate of Xiaomi’s cellphone
can be much lower than Xiaomi’s own claim.30 Moreover, the reach of the firm’s own claim of
its cost may be narrow. Kuah and Weerakkody (2015) also summarize some other difficulties for
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the firm to credibly disclose its cost information. In contrast, many third-party infomediaries and
news media, such as Electronics360, can examine or take apart the new products to provide more
credible cost information because they do not have conflict of interests. So, infomediaries can
serve an important role in providing credible cost transparency.
Our results around the effect of cost transparency on profit margins are consistent with some
anecdotal evidence. For example, Scott Painter, CEO of TrueCar.com, suggested that the “average
gross profit [of participating dealerships] has risen $100 per new vehicle to $350 today, from $250
a year and a half ago.”31 This is consistent with our prediction that if the equilibrium is pooling
when consumers do not know the firm’s cost, then cost transparency will increase the high-cost
firm’s optimal price because the firm is no longer pooled with the low-cost firm.
Note that we assumed that the product’s marginal cost is independent of the firm’s innovation
cost (𝐼). This is a reasonable assumption when the variance in production cost arises from the
uncertainty in exogenous factors such as production technology or input prices. We however
conjecture that when the firm’s investments are focused on reducing its unit cost (e.g., process
innovation), cost transparency will tend to lower the firm’s incentive in making cost-reduction
investments, since cost transparency will increase a high-cost firm’s profit and reduce a low-cost
firm’s profit, leading to a smaller profit difference between a high-cost firm and a low-cost firm.
We hope that our paper will inspire empirical work on testing when cost infomediaries arise
and their effects on firm pricing and margins. We offer the conjecture that cost infomediaries can
lead to greater product innovation and lower process innovation. Similarly, our paper offers
hypotheses for empirical testing of the effects of cost intermediaries on prices and margins.
Our analysis can be extended in the following ways: First, throughout the paper we have
assumed that all consumers are strategic and anticipate future price change when they make
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purchase decisions. It will be interesting to investigate what happens if some of the consumers are
myopic and do not anticipate future price changes. Previous research shows that the existence of
myopic consumers increases the firm’s profit when there is no information asymmetry (Aviv and
Pazgal 2008). Future research can focus on whether this result will still hold when information
asymmetry exists and consumers do not know the firm’s cost.
Second, in this paper we have analyzed two-period models, and have not explicitly investigated
a multi-period model or a continuous-time model. Previous research shows that as the number of
periods increases, firms’ incentive to acquire a good reputation (e.g., “being tough” or “being
benevolent” as in Kreps and Wilson 1982) becomes stronger. If we apply their arguments to our
research setting, a firm will tend to have a stronger incentive to be considered as a high-cost type
when the number of periods increases. Hence, a low-cost firm will have stronger incentive to
mimic a high-cost firm and the high-cost firm will need to raise its price more to prevent being
mimicked. Consequently, we conjecture that if the number of periods increases, the high-cost
firm’s benefit from cost transparency will tend to increase whereas the low-cost firm will become
even worse off.
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Appendix A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. Note that 𝑈𝑖,2 is defined as type-𝑖 consumer’s utility if she does not buy
tickets in the first period and makes her optimal buying decision (from the primary market, from
the resale market, or not buying) in the second period. Hence 𝐸[𝑈𝑖,2 ] ≥ 0 and a type-𝑖 consumer
will try to buy tickets in the first period if and only if 𝐸[𝑈𝑖,1 ] ≥ 𝐸[𝑈𝑖,2 ].
̅<
Because 𝑁 ≤ 𝑁

1+𝛼
2

, there will be always some consumers with strictly positive valuation

unserved in the second period, so 𝑟̂∗ > 0. Thus, 𝑟̂∗ is either 𝑉𝐴 or 𝑉𝐶 .
LEMMA A.1 If there are any casual fans trying to buy tickets in the first period, all avid fans
will try to buy tickets in the first period.
This is true because 𝐸[𝑈𝐴,1 ] − 𝐸[𝑈𝐴,2 ] ≥ 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1 ] − 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2 ] for all 0 ≤ 𝜌𝑖 ≤ 1.
LEMMA A.2 If a casual fan with 𝜌𝑖 = 𝜌 > 0 will try to buy tickets in the first period, then all
casual fans with 𝜌𝑖 ∈ [𝜌, 1] will try to buy tickets in the first period.
We prove by contraposition. Suppose that there exist 𝜌 ∈ (0,1), such that the casual consumer
with 𝜌𝑖 = 𝜌 will try to buy tickets in the first period and that there exist 𝜌𝑖 > 𝜌 and the casual
consumer with 𝜌𝑖 will not buy tickets in the first period. Because both 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1 ] and 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2 ] are
linear in 𝜌𝑖 and 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2 ] ≥ 0, the casual consumer with 𝜌𝑖 = 1 will not try to buy tickets in the first
period, and the casual consumer with 𝜌𝑖 = 0 will try to buy tickets in the first period. But
𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2 ] = 0 if 𝜌𝑖 = 0, so 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1 ] > 0 when 𝜌𝑖 = 0, which is equivalent to (1 − 𝑘)𝑟̂∗ − 𝑝 > 0.
Therefore, 𝑟̂∗ ≠ 0, so 𝑟̂∗ ≥ 𝑉𝐶 .
Note that both 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1 ] and 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2 ] are weakly increasing in 𝜌𝑖 and that 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1 ] > 0 when
𝜌𝑖 = 0, so 𝐸[𝑈𝑖,1 ] > 0 for all 𝜌𝑖 = 0. We divide the discussion into the following three cases.
̂
̂∗
(i) If tickets are expected to sell out in the first period, 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2 ] = 𝜌𝑖 ⋅ 𝑃𝑟
2,𝑅 ⋅ max{𝑉𝐶 − 𝑟 , 0} = 0 for
all 𝜌𝑖 ≥ 0. So 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1 ] > 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2 ] when 𝜌𝑖 = 1.
(ii) If tickets are not expected to sell out and 𝑝 > 𝑟̂∗ , 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2 ] = 0 for all 𝜌𝑖 ≥ 0. So 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1 ] > 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2 ]
when 𝜌𝑖 = 1.
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(iii) If tickets are not expected to sell out and 𝑝 ≤ 𝑟̂∗ , for the casual consumer with 𝜌𝑖 = 1, 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1 ] =
̂
max{𝑉𝐶 , (1 − 𝑘)𝑟̂∗ } − 𝑝 = max{𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝, (1 − 𝑘)𝑟̂∗ − 𝑝} ≥ max{𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝, 0} ≥ 𝑃𝑟
2,𝑃 max{𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝, 0} =
𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2 ].
Therefore, in all three cases, the casual fan with 𝜌𝑖 = 1 will try to buy tickets in the first period,
contradictory to the previous conclusion that this consumer will not try to buy tickets in the first period.
Let 𝑛1 be the number of consumers trying to buy tickets in the first period. Lemma A.1 and Lemma
A.2 together imply that if there are two rational expectation subgame perfect equilibria with the same 𝑛1 ,
̂1 = min{1, 𝑁 } is also the same in
then they are the same group of consumers in these two equilibria. 𝑃𝑟
𝑛1

these two equilibria. Further, note that in the second period, the number of consumers who want to sell
tickets, the number of avid fans, and the number of casual fans who want to buy tickets are uniquely pinned
down by 𝑛1 , so 𝑟 ∗ is also uniquely determined by 𝑛1 , and so is 𝑟̂∗ . Thus, if there are two rational expectation
subgame perfect equilibria with the same 𝑛1 , these two equilibria are identical. This directly implies that
the buying-spree equilibrium is unique. ∎

Derivation of the casual fan’s utility function
We first derive the consumer’s utility functions. Note that, as described earlier, a consumer
who wants to buy a ticket may not be able to get a ticket. Let 𝑈𝑖,1 denote type-𝑖 consumer’s utility
of trying to buy a ticket in the first period, and 𝑢𝑖,1 denote her utility of successfully getting a ticket
in the first period. Let 𝑈𝑖,2 be type-𝑖 consumer’s utility if she does not buy tickets in the first period
and makes her optimal buying decision (from the primary market, from the resale market, or not
buying) in the second period. In the buying-spree equilibrium, the rational prediction will be
fulfilled. Because the resale price 𝑟 ≤ 𝑉𝐴, an avid fan will never resell her ticket in the second
period. Thus, an avid fan will attend the concert if she has a ticket, and will always want to buy a
ticket from either the primary or the resale market if she does not have a ticket. If tickets are
expected to sell out on the primary platform in the first period, an avid fan’s expected utility of
trying to buy a ticket in the first period is
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̂1 (𝑉𝐴 − 𝑝) + (1 − 𝑃𝑟
̂1 ) ⋅ 𝑃𝑟
̂
̂∗
𝐸[𝑈𝐴,1 ] = 𝑃𝑟
2,𝑅 (𝑉𝐴 − 𝑟 ),

(1)

where 𝑃𝑟1 is the probability of successfully getting a ticket (from the primary market) in the first
period and 𝑃𝑟2,𝑅 is the probability of successfully getting a ticket from the resale market in the
second period. Note that 𝐸[𝑈𝐴,1 ] consists of two terms. The first term represents the case that the
̂1 is the rationally expected
avid fan successfully gets a ticket in the first period, where 𝑃𝑟
probability of getting the ticket and 𝑉𝐴 − 𝑝 is the avid fan’s utility conditional on getting the ticket
in the first period. The second term in (1) represents the case that the avid fan does not get a ticket
̂1) but gets a ticket in the second period
in the first period (which occurs with a probability of 1 − 𝑃𝑟
̂
̂∗
(which occurs with a probability of 𝑃𝑟
2,𝑅 ) and 𝑉𝐴 − 𝑟 is her utility conditional on getting the
resale ticket. 32 Note that in the second period the consumer cannot get a ticket from the sold-out
primary platform. In this case, an avid fan’s expected utility from trying to buy a ticket in the
̂
̂∗
second period is 𝐸[𝑈𝐴,2 ] = 𝑃𝑟
2,𝑅 (𝑉𝐴 − 𝑟 ) ≥ 0.
̂1 = 1 and
If tickets are not expected to sell out on the primary platform in the first period, 𝑃𝑟
an avid fan’s expected utility from buying in the first period is 𝐸[𝑈𝐴,1 ] = 𝑉𝐴 − 𝑝. Her expected
utility of trying to buy a ticket in the second period depends on 𝑝 and the expectation of 𝑟. If 𝑝 <
𝑟̂∗ , avid fans will first try to buy tickets from the cheaper, primary platform, and if unsuccessful,
then from the resale platform. An avid fan’s expected utility from trying to buy in the second
period is given by
̂
̂
̂
̂∗
𝐸[𝑈𝐴,2 ] = 𝑃𝑟
2,𝑃 (𝑉𝐴 − 𝑝) + (1 − 𝑃𝑟2,𝑃 ]) ⋅ 𝑃𝑟2,𝑅 ⋅ (𝑉𝐴 − 𝑟 ),

(2)

where 𝑃𝑟2,𝑃 is the probability of successfully getting a ticket on the primary market in the second
period. The first term in (2) corresponds to the situation in which the avid fan can successfully get
̂
a ticket from the primary platform in the second period, which occurs with probability 𝑃𝑟
2,𝑃 and
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conditional on which the avid fan’s utility is 𝑉𝐴 − 𝑝. The second term of (2) represents the situation
in which the avid fan does not successfully get a ticket from the primary platform in the second
̂
period, which happens with probability 1 − 𝑃𝑟
2,𝑃 . In this case, the avid fan will try to buy a ticket
̂
from the resale platform, where she can successfully get a ticket with probability 𝑃𝑟
2,𝑅 , in which
case her utility is 𝑉𝐴 − 𝑟̂∗. Similarly, if 𝑝 ≥ 𝑟̂∗ , an avid fan will try to buy tickets from the resale
̂
̂∗
platform first, and if unsuccessful, then try the primary platform. So, 𝐸[𝑈𝐴,2 ] = 𝑃𝑟
2,𝑅 (𝑉𝐴 − 𝑟 ) +
̂
̂
(1 − 𝑃𝑟
2,𝑅 ) ⋅ 𝑃𝑟2,𝑃 (𝑉𝐴 − 𝑝) ≥ 0.
A casual fan 𝑖 has probability 1 − 𝜌𝑖 of having realized valuation 𝑣𝑖 = 0, in which case she
wants to resell the ticket at any positive price. With probability 𝜌𝑖 , her valuation is 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶 . Note
that the consumer can earn (1 − 𝑘)𝑟 from reselling a ticket, so when her realized valuation is 𝑣𝑖 =
𝑉𝐶 , a casual fan will resell her ticket if and only if 𝑉𝐶 < (1 − 𝑘)𝑟. Therefore, if a causal fan
successfully gets a ticket in the first period, her expected utility is 𝐸[𝑢𝐶,1 ] = 𝜌𝑖 ⋅ max{𝑉𝐶 , (1 −
𝑘)𝑟̂∗ } + (1 − 𝜌𝑖 )(1 − 𝑘)𝑟̂∗ − 𝑝. If tickets are expected to sell out on the primary platform in the
first period, a casual fan’s expected utilities from trying to buy a ticket in the first period and in
̂1 ⋅ 𝐸[𝑢𝐶,1 ] + 𝜌𝑖 ⋅ (1 − 𝑃𝑟
̂1 ) ⋅ 𝑃𝑟
̂
̂∗
the second period are 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1 ] = 𝑃𝑟
2,𝑅 ⋅ max{𝑉𝐶 − 𝑟 , 0} and
̂
̂∗
𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2 ] = 𝜌𝑖 ⋅ 𝑃𝑟
2,𝑅 ⋅ max{𝑉𝐶 − 𝑟 , 0}, respectively. If tickets are not expected to sell out on the
primary platform in the first period, 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1 ] = 𝜌𝑖 ⋅ max{𝑉𝐶 , (1 − 𝑘)𝑟̂∗ } + (1 − 𝜌𝑖 )(1 − 𝑘)𝑟̂∗ − 𝑝
and

𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2 ] = {

̂
̂ ̂
̂∗
̂∗
𝜌𝑖 ⋅ [𝑃𝑟
2,𝑃 max{𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝, 0} + (1 − 𝑃𝑟2,𝑃 ) ⋅ 𝑃𝑟2,𝑅 ⋅ max{𝑉𝐶 − 𝑟 , 0}], 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 ≤ 𝑟
.
̂
̂ ̂
̂∗
̂∗
𝜌𝑖 ⋅ [𝑃𝑟
2,𝑅 max{𝑉𝐶 − 𝑟 , 0} + (1 − 𝑃𝑟2,𝑅 ) ⋅ 𝑃𝑟2,𝑃 max{𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝, 0}], 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 > 𝑟

PROOF OF LEMMA 2.

123

(a) 𝐸[𝑢𝐶,1 ] ≤ 𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝 = 0, so 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1 ] ≤ 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2 ]. Therefore, no casual fans will buy tickets in the first
period. Tickets will hence not sell out in equilibrium. 𝐸[𝑈𝐴,1 ] = 𝑉𝐴 − 𝑝 > 0, so all avid fans will buy tickets
in the first period.
(b) If there is an equilibrium where the concert sells out in the first period and 𝑟 ∗ = 𝑉𝐴 , there will be
more avid fans, whose valuation is 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐴 , wanting to buy tickets than the number of consumers wanting
to reselling tickets in the second period.
Let 𝑥 = 𝑣𝐿 − 𝑝 and 𝑦 = 𝑣𝐿 − (1 − 𝑘)𝑣𝐻 . We need to guarantee that (i) there are more than 𝑁
consumers who want to buy tickets in the first period, (ii) on the resale market, there are at least as many
consumers who want to buy tickets as those who want to resell tickets at resale price 𝑟 = 𝑣𝐻 .
If tickets sell out, 𝑛1 ≥ 𝑁 ≥ 𝛼, so all avid fans will buy tickets in the first period. For casual fans,
𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1 ] = 𝜌𝑖 𝑉𝐶 + (1 − 𝜌𝑖 )(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 − 𝑝 and 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2 ] = 0. Casual fans with 𝜌𝑖 > 𝜌∗ = 𝑉

𝑝−(1−𝑘)𝑉𝐴
𝐶 −(1−𝑘)𝑉𝐴

will

buy tickets in the first period. Thus condition (i) 𝑛1 = 𝛼 + (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜌∗ ) > 𝑁 is equivalent to 𝜌∗ <

1−𝑁
.
1−𝛼

There will be

𝛼
𝑁
𝛼+(1−𝛼)(1−𝜌∗ )

avid fans and

(1−𝛼)(1−𝜌∗ )
𝑁
𝛼+(1−𝛼)(1−𝜌∗ )

casual fans with 𝜌𝑖 ≥ 𝜌∗ successfully

getting tickets in the first period. In the second period, all avid fans with tickets will attend the concert.
Consumers reselling tickets are casual fans with a ticket but unable to attend the concerts. Thus, the supply
(1−𝛼)𝑥

𝑁(1−𝛼)(1−𝜌∗ )

1

of resale tickets is 𝑆𝑅 = 𝑁 𝛼𝑦+(1−𝛼)𝑥 ⋅ ∫𝜌∗ (1 − 𝜌𝑖 )𝑑𝜌𝑖 = 𝛼+(1−𝛼)(1−𝜌∗ ) ⋅
𝑁
]
𝛼+(1−𝛼)(1−𝜌∗ )

1−𝜌∗
2

. There will be 𝛼[1 −

avid fans who did not get tickets in the first period, so the demand in the resale market when
𝑁

𝑟 = 𝑉𝐴 is 𝐷𝑅 = 𝛼[1 − 𝛼+(1−𝛼)(1−𝜌∗ )]. Condition (ii) can be written as 𝐷𝑅 ≥ 𝑆𝑅 , which is equivalent to
𝜌∗ ≤

√(1−𝛼)𝛼[𝛼(1+2𝑁)−𝛼 2 −2𝑁2 ]
.
(1−𝛼)𝑁

Since

√(1−𝛼)𝛼[𝛼(1+2𝑁)−𝛼 2 −2𝑁2 ]
(1−𝛼)𝑁

<

1−𝑁
,
1−𝛼

condition (ii) implies condition (i). There is an equilibrium

where the concert sells out in the first period and 𝑟 ∗ = 𝑉𝐴 if and only if 𝜌∗ ≤
when (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝜃𝑉𝐶 + (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 , where 0 < 𝜃 =
1.

∎
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√(1−𝛼)𝛼[𝛼(1+2𝑁)−𝛼 2 −2𝑁2 ]
,
(1−𝛼)𝑁

i.e.,

(1−𝛼)(𝑁−𝛼)+√(1−𝛼)𝛼[𝛼(1+2𝑁)−𝛼2 −2𝑁2 ]
(1−𝛼)𝑁

<

PROOF OF LEMMA 3. Lemma 3 summarizes the equilibrium outcome in the independent-platforms
case. We first consider the primary platform’s optimal strategy given the musician’s choices of 𝑁
and 𝑓.
When 𝑁 ≤ 𝛼, it is optimal for the primary platform to choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 . The primary platform’s
profit is 𝜋𝑃 = 𝛼(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑓).
2𝛼

̅≤
When 𝛼 < 𝑁 ≤ 𝑁
, it will be optimal for the primary platform to either choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴
1+𝛼
or 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 . If it chooses 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 , its profit will be 𝜋𝑃 (𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 ) = 𝛼(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑓). If it chooses 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 ,
its profit will be 𝜋𝑃 (𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 ) = 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓). The primary platform will choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 if 𝑓 >
𝑁𝑉𝐶 −𝛼𝑉𝐴
𝑁−𝛼

, and will choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 if 𝑓 ≤

𝑁𝑉𝐶 −𝛼𝑉𝐴
𝑁−𝛼

.

Then we consider the musician’s optimal strategy:
If 𝑁 ≤ 𝛼, its profit is 𝜋𝑀 = 𝑁(𝑓 − 𝑐), so the musician will choose 𝑁 = 𝛼 and 𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴.
If 𝑁 ≥ 𝛼 and 𝑓 >

𝑁𝑉𝐶 −𝛼𝑉𝐴
𝑁−𝛼

, the primary platform will choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 , and only avid fans will

buy tickets from the primary platform. So the musician’s profit is 𝜋𝑀 = 𝛼𝑓 − 𝑐𝑁. The musician
will choose 𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴 and 𝑁 = 𝛼.
If 𝑁 ≥ 𝛼 and 𝑓 ≤

𝑁𝑉𝐶 −𝛼𝑉𝐴
𝑁−𝛼

, the primary platform will choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 , so avid fans will buy

tickets in the first period and casual fans with 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶 will buy in the second period, and tickets
sell out. The musician’s profit is 𝜋𝑀 = 𝑁(𝑓 − 𝑐). Because
̅ and 𝑓 =
will choose 𝑁 = 𝑁

𝑁𝑉𝐶 −𝛼𝑉𝐴
𝑁−𝛼

𝑁𝑉𝐶 −𝛼𝑉𝐴
𝑁−𝛼

increases in 𝑁, the musician

.
̅

̅, 𝑁𝑣𝐿−𝛼𝑣𝐻), and
To conclude, the musician will either choose (𝑁, 𝑓) = (𝛼, 𝑉𝐴 ) or (𝑁, 𝑓) = (𝑁
̅ −𝛼
𝑁
̅, 𝑓 =
the musician’s corresponding profits are 𝜋𝑀 (𝑁 = 𝛼, 𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴 ) = 𝛼(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑐) and 𝜋𝑀 (𝑁 = 𝑁
̅ 𝑣𝐿 −𝛼𝑣𝐻
𝑁
)
̅ −𝛼
𝑁

̅(
=𝑁

̅ 𝑣𝐿 −𝛼𝑣𝐻
𝑁
̅ −𝛼
𝑁

− 𝑐). It will be optimal for the musician to choose (𝑁, 𝑓) = (𝛼, 𝑉𝐴 ) if 𝛼 ≥
̅

̅ (1 − √𝑉𝐴−𝑉𝐶 ), and will choose (𝑁, 𝑓) = (𝑁
̅, 𝑁𝑣𝐿−𝛼𝑣𝐻 ) if 𝛼 < 𝑁
̅ (1 − √𝑉𝐴−𝑉𝐶 ).
𝑁
̅ −𝛼
𝑉 −𝑐
𝑁
𝑉 −𝑐
𝐴

𝐴
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∎

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. Proposition 1 can be directly shown from the integrated platform’s
optimal choice of 𝑝 in the integrated-platform case.
When 𝑁 ≤ 𝛼, the integrated platform will optimally choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 . Its profit is 𝜋𝑃 (𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 ) =
𝛼(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑓).
2𝛼

Next we discuss the case when 𝛼 < 𝑁 ≤ 1+𝛼.
(i)

If the integrated platform chooses 𝑝 > 𝑉𝐶 , its profit is 𝜋𝐼 = 𝛼(𝑝 − 𝑓), so it is optimal for the

integrated platform to choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 .
(ii)

If the integrated platform chooses 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 , its profit is 𝜋𝐼 (𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 ) = 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓)

(iii)

Suppose that the integrated platform chooses 𝜃𝑉𝐶 + (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 < 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶 . Suppose that

casual consumers with 𝜌𝑖 ≥ 𝜌0 will try to buy tickets in the first period. Thus 𝑛1 = 𝛼 + (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜌0 ).
If 𝑛1 ≤ 𝑁, i.e., 1 − 𝜌0 ≤

𝑁−𝛼
,
1−𝛼

all consumers trying to buy tickets in the first period will get a ticket
1

successfully, and there will be 𝑆𝑅 = (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜌0 ) ∫𝜌 (1 − 𝜌𝑖 )𝑑𝜌𝑖 =

(1−𝛼)(1−𝜌0 )2
2

0

their tickets in the second period. Note that
1 − 𝜌0 >

𝑁−𝛼
, all
1−𝛼

(1−𝛼)(1−𝜌0 )2
2

≤

(𝑁−𝛼)2

(𝑁−𝛼)(𝑁−𝑁𝛼)

<

2(1−𝛼)

2(1−𝛼)

<

consumers reselling

𝑁(1−𝛼)
. If
2

𝑛1 > 𝑁, i.e.,
𝑁

tickets sell out in the first period and consumers get tickets with probability 𝑛 , thus there
1

𝑁

1

1

0

(1−𝜌

)2

0
will be 𝑆𝑅 = 𝑛 ⋅ (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜌0 ) ∫𝜌 (1 − 𝜌𝑖 )𝑑𝜌𝑖 = 𝛼+(1−𝛼)(1−𝜌
⋅
)

tickets in the second period. Note that

0

(1−𝜌0 )2
𝛼+(1−𝛼)(1−𝜌0 )

⋅

𝑁(1−𝛼)
2

≤

𝑁(1−𝛼)
2

𝑁(1−𝛼)
.
2

consumers reselling their

Thus 𝑆𝑅 ≤

𝑁(1−𝛼)
2

no matter

whether 𝑛1 > 𝑁 or not.
Lemma 2 indicates that in equilibrium, it is either 𝑟 ∗ ≤ 𝑉𝐶 or tickets do not sell out in the first period.
We discuss the following cases.
(a) If tickets do not sell out in the first period and no casual consumers buy tickets in the first period,
there will be no consumers reselling tickets in the second period, so the integrated platform’s profit
is 𝜋𝐼 = 𝑁(𝑝 − 𝑓) < 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓).
(b) If tickets do not sell out in the first period and some casual consumers buy tickets in the first period,
we claim that 𝑟 ∗ ≤ 𝑉𝐶 . If not, 𝑟 ∗ = 𝑉𝐴 , so 𝐸[𝑈𝐴,1 ] > 𝐸[𝑈𝐴,2 ], and all avid fans will buy tickets in
the first period and get tickets successfully. In the second period there will be no avid fans wanting
tickets and there will be some casual fans reselling the tickets, so 𝑟 ∗ ≤ 𝑉𝐶 , which is contradictory
to 𝑟 ∗ = 𝑉𝐴 . Therefore 𝑟 ∗ ≤ 𝑉𝐶 . For the casual fan with 𝜌𝑖 = 𝜌0 , 0 ≤ 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1 ] ≤ 𝐸[𝑢𝐶,1 ] = 𝜌0 𝑉𝐶 +
(1 − 𝜌0 )(1 − 𝑘)𝑟 ∗ − 𝑝 ≤ [𝜌0 + (1 − 𝜌0 )(1 − 𝑘)]𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝, so 𝑝 ≤ [𝜌0 + (1 − 𝜌0 )(1 − 𝑘)]𝑉𝐶 . The
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integrated platform’s profit is 𝜋𝐼 = (𝑝 − 𝑓)𝑁 + 𝑆𝑅 𝑘𝑟 ∗ ≤ {[𝜌0 + (1 − 𝜌0 )(1 − 𝑘)]𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓}𝑁 +
𝑆𝑅 𝑘𝑉𝐶 = [𝜌0 + (1 − 𝜌0 )(1 − 𝑘) +
[𝜌0 + (1 − 𝜌0 )(1 − 𝑘) +

(1−𝛼)(1−𝜌0 )2
2𝑁

(1−𝛼)(1−𝜌0 )2
2𝑁

𝑘] 𝑉𝐶 𝑁 − 𝑁𝑓. Note that 1 − 𝜌0 ≤

𝑁−𝛼
,
1−𝛼

so 𝜋𝐼 ≤

𝑘] 𝑉𝐶 𝑁 − 𝑁𝑓 < 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓).

(c) If tickets sell out in the first period, then 𝑟 ∗ ≤ 𝑉𝐶 . For the casual fan with 𝜌𝑖 = 𝜌0 , 0 ≤ 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1 ] ≤
𝐸[𝑢𝐶,1 ] = 𝜌0 𝑉𝐶 + (1 − 𝜌0 )(1 − 𝑘)𝑟 ∗ − 𝑝 ≤ [𝜌0 + (1 − 𝜌0 )(1 − 𝑘)]𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝 , so 𝑝 ≤ [𝜌0 + (1 −
𝜌0 )(1 − 𝑘)]𝑉𝐶 . The integrated platform’s profit is 𝜋𝐼 = (𝑝 − 𝑓)𝑁 + 𝑆𝑅 𝑘𝑟 ∗ ≤ {[𝜌0 + (1 −
𝜌0 )(1 − 𝑘)]𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓}𝑁 + 𝑆𝑅 𝑘𝑉𝐶 = [𝜌0 + (1 − 𝜌0 )(1 − 𝑘) +
Note that

1−𝜌0
1−𝛼
⋅
𝛼+(1−𝛼)(1−𝜌0 )
2

(1−𝜌0 )2
𝛼+(1−𝛼)(1−𝜌0 )

⋅

(1−𝛼)

(1−𝜌0 )2

< 1, so 𝜌0 + (1 − 𝜌0 )(1 − 𝑘) +

𝛼+(1−𝛼)(1−𝜌0 )

2

⋅

𝑘] 𝑉𝐶 𝑁 − 𝑁𝑓 .

(1−𝛼)
2

𝑘 < 1. Thus

𝜋𝐼 < 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓).
The discussion of case (a) to (c) together show that if 𝜃𝑉𝐶 + (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 < 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶 , the
integrated platform will earn strictly less profit than when choosing 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 . Thus the integrated platform
will never choose 𝑝 ∈ (𝜃𝑉𝐶 + (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 , 𝑉𝐶 ).
(iv)

If the integrated platform chooses (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝜃𝑉𝐶 + (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 , by part (b) of

Lemma 2, all tickets sell out in the first period and 𝑟 ∗ = 𝑉𝐴 in the buying-spree equilibrium. The integrated
platform’s

profit

is

𝜋𝐼 = (𝑝 − 𝑓)𝑁 + 𝑆𝑅 𝑘𝑉𝐴 = 𝑁𝑥

𝑘𝑉𝐴
(1−𝛼)𝑥−{𝛼𝑦+(1−𝛼)𝑥}𝑦
2

{𝛼𝑦+(1−𝛼)𝑥}𝑦

+ 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓) =

𝑘𝑉𝐴
(1−𝛼)𝑥

2
𝑁𝑥[[𝛼𝑦+(1−𝛼)𝑥]𝑦
− 1] + 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓), where 𝑥 = 𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝 and 𝑦 = 𝑉𝐶 − (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 , so (1 − 𝜃)𝑦 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑦.

The integrated platform will thus choose 𝑥 ∈ [(1 − 𝜃)𝑦, 𝑦] to maximize 𝜋𝐼 . Note that 𝜋𝐼 < 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓)
when

𝑘𝑉𝐴
(1−𝛼)𝑥
2

[𝛼𝑦+(1−𝛼)𝑥]𝑦

< 1, and 𝜋𝐼 strictly increases with 𝑥 when

𝑘𝑉𝐴
(1−𝛼)𝑥
2

[𝛼𝑦+(1−𝛼)𝑥]𝑦

≥ 1. So if 𝜋𝐼 ≤ 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓)

when 𝑥 = 𝑦, then it is not optimal for the integrated platform to choose (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝜃𝑉𝐶 + (1 −
𝜃)(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 . By contrast, if 𝜋𝐼 > 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓), the integrated platform can earn a higher profit by choosing
𝑥 = 𝑦 (i.e., 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 ) than choosing 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 .

𝑘𝑉𝐴
(1−𝛼)𝑥
2

[𝛼𝑦+(1−𝛼)𝑥]𝑦

≥ 1 if and only if 𝛼 < 𝛼0 ≡

The integrated platform’s profit with 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 is 𝜋𝐼 = 𝑁 [𝑉𝐴 (1 −
(v)

𝑘(1+𝛼)
)−
2

(2−𝑘)𝑉𝐴 −2𝑉𝐶
𝑘𝑉𝐴

.

𝑓] .

If the integrated platform chooses 𝑝 < (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 , the integrated platform’s profit is 𝜋𝐼 =

(𝑝 − 𝑓)𝑁 + 𝑆𝑅 𝑘𝑟 ∗ < ((1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 − 𝑓)𝑁 +

𝑁(1−𝛼)
𝑘𝑉𝐴
2
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≤ 𝑁 [𝑉𝐴 (1 −

𝑘(1+𝛼)
)−
2

𝑓].

From the results in (i) to (v), we know that the integrated platform will choose either 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 , 𝑉𝐶 or
(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 . In addition, 𝜋𝐼 (𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 ) ≥ 𝜋𝐼 (𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 ) if and only if 𝛼 < 𝛼0 , and 𝜋𝐼 (𝑝 = (1 −
𝑘)𝑉𝐴 ) ≥ 𝜋𝐼 (𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 ) if and only if 𝑓 <

𝑁[1−

𝑘(1+𝛼)
]−𝛼
2

𝑁−𝛼

𝑉𝐴 .

∎

DERIVATION OF TABLE 2. We know from the proof of Proposition 1 that the integrated platform will
choose either 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 , 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 or 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 . 𝜋𝐼 (𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 ) ≥ 𝜋𝐼 (𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 ) if and only if 𝛼 < 𝛼0 ,
𝜋𝐼 (𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 ) ≥ 𝜋𝐼 (𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 ) if and only if 𝑓 <
and only if 𝑓 <

𝑁[1−

𝑘(1+𝛼)
]−𝛼
2

𝑁−𝛼

𝑉𝐴 , and 𝜋𝐼 (𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 ) ≥ 𝜋𝐼 (𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 ) if

𝑁𝑉𝐶 −𝛼𝑉𝐴
.
𝑁−𝛼

(i) If 𝛼 > 𝛼0 , then the integrated platform will choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 if and only if 𝑓 >
will choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 if and only if 𝑓 ≤
̅ 𝑉𝐶 −𝛼𝑉𝐴
𝑁
̅ −𝛼
𝑁

musician will choose 𝑓 =

𝑁𝑉𝐶 −𝛼𝑉𝐴
𝑁−𝛼

𝑁𝑉𝐶 −𝛼𝑉𝐴
𝑁−𝛼

, and

. Lemma 3 has shown that when 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃 , the

̅ , and the integrated platform will choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 .
and 𝑁 = 𝑁

When 𝛼 > 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃 , the musician will choose 𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴 and 𝑁 = 𝛼, and the integrated platform will
choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 .
(ii) If 𝛼 < 𝛼0 , then the integrated platform will choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 if and only if 𝑓 ≥
𝑁[1−

𝑘(1+𝛼)
]−𝛼
2

𝑁−𝛼

𝑉𝐴 , and will choose 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 if and only if 𝑓 <

𝑁[1−

𝑘(1+𝛼)
]−𝛼
2

𝑁−𝛼

𝑉𝐴 .

Now consider the musician’s optimal choice of 𝑁 and 𝑓.
If 𝑁 ≤ 𝛼, the musician’s profit is 𝜋𝑀 = 𝑁(𝑓 − 𝑐), so the musician will choose 𝑁 = 𝛼 and 𝑓 =
𝑉𝐴 .
If 𝑁 ≥ 𝛼 and 𝑓 >

𝑁[1−

𝑘(1+𝛼)
]−𝛼
2

𝑁−𝛼

𝑉𝐴 , the primary platform will choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 , and only avid

fans will buy tickets from the primary platform. So the musician’s profit is 𝜋𝑀 = 𝛼𝑓 − 𝑐𝑁. The
musician will choose 𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴 and 𝑁 = 𝛼.
If 𝑁 ≥ 𝛼 and 𝑓 ≤

𝑁[1−

𝑘(1+𝛼)
]−𝛼
2

𝑁−𝛼

𝑉𝐴 , the primary platform will choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 , so avid fans will

buy tickets in the first period and casual fans with 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶 will buy in the second period, and
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𝑁[1−

tickets sell out. The musician’s profit is 𝜋𝑀 = 𝑁(𝑓 − 𝑐). Because
̅ and 𝑓 =
the musician will choose 𝑁 = 𝑁

𝑁[1−

𝑘(1+𝛼)
]−𝛼
2

𝑁−𝛼

𝑘(1+𝛼)
]−𝛼
2

𝑁−𝛼

𝑉𝐴 .

̅,
Thus, the musician will choose either (𝑁, 𝑓) = (𝛼, 𝑉𝐴 ) or (𝑁

̅ [1−𝑘(1+𝛼)]−𝛼
𝑁
2

̅ −𝛼
𝑁

̅, 𝑓 =
and the profits are 𝜋𝑀 (𝑁 = 𝛼, 𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴 ) = 𝛼(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑐) and 𝜋𝑀 (𝑁 = 𝑁
̅(
𝑁

̅ [1−𝑘(1+𝛼)]−𝛼
𝑁
2

̅ −𝛼
𝑁

𝑉𝐴 increases in 𝑁,

𝑉𝐴 ) in equilibrium,

̅ [1−𝑘(1+𝛼)]−𝛼
𝑁
2

̅ −𝛼
𝑁

𝑉𝐴 ) =

̅ 2 +8(1+𝑁
̅ )(𝑉𝐴 −𝑐)]−𝑉𝐴 𝑘𝑁
̅

̅ [1 − √𝑉𝐴𝑘[𝑉𝐴𝑘𝑁
𝑉𝐴 − 𝑐) respectively. Define 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 ≡ 𝑁

4(𝑉𝐴 −𝑐)

].The

musician will choose (𝑁, 𝑓) = (𝛼, 𝑉𝐴 ) if and only if 𝛼 > 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 , and will choose (𝑁, 𝑓) =
̅,
(𝑁

̅ [1−𝑘(1+𝛼)]−𝛼
𝑁
2

̅ −𝛼
𝑁

𝑉𝐴 ) if and only if 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 .

Therefore, in the case of 𝛼0 < 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 :
̅,
If 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼0 , the musician will choose (𝑁 ∗ , 𝑓 ∗ ) = (𝑁

̅ [1−𝑘(1+𝛼)]−𝛼
𝑁
2

̅ −𝛼
𝑁

𝑉𝐴 ) , and the integrated

platform will choose 𝑝∗ = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 .
̅,
If 𝛼0 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃 , the musician will choose (𝑁 ∗ , 𝑓 ∗ ) = (𝑁

̅ 𝑉𝐶 −𝛼𝑉𝐴
𝑁
),
̅ −𝛼
𝑁

and the integrated

platform will choose 𝑝∗ = 𝑉𝐶 .
If 𝛼 > 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃 , the musician will choose (𝑁 ∗ , 𝑓 ∗ ) = (𝛼, 𝑉𝐴 ), and the integrated platform will
choose 𝑝∗ = 𝑉𝐴 .
In the case of 𝛼0 > 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 :
̅,
If 𝛼 < 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 , the musician will choose (𝑁 ∗ , 𝑓 ∗ ) = (𝑁

̅ [1−𝑘(1+𝛼)]−𝛼
𝑁
2

̅ −𝛼
𝑁

𝑉𝐴 ), and the integrated

platform will choose 𝑝∗ = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 .
If 𝛼 > 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 , the musician will choose (𝑁 ∗ , 𝑓 ∗ ) = (𝛼, 𝑉𝐴 ), and the integrated platform will
choose 𝑝∗ = 𝑉𝐴 .
One can directly calculate the profits of the musician, the integrated platform, and consumer
surplus with the 𝑁 ∗ , 𝑓 ∗ , and 𝑝∗ above. ∎
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PROOF

OF

2

𝑉

2

𝐴

𝐴

𝜖1 , 𝜖2 > 0 and they are sufficiently small. So 𝑘1 > 𝑘2 . Since
(2−𝑘)𝑉𝐴 −2𝑉𝐶
𝑘𝑉𝐴

𝑉

PROPOSITION 2. Let 𝑘1 = 1+𝛼 (1 − 𝑉𝐶 ) + 𝜖1 , and 𝑘2 = 1+𝛼 (1 − 𝑉𝐶 ) − 𝜖2 , where

<

(3−𝑘)𝑉𝐴 −3𝑉𝐶
(1+𝑘)𝑉𝐴 −𝑉𝐶

, so there exist 𝛼 such that

̅ 2 +8(1+𝑁
̅ )(𝑉𝐴 −𝑐)]−𝑉𝐴 𝑘1 𝑁
̅
√𝑉𝐴 𝑘1 [𝑉𝐴 𝑘1 𝑁
4(𝑉𝐴 −𝑐)
̅ 2 +8(1+𝑁
̅ )(𝑉𝐴 −𝑐)]−𝑉𝐴 𝑘2 𝑁
̅
√𝑉𝐴 𝑘2 [𝑉𝐴 𝑘2 𝑁
4(𝑉𝐴 −𝑐)

],
],

(3−𝑘1 )𝑉𝐴 −3𝑉𝐶
(1+𝑘1 )𝑉𝐴 −𝑉𝐶
(3−𝑘2 )𝑉𝐴 −3𝑉𝐶
(1+𝑘2 )𝑉𝐴 −𝑉𝐶

}

,

and

(2−𝑘)𝑉𝐴 −2𝑉𝐶
𝑘𝑉𝐴

decreases with 𝑘, and

(2−𝑘1 )𝑉𝐴 −2𝑉𝐶
𝑘1 𝑉𝐴

𝛼<

̅ [1 −
< 𝛼 < min{𝑁

(2−𝑘2 )𝑉𝐴 −2𝑉𝐶
𝑘2 𝑉𝐴

̅ [1 −
< min{𝑁

}.

When 𝑘1 and 𝑘2 satisfy the conditions above, if 𝑘 = 𝑘1 , 𝛼0 < 𝛼 < 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 , in equilibrium the
̅

̅, 𝑁𝑉𝐶 −𝛼𝑉𝐴 ) and the integrated platform will choose 𝑝∗ = 𝑉𝐶 ,
musician will choose (𝑁 ∗ , 𝑓 ∗ ) = (𝑁
̅ −𝛼
𝑁
̅ (𝑉𝐴 − 𝑉𝐶 ); if 𝑘 = 𝑘2 , 𝛼 < 𝛼0 < 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 , in equilibrium the musician
and the consumer surplus is 𝑁
will choose

(𝑁 ∗

,𝑓

∗)

̅,
= (𝑁

̅ [1−𝑘2 (1+𝛼)]−𝛼
𝑁
2

̅ −𝛼
𝑁

𝑉𝐴 ) and the integrated platform will choose 𝑝∗ =

̅ [𝛼𝑉𝐴 𝑘2 + (1−𝛼)[𝑉𝐶 −(1−𝑘2 )𝑉𝐴]]. Since 𝛼 < (3−𝑘2 )𝑉𝐴−3𝑉𝐶,
(1 − 𝑘2 )𝑉𝐴 , and the consumer surplus is 𝑁
(1+𝑘 )𝑉 −𝑉
2
2

̅ [𝛼𝑉𝐴 𝑘2 +
𝑁

(1−𝛼)[𝑉𝐶 −(1−𝑘2 )𝑉𝐴 ]
2

𝐴

𝐶

̅ (𝑉𝐴 − 𝑉𝐶 ). So, 𝑝∗ is smaller when 𝑘 = 𝑘2 than when 𝑘 = 𝑘1 ,
]<𝑁

but the consumer surplus is lower when 𝑘 = 𝑘2 than when 𝑘 = 𝑘1 . ∎

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3 AND PROPOSITION 4. One can derive the results by directly comparing
the outcomes of Lemma 3 and Table 2.

PROOF OF LEMMA 4. We prove Lemma 4 by contradiction. Suppose that in equilibrium 𝑟 ∗ >
𝑉𝐶 . As we discussed earlier, there are three possible equilibrium resale prices in our setting: 𝑉𝐴 ,
𝑉𝐶 , and zero, so 𝑟 ∗ = 𝑉𝐴 . If 𝑝 ≥ (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 , no casual fans will buy tickets from the primary market
in the first period, so no one will resell tickets in equilibrium (since avid fans can always attend
the concert). If 𝑝 < (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴, all casual fans will try to buy tickets in the first period and resell
them at the high resale price 𝑟 ∗ = 𝑉𝐴 regardless of whether they can attend the concert. Because
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all casual fans and avid fans will try to buy tickets in the first period, the concert will sell out in
the first period. Because in equilibrium all ticket resellers successfully resell their tickets, the
casual fans will not possess any tickets after all resale transactions have completed. This implies
that the number of consumers attending the concert cannot exceed the population of avid fans, 𝛼.
This contradicts the fact that 𝑁 > 𝛼 and the concert sells out in the primary market. This completes
the proof. ∎

PROOF OF LEMMA 5. Lemma 4 shows that 𝑟 ∗ ≤ 𝑉𝐶 . Suppose that the retail price is 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶 . A
casual fan’s expected utility of successfully buying a ticket in the first period is 𝐸[𝑢𝐶,1 ] = 𝜌𝑖 𝑉𝐶 +
(1 − 𝜌𝑖 )(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝. A necessary condition for the casual fan to try to buy tickets in the first
period is 𝐸[𝑢𝐶,1 ] ≥ 0, i.e., 𝜌𝑖 ≥ 1 −

𝑉𝐶 −𝑝
𝑘𝑉𝐶

second period will not exceed (1 − 𝛼)𝑁
(𝑝 − 𝑓)𝑁 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑁

𝑉𝐶 −𝑝
𝑘𝑉𝐶

. The number of casual fans who will resell tickets in the

𝑉𝐶 −𝑝
𝑘𝑉𝐶

. The integrated platform’s profit is 𝜋𝐼 ≤ 𝜋𝑃 + 𝜋𝑅 =

⋅ 𝑘𝑉𝐶 < (𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝)𝑁 , which is strictly lower than the integrated

platform’s profit if it chooses 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 . Thus the integrated platform will never choose 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶 . The
equilibrium outcome will be the same in the independent-platforms case and in the integratedplatform case. ∎
PROOF OF LEMMA 6. We consider the parameter region with 𝛽 ≤

̅
2𝛼−(1+𝛼)𝑁
1−𝛼

𝑉

and 𝑘 ≥ 1 − 𝑉𝐶 .
𝐴

If 𝑝 > 𝑉𝐶 , it is optimal for the integrated platform to choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 . Only avid fans will buy
tickets in the first period. No casual fans or scalpers will buy tickets in either period. The integrated
platform’s profit is 𝜋𝐼 = 𝛼(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑓).
If 𝑉𝐶 ≥ 𝑝 > (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 , no scalpers will buy tickets in the first period. Similar to the proof of
Proposition 1, the integrated platform will optimally choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 .
If 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 and 𝑟 ∗ = 𝑉𝐴 , all consumers and scalpers will buy in the first period. 𝛽
scalpers, 𝛼(𝑁 − 𝛽) avid fans and (1 − 𝛼)(𝑁 − 𝛽) casual fans will successfully receive the
131

ticket. All scalpers and
market is 𝑆𝑅 = 𝛽 +

(1−𝛼)(𝑁−𝛽)
2

casual fans will resell the tickets, so the supply in the resale

(1−𝛼)(𝑁−𝛽)

. 𝛼(1 − 𝑁 + 𝛽) avid fans will buy resale tickets in the resale

2

market, so 𝐷𝑅 = 𝛼(1 − 𝑁 + 𝛽). Because 𝛽 ≤

̅
2𝛼−(1+𝛼)𝑁
1−𝛼

number of tickets resold on the resale platform is 𝛽 +
profit is 𝜋𝐼 =

1+𝛼
2

will

next

prove

2𝛼−(1+𝛼)𝑁
1−𝛼

, 𝑆𝑅 < 𝐷𝑅 , so 𝑟 ∗ = 𝑉𝐴 . The

(1−𝛼)(𝑁−𝛽)
2

. The integrated platform’s total

𝑘(1+𝛼)

𝛽𝑘𝑉𝐴 + 𝑁 [𝑉𝐴 (1 −

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. 𝛼𝑆𝐶𝑃

≤

) − 𝑓]. ∎

2

̅[1 −
=𝑁
𝜕𝛼𝑆𝐶𝑃

that

𝜕𝛽

𝛽
𝑁

̅ (𝑁
̅ −𝛽)+8(1+𝑁
̅ )(𝑉𝐴 −𝑐)]−𝑉𝐴 𝑘(𝑁
̅ −𝛽)
√1− ̅ √𝑉𝐴 𝑘[𝑉𝐴 𝑘𝑁
4(𝑉𝐴 −𝑐)

>0

,

which

is

] . We

equivalent

to

̅

̅ − 𝛽)]2 + 8(1+𝑁)(𝑉𝐴−𝑐) 𝑉𝐴 𝑘(𝑁
̅ − 𝛽) − 𝑉𝐴 𝑘(𝑁
̅ − 𝛽) decreases with 𝛽. Let 𝑎 = 𝑉𝐴 𝑘(𝑁
̅−
√[𝑉𝐴 𝑘(𝑁
̅
𝑁
𝛽) > 0 and 𝑏 =

̅ )(𝑉𝐴 −𝑐)
8(1+𝑁
̅
𝑁

̅

̅ − 𝛽)]2 + 8(1+𝑁)(𝑉𝐴−𝑐) 𝑉𝐴 𝑘(𝑁
̅ − 𝛽) − 𝑉𝐴 𝑘(𝑁
̅−
> 0. So √[𝑉𝐴 𝑘(𝑁
̅
𝑁
2

𝛽) = √𝑎2 + 𝑎𝑏 − 𝑎 .
𝛽<

̅
2𝛼−(1+𝛼)𝑁
1−𝛼

𝜕(√𝑎2 +𝑎𝑏−𝑎)
𝜕𝛽

, one can show that

=

𝜕(√𝑎2 +𝑎𝑏−𝑎)
𝜕𝑎

𝜕𝛼𝑆𝐶𝑃
𝜕𝛽

⋅

𝜕𝑎
𝜕𝛽

=[

√𝑎2 +𝑏𝑎+𝑏

4

√𝑎2 +𝑎𝑏

− 1] ⋅ (−𝑉𝐴 𝑘) < 0 . When

> 0. Also note that if 𝛽 = 0, 𝛼𝑆𝐶𝑃 = 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 , so 𝛼𝑆𝐶𝑃 >

𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 when 𝛽 > 0.
𝛼1 =

̅ (𝑉𝐴 −𝑉𝐶 )
2𝑁
̅ −𝛽)𝑉𝐴 𝑘
(𝑁

− 1 is increasing in 𝛽, and if 𝛽 = 0, 𝛼1 = 𝛼0 . So 𝛼1 > 𝛼0 when 𝛽 > 0.

When 𝛽 = 0 and 𝛼 > min{𝛼0 , 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 }, Table 2 has shown that if 𝛽 = 0, the integrated platform
will set 𝑝∗ ≥ 𝑉𝐶 . But if 𝛽 > 0 and 𝛼 < min{𝛼1 , 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 }, in equilibrium the musician will choose
̅ and 𝑓 ∗ = 𝑉𝐴 [1 −
𝑁∗ = 𝑁

̅ −𝛽)
𝑘(1+𝛼)(𝑁
],
̅
2(𝑁 −𝛼)

and the integrated platform will choose 𝑝∗ = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐶 .

∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. We consider the case when 𝛿 → 0+ . From the previous analysis, we
know that in the independent-platforms case, the primary platform will choose 𝑝 such that no
casual fans will buy tickets in the first period. This is still true when 𝛿 → 0+ . The only consumers
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reselling tickets in the first period are avid fans who find themselves not being able to attend the
concert, whose population is 𝛿𝛼. The resale platform’s profit is 𝜋𝑅 = 𝛿𝛼𝑘𝑟 ∗ . Because 𝛿 → 0+ ,
changing 𝑘 will not affect the resale ticket demand, so 𝑟 ∗ will not change with 𝑘. Hence the resale
∗
platform will always choose 𝑘𝐼𝐷𝑃
= 1.
𝑉

Next we consider the integrated-platform case. If 𝑘 < 1 − 𝑉𝐶 , as is shown in Lemma 5, the
𝐴

integrated platform will never set 𝑝∗ < 𝑉𝐶 , and its profit is less than when it sets 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 and 𝑘 =
𝑉

1. If 𝑘 ≥ 1 − 𝑉𝐶 and 𝑁 ≤ 𝛼, in equilibrium the musician will choose 𝑓 ∗ = 𝑉𝐴 , and the integrated
𝐴

platform will choose 𝑝∗ = 𝑉𝐴 , so the integrated platform will receive zero profit. When 𝑘 ≥ 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴

2𝛼

and 𝛼 < 𝑁 ≤ 1+𝛼, it could either set 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 , 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 , or 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 . If 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 , the

integrated platform’s profit is 𝑁 [𝑉𝐴 (1 −

𝑘(1+𝛼)
2

) − 𝑓], which strictly decreases with 𝑘. So it will

𝑉

set 𝑘 = 1 − 𝑉𝐶 and set 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 . 𝜋𝐼 = 𝑁{(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓) +
𝐴

1−𝛼

(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑉𝐶 )}. If the integrated platform sets

2

𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 , its profit is 𝜋𝐼 = 𝛼(𝑉𝐻 − 𝑓), and in this case the integrated platform will optimally choose
𝑉

𝑘 = 1 . The platform will choose (𝑝, 𝑘) = (𝑉𝐶 , 1 − 𝑉𝐶 ) instead of (𝑉𝐴 , 1) if and only if 𝑓 >
𝐴

𝑁[(1−𝛼)𝑉𝐴 +(1+𝛼)𝑉𝐶 ]−2𝛼𝑉𝐴
2(𝑁−𝛼)

.

̅ , 𝑁[(1−𝛼)𝑉𝐴+(1+𝛼)𝑉𝐶 ]−2𝛼𝑉𝐴).
For the musician, it will either choose (𝑁, 𝑓) to be (𝛼, 𝑉𝐴 ) or (𝑁
2𝑉 (𝑁−𝛼)
𝐴

The musician’s profits are 𝜋𝑃 (𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴 ) = 𝛼(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑐) and 𝜋𝑃 (𝑓 =
̅ [(1 −
𝑁

𝑁[(1−𝛼)𝑉𝐴 +(1+𝛼)𝑉𝐶 ]−2𝛼𝑉𝐴
)
2𝑉𝐴 (𝑁−𝛼)

=

̅ (1+𝛼)(1−𝑉𝐴 )
𝑁
𝑉𝐶

̅ −𝛼)
2(𝑁

) 𝑉𝐴 − 𝑐], respectively. The performer will choose 𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴 if and only if 𝛼 >
̅2

̅

̅

̅ [1 − √(𝑉𝐴−𝑉𝐶 )[(𝑉𝐴 −𝑉𝐶 )𝑁 +8(1+𝑁)(𝑉𝐴−𝑐)]−(𝑉𝐴−𝑉𝐶 )𝑁] ≡ 𝛼2 . If 𝛼 > 𝛼2 , the musician will choose
𝑁
4(𝑉 −𝑐)
𝐴

∗

∗

𝑁 = 𝛼 and 𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴 , and the integrated platform will choose 𝑝∗ = 𝑉𝐴 and 𝑘 ∗ = 1. If 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼2 , the
̅ and 𝑓 ∗ = 𝑁[(1−𝛼)𝑉𝐴+(1+𝛼)𝑉𝐶 ]−2𝛼𝑉𝐴 , and the integrated platform will
musician will choose 𝑁 ∗ = 𝑁
2𝑉𝐴 (𝑁−𝛼)

𝑉𝐶

∗
choose 𝑝∗ = 𝑉𝐶 and 𝑘𝐼𝑁𝑇
= 1−𝑉 .∎
𝐴

PROOF

OF

2𝛼

𝑉

PROPOSITION 6. Suppose that 𝛼 < 𝑁 < 1+𝛼 and 𝑘𝐶 ≥ 1 − 𝑉𝐶 . In the competitive
𝐴

platform case, suppose the musician has chosen

2𝛼
1+𝛼
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> 𝑁 > 𝛼 and 𝑓, the integrated platform’s

total profit is 𝜋𝐼 (𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 )𝑉𝐴 ) = 𝑁 [𝑉𝐴 (1 −

𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 [2−(1−𝛼)𝜙]
2

) − 𝑓] if it sets 𝑝 = (1 −

𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 )𝑉𝐴 , its profit is 𝜋𝐼 (𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 ) = 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓) if 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 , and its profit is 𝜋𝐼 (𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 ) = 𝛼(𝑉𝐴 −
𝑓) if 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴.
𝜋𝐼 (𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 ) = 𝑁 [𝑉𝐴 (1 −
only if 𝛼 < 1 −

2[𝑉𝐶 −(1−𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 )𝑉𝐴 ]
𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 𝜙𝑉𝐴

𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 [2−(1−𝛼)𝜙]

. If 𝛼 < 1 −

choose 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 )𝑉𝐴 when 𝑓 <
𝑓≥

𝑘
[2−(1−𝛼)𝜙]
𝑁[1− 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃
]−𝛼
2

𝑁−𝛼

2

) − 𝑓] > 𝜋𝐼 (𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 ) = 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓) if and

2[𝑉𝐶 −(1−𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 )𝑉𝐴 ]
𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 𝜙𝑉𝐴

𝑘
[2−(1−𝛼)𝜙]
𝑁[1− 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃
]−𝛼
2

𝑁−𝛼

, the integrated platform will

𝑉𝐴 , and will charge 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 when

𝑉𝐴 .

Next we consider the musician’s decision. The musician will either choose (𝑁, 𝑓) = (𝛼, 𝑉𝐴 )
̅,
or (𝑁

̅ [1−𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 (1−1−𝛼𝜙)]−𝛼
𝑁
2

̅ −𝛼
𝑁

̅, 𝑓 =
𝑐) and 𝜋𝑀 (𝑁 = 𝑁

𝑉𝐴 ), and its corresponding profits are 𝜋𝑀 (𝑁 = 𝛼, 𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴 ) = 𝛼(𝑉𝐴 −
𝑁[1−𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 (1−

̅, 𝑓 =
musician will choose 𝑁 = 𝑁

1−𝛼
𝜙)]−𝛼
2

𝑁−𝛼
𝑁[1−𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 (1−

1−𝛼
𝜙)]−𝛼
2

𝑁−𝛼

̅ 𝑉𝐴 )2 +8𝑉𝐴 (𝑉𝐴 −𝑐)𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 [2−(1−𝑁
̅ )𝜙]−𝜙𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 𝑁
̅ 𝑉𝐴
√(𝜙𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 𝑁
4(𝑉𝐴 −𝑐)
2[𝑉𝐶 −(1−𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 )𝑉𝐴 ]
𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 𝜙𝑉𝐴
2[𝑉𝐶 −(1−𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 )𝑉𝐴 ]
𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 𝜙𝑉𝐴

̅ [1−𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 (1−1−𝛼𝜙)]−𝛼
𝑁

̅[
𝑉𝐴 ) = 𝑁

2

̅ −𝛼
𝑁

𝑉𝐴 − 𝑐] . The

̅ [1 −
𝑉𝐴 if and only if 𝛼 < 𝛼𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 ≡ 𝑁

] . Note that 𝛼𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 < 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 and 1 −

< 𝛼0 if and only if 𝜙 < 1 −

𝑘−𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃
𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃

1+𝛼

⋅ 1−𝛼 . So if min{𝛼𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 , 1 −

} < 𝛼 < min{𝛼0 , 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 } , in the competing-platform case, the musician will

choose 𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴 and 𝑁 = 𝛼, and the integrated platform will choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴, and in the integratedplatform case, the musician will choose 𝑓 = [1 −

̅ 𝑘(1+𝛼)
𝑁
]𝑉
̅ −𝛼) 𝐴
2(𝑁

̅ , and the integrated
and 𝑁 = 𝑁

platform will choose 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 . ∎
Endnotes:
̂1 , 𝑃𝑟
̂
̂∗
In our setting, in the buying-spree equilibrium, 𝑃𝑟
2,𝑅 , and 𝑟 can be uniquely calculated, and they will be
̂1 ) ⋅ 𝑃𝑟
̂
̂∗
exactly equal to their realized values. Hence 𝐸[(1 − 𝑃𝑟1 )𝑃𝑟2,𝑅 (𝑉𝐴 − 𝑟 ∗ )] = (1 − 𝑃𝑟
2,𝑅 (𝑉𝐴 − 𝑟 ) in equilibrium.
The similar reasoning applies to all the equations in this section.
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Appendix B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. Suppose that the referral fee is 𝑟 and all sellers’ retailing prices are
𝑝∗ (𝑟). In equilibrium, seller 𝑖 will not change its retail price 𝑝𝑖 away from 𝑝∗ (𝑟). Seller 𝑖’s profit
is
𝜋𝑖𝑆 (𝑝𝑖 ; 𝑟) =

𝐹0 (𝑚
̅ + 𝜇𝐾 − 𝑝∗ (𝑟))
⋅ [1 − 𝐹(𝑚
̅ − 𝑝∗ (𝑟) + 𝑝𝑖 )] ⋅ [(1 − 𝑟)𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐].
𝑛(1 − 𝐹(𝑚
̅ ))

The first-order condition is:

𝑑𝜋𝑖𝑆 (𝑝𝑖 ;𝑟)
𝑑𝑝𝑖

=

̅ +𝜇𝐾 −𝑝∗ (𝑟))
𝐹0 (𝑚
̅ ))
𝑛(1−𝐹(𝑚

⋅ {[1 − 𝐹(𝑚
̅ − 𝑝∗ (𝑟) + 𝑝𝑖 )](1 −
𝑐

𝑟) − 𝑓(𝑚
̅ − 𝑝∗ (𝑟) + 𝑝𝑖 ) ⋅ [(1 − 𝑟)𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐]} = 0, i.e., 𝑝𝑖 = 1−𝑟 + ℎ(𝑚
̅ − 𝑝∗ (𝑟) + 𝑝𝑖 ). In a
𝑐

symmetric equilibrium, 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝∗ (𝑟), therefore, 𝑝∗ (𝑟) = 1−𝑟 + ℎ(𝑚
̅ ). We also need to check the
second-order condition, i.e.,

𝑑2 𝜋𝑖𝑆 (𝑝𝑖 ;𝑟)
𝑑𝑝𝑖2

|𝑝𝑖 =𝑝∗(𝑟) < 0. This is equivalent to −2𝑓(𝑚
̅) −

𝑓 ′ (𝑚
̅ )ℎ(𝑚
̅ ) < 0. This is true because ℎ′ (𝑚
̅ ) < 0 implies that −

̅ )+ℎ(𝑚
̅ )𝑓 ′ (𝑚
̅)
𝑓(𝑚
̅)
𝑓(𝑚

< 0, which

implies that −2𝑓(𝑚
̅ ) − 𝑓 ′ (𝑚
̅ )ℎ(𝑚
̅ ) < 0.
Substituting 𝑝∗ (𝑟) =
̅ +𝜇𝐾 −
𝐹0 (𝑚

𝑐
̅ ))
−ℎ(𝑚
1−𝑟

𝑛

𝑐
1−𝑟

̃ , we have 𝜋̃𝑖𝑆∗ =
+ ℎ(𝑚
̅ ) into expressions of 𝜋̃𝑖𝑆 and 𝐷
𝑐

̃ = 𝐹0 (𝑚
(1 − 𝑟)ℎ(𝑚
̅ ) and 𝐷
̅ + 𝜇𝐾 − 1−𝑟 − ℎ(𝑚
̅ )). ∎

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. These results are straightforward because
and

̃
𝜕𝐷
𝜕𝜏

𝑐

= 𝑓0 (𝑚
̅ + 𝑞 − 1−𝑟 − ℎ(𝑚
̅ )) (1 − ℎ′ (𝑚
̅ )) ⋅

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. Since

̅
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝜏

̅
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝜏

𝜕𝑝̃∗
𝜕𝜏

= ℎ′ (𝑚
̅) ⋅

̅
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝜏

>0

< 0. ∎

< 0, it is sufficient to show that ,
𝑐

̅)
𝑑𝜋 𝑃∗ (𝑚
̅
𝑑𝑚

> 0.

𝑐

𝜋 𝑃∗ (𝑚
̅ ) = 𝜋 𝑃 (𝑟 ∗ (𝑚
̅ )) = 𝐹0 (𝑚
̅ + 𝜇𝐾 − 1−𝑟 ∗(𝑚̅) − ℎ(𝑚
̅ )) ⋅ 𝑟 ∗ (𝑚
̅ ) ⋅ (1−𝑟 ∗(𝑚̅) + ℎ(𝑚
̅ )). Because
𝑟 ∗ (𝑚
̅ ) maximizes the platform’s profit 𝜋 𝑃 , it must follow the FOC that
𝑐

𝑐

𝑟𝑐

𝑐

𝜕𝜋 𝑃∗
𝜕𝑟

|𝑟=𝑟 ∗ =
𝑐

𝐹0 (𝑚
̅ + 𝜇𝐾 − 1−𝑟 − ℎ(𝑚
̅ )) [(1−𝑟)2 + ℎ(𝑚
̅ )] − (1−𝑟)2 (1−𝑟 + ℎ(𝑚
̅ )) 𝑓0 (𝑚
̅ + 𝜇𝐾 − 1−𝑟 −
ℎ(𝑚
̅ )) = 0.
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When consumer search becomes easier, 𝑚
̅ increases. By envelope theorem,
𝜕𝜋 𝑃
̅
𝜕𝑚

̅)
𝑑𝜋 𝑃∗ (𝑚
̅
𝑑𝑚

𝑐

=

𝑐

|𝑟=𝑟 ∗(𝑚̅) = 𝐹0 (𝑚
̅ + 𝜇𝐾 − 1−𝑟 ∗(𝑚̅) − ℎ(𝑚
̅ )) 𝑟 ∗ (𝑚
̅ )ℎ′ (𝑚
̅ ) + 𝑓0 (𝑚
̅ + 𝜇𝐾 − 1−𝑟 ∗(𝑚̅) −
𝑐

𝑐

ℎ(𝑚
̅ )) (1 − ℎ′ (𝑚
̅ )) ⋅ 𝑟 ∗ (𝑚
̅ ) ⋅ (1−𝑟 ∗(𝑚̅) + ℎ(𝑚
̅ )) = 𝐹0 (𝑚
̅ + 𝜇𝐾 − 1−𝑟 ∗(𝑚̅) −
𝑐

ℎ(𝑚
̅ )) 𝑟 ∗ (𝑚
̅ )ℎ′ (𝑚
̅ ) + 𝐹0 (𝑚
̅ + 𝜇𝐾 − 1−𝑟 ∗(𝑚̅) − ℎ(𝑚
̅ )) (1 − ℎ′ (𝑚
̅ )) ⋅
𝐹0 (𝑚
̅ + 𝜇𝐾 −
̅ )(1−𝑟 ∗ (𝑚
̅ ))
ℎ(𝑚
𝑐

𝑐
̅
1−𝑟 ∗ (𝑚

̅ )(1−𝑟 ∗ (𝑚
̅ ))
ℎ(𝑚

− ℎ(𝑚
̅ )) ⋅ [(1 +
)

𝑐
̅)
2 +ℎ(𝑚
̅̅̅))
(1−𝑟∗ (𝑚
𝑐
2
̅̅̅))
(1−𝑟∗ (𝑚

=

2

) − ℎ′ (𝑚
̅ ) (1 − 𝑟 ∗ (𝑚
̅) +

𝑐

2

)] > 0. ∎
𝑐𝑟

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. The platform’s profit is 𝜋 𝑃 = 𝐷(𝑟, 𝑚
̅ ) ⋅ (1−𝑟 + 𝑟ℎ(𝑚
̅ )). The FOC
is

𝜕𝜋 𝑃∗
𝜕𝑟

|

̅)
𝑟=𝑟 ∗ (𝑚

= 0 for all 𝑚
̅ , thus 0 =

𝑑

𝜕𝜋𝑃
|
∗ ̅̅̅)
𝜕𝑟 𝑟=𝑟 (𝑚

̅
𝑑𝑚

Because the second-order condition guarantees
𝜕 2 𝜋𝑃

only if 𝜕𝑟𝜕𝑚̅ |𝑟=𝑟 ∗(𝑚̅) > 0. Moreover
𝑑

𝜕𝑙𝑛𝜋𝑃
|
∗ ̅̅̅)
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑟 𝑟=𝑟 (𝑚

̅
𝑑𝑚

only if

𝑑

𝜕 2 𝜋𝑃

𝜕𝑙𝑛𝜋𝑃
|
∗ ̅̅̅)
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑟 𝑟=𝑟 (𝑚

̅
𝑑𝑚

𝜕𝑙𝑛𝜋𝑃
|
∗ ̅̅̅)
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑟 𝑟=𝑟 (𝑚

̅
𝑑𝑚
𝑑

𝜕𝑙𝑛𝜋𝑃
|
∗ ̅̅̅)
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑟 𝑟=𝑟 (𝑚

̅
𝑑𝑚

𝜕𝑙𝑛𝜋𝑃
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑟

̅
𝑑𝑚

𝜕2 𝜋𝑃
𝜕𝑟 2

𝜕2 𝜋𝑃 |𝑟=𝑟∗ (𝑚
̅̅̅)
𝜕𝑟 2
𝜕𝜋𝑃 𝑟
⋅ )
𝜕𝑟 𝜋𝑃

𝑑(

=

̅)
𝑟 ∗ (𝑚

|𝑟=𝑟 ∗(𝑚̅) ⋅

̅)
𝜕𝑟 ∗ (𝑚
̅
𝜕𝑚

< 0, therefore,

𝜕 2 𝜋𝑃

𝑟

̅
𝑑𝑚

= 𝜕𝑟𝜕𝑚̅ ⋅ 𝜋𝑃 +

𝜕 2 𝜋𝑃

̅)
𝑟 ∗ (𝑚

𝜕 2 𝜋𝑃

+ 𝜕𝑟𝜕𝑚̅ |𝑟=𝑟 ∗(𝑚̅) .

𝜕𝜋 𝑃
𝜕𝑟

̅)
𝜕𝑟 ∗ (𝑚
̅
𝜕𝑚

𝜕𝑙𝑛𝜋 𝑃
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑟

> 0 if and

𝜕𝜋𝑃

⋅

−𝑟⋅ ̅̅̅
𝜕𝑚
.
(𝜋 𝑃 )2

= 𝜕𝑟𝜕𝑚̅ |𝑟=𝑟 ∗ (𝑚̅) ⋅ 𝜋𝑃 (𝑟 ∗(𝑚̅)) + 0 = 𝜕𝑟𝜕𝑚̅ |𝑟=𝑟 ∗(𝑚̅) ⋅ 𝜋𝑃 (𝑟 ∗(𝑚̅)). Hence

Note that
𝑑

𝑑

=

Thus

̅)
𝜕𝑟 ∗ (𝑚
̅
𝜕𝑚

> 0 if and

> 0.

= 𝜖𝐷,𝑟 (𝑟, 𝑚
̅) +

> 0 if and only if
> 0 if and only if

𝑐𝑟
̅ ))
+𝑟ℎ(𝑚
1−𝑟

𝜕(

̅)
𝜕𝜖𝐷,𝑟 (𝑟 ∗ ,𝑚
̅
𝜕𝑚

𝜕𝑟

>

̅ )|
𝜕|𝜖𝐷,𝑟 (𝑟 ∗ ,𝑚
̅
𝜕𝑚

⋅

𝑟
𝑐𝑟
̅)
+𝑟ℎ(𝑚
1−𝑟

= 𝜖𝐷,𝑟 (𝑟, 𝑚
̅) +

̅ )𝑟 ∗ (𝑚
̅)
𝑐ℎ′ (𝑚
(𝑐+ℎ(𝑚
̅ )(1−𝑟 ∗ (𝑚
̅ )))

<

2

(𝑐+ℎ(𝑚
̅ )(1−𝑟 ∗ (𝑚
̅ )))
𝑚max

Thus

. Because 𝜖𝐷,𝑟 (𝑟 ∗ , 𝑚
̅ ) < 0,

̅ )𝑟 ∗ (𝑚
̅)
−𝑐ℎ′ (𝑚

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. Let 𝐺(𝑥) = ∫𝑥

̅ )(1−𝑟)2
𝑐+ℎ(𝑚
.
̅ )(1−𝑟)
𝑐+ℎ(𝑚

2

. ∎

(𝑚 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑚)𝑑𝑚. One can show that 𝐺 ′ (𝑥) =

𝐹(𝑥) − 1 < 0 and 𝐺 ′′ (𝑥) = 𝑓(𝑥) > 0. When filtering is not available, the consumer’s
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̅ , satisfies ∫̅𝑀max (𝑀 − 𝑀
̅ )𝑓𝑀 (𝑀)𝑑𝑀 = 𝜏, where
acceptance aggregate match level threshold, 𝑀
𝑀
𝑀max = 𝑚max + 𝜇𝐾 . Note that 𝑓(𝑚) = 0 when 𝑚 > 𝑚max . The left-hand-side can be written
as:
𝑚

𝜏 = ∫𝑀̅ max

+𝜇𝐾

𝑚max +(𝜇𝐾 −𝜇𝑘 )
̅ )𝑓𝑀 (𝑀)𝑑𝑀 = ∑𝐾
̅ − 𝜇𝑘 ))𝑓(𝑚)𝑑𝑚 =
(𝑀 − 𝑀
(𝑚 − (𝑀
𝑘=1 𝜙𝑘 ∫𝑀
̅ −𝜇
𝑘

𝑚max
𝐾
̅
̅
∑𝐾
𝑘=1 𝜙𝑘 ∫𝑀
̅ −𝜇 (𝑚 − (𝑀 − 𝜇𝑘 ))𝑓(𝑚)𝑑𝑚 = ∑𝑘=1 𝜙𝑘 𝐺(𝑀 − 𝜇𝑘 ).
𝑘

𝐾
̅
̅
Because 𝐺 ′′ (𝑥) > 0 and ∑𝐾
𝑘=1 𝜙𝑘 𝜇𝑘 = 0, 𝐺(𝑀) = 𝐺(∑𝑘=1 𝜙𝑘 (𝑀 − 𝜇𝑘 ) ) <

̅
∑𝐾
𝑘=1 𝜙𝑘 𝐺(𝑀 − 𝜇𝑘 ) = 𝜏.
When filtering is available, the consumers will search products with 𝑚𝑖𝑗 = 𝜇𝐾 and will buy
𝑚
̅ ).
a product only if 𝑚𝑖𝑗 > 𝑚
̅. 𝑚
̅ is determined by 𝐺(𝑚
̅ ) = ∫𝑚̅ max (𝑚 − 𝑚
̅ )𝑓(𝑚)𝑑𝑚 = 𝜏 > 𝐺(𝑀

̅ >𝑚
̅𝑁 − 𝑀
̅ = 𝜇𝐾 + 𝑚
̅ < 𝜇𝐾 .
Because 𝐺(𝑥) is a strictly decreasing function, 𝑀
̅ . Thus 𝑀
̅ −𝑀
𝐾
̅
̅
̅
̅
Moreover,𝐺(𝑚
̅ ) = 𝜏 = ∑𝐾
𝑘=1 𝜙𝑘 𝐺(𝑀 − 𝜇𝑘 ) < ∑𝑘=1 𝜙𝑘 𝐺(𝑀 − 𝜇𝐾 ) = 𝐺(𝑀 − 𝜇𝐾 ), so 𝑀 − 𝜇𝐾 <

̅𝑁 − 𝑀
̅ > 0. ∎
𝑚
̅ , i.e., 𝑀

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. Consider the marginal impact of filtering on the sellers’
equilibrium price. Let max |𝜇𝑘 | → 0. Let 𝜎𝜇2 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜇).
𝑘

̅ and 𝑚
First we determine the relationship between 𝑀
̅ . Observe that:
̅ − 𝜇) = 𝐸𝜇 𝐺(𝑚
̅ −𝑚
𝜏 = 𝐺(𝑚
̅ ) = 𝐸𝜇 𝐺(𝑀
̅ + (𝑀
̅ − 𝜇))
̅ −𝑚
= 𝐸𝜇 [𝐺(𝑚
̅ ) + 𝐺 ′ (𝑚
̅ )(𝑀
̅ − 𝜇) +
𝐺
̅ −𝑚
= 𝐺(𝑚
̅ ) + 𝐺 ′ (𝑚
̅ )(𝑀
̅) +

̅ −𝑚
= 𝐺(𝑚
̅ ) + 𝐺 ′ (𝑚
̅ )(𝑀
̅) +
̅)
𝐺 ′′ (𝑚

̅ −𝑚
Thus 𝑀
̅ ≅ − 𝐺′ (𝑚̅) ⋅
̅)
ℎ(𝑚
̅)
ℎ𝑁 (𝑀

= ℎ(𝑚
̅) ⋅

2
𝜎𝜇

2

̅ −𝜇)
𝐸𝜇 𝑓(𝑀
̅ −𝜇)]
𝜇 [1−𝐹(𝑀

= ℎ(𝑚
̅) ⋅ 𝐸

=

′′ (𝑚
̅)

2
̅)
𝐺 ′′ (𝑚
2
2
𝜎𝜇

2

̅)
𝐺 ′′ (𝑚
2

̅ −𝑚
̅ −𝑚
(𝑀
̅ − 𝜇)2 + 𝑜((𝑀
̅ − 𝜇)2 )]

̅ −𝑚
̅ −𝑚
[(𝑀
̅ )2 + 𝜎𝜇2 ] + 𝑜((𝑀
̅ )2 ) + 𝑜(𝜎𝜇2 )
̅ −𝑚
𝜎𝜇2 + 𝑜(𝑀
̅ ) + 𝑜(𝜎𝜇2 ) .

̅)
𝑓(𝑚

⋅ 1−𝐹(𝑚̅) =

2
𝜎𝜇

2

1

⋅ ℎ(𝑚̅)

̅ −𝑚
̅ +(𝑀
̅ −𝜇))
𝐸𝜇 𝑓(𝑚
̅
[1−𝐹(𝑚
̅
̅ −𝜇))]
+(𝑀
−𝑚
𝜇

= ℎ(𝑚
̅) ⋅ 𝐸

̅̅̅)
𝑓′′ (𝑚
2 )]
̅ −𝑚
̅ −𝑚
(𝑀
̅ −𝜇)2 +𝑜(𝑀
̅ )+𝑜(𝜎𝜇
2
̅̅̅)
𝑓′ (𝑚
2 )]
̅ −𝑚
̅ −𝑚
̅ −𝑚
(𝑀
̅ ))−𝑓(𝑚
̅ )(𝑀
̅ −𝜇)−
̅ −𝜇)2 +𝑜(𝑀
̅ )+𝑜(𝜎𝜇
𝐸𝜇 [(1−𝐹(𝑚
2

̅ −𝑚
̅ )+𝑓 ′ (𝑚
̅ )(𝑀
̅ −𝜇)+
𝐸𝜇 [𝑓(𝑚
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≅
=

̅̅̅) 2
𝑓′′ (𝑚
𝜎𝜇
2
̅̅̅) 2
𝑓′ (𝑚
̅ −𝑚
(1−𝐹(𝑚
̅ ))−𝑓(𝑚
̅ )(𝑀
̅ )−
𝜎𝜇
2
2
2
̅̅̅) 𝜎𝜇 𝑓(𝑚
̅̅̅)
̅̅̅) 𝜎𝜇
𝑓′ (𝑚
𝑓′′ (𝑚
2
1+ ̅̅̅) ⋅ ⋅
+ ̅̅̅) ⋅
𝜎𝜇
̅̅̅) 𝑓(𝑚
𝑓(𝑚 2 1−𝐹(𝑚
2
2
2
′
𝜎
𝜎
̅̅̅)
̅̅̅)
̅̅̅)
2
𝑓(𝑚
𝑓 (𝑚
𝜇 𝑓(𝑚
𝜇
1−
⋅ ⋅
−
⋅
̅̅̅) 2 1−𝐹(𝑚
̅̅̅) 1−𝐹(𝑚
̅̅̅) 2
1−𝐹(𝑚

̅)
1−𝐹(𝑚
̅)
𝑓(𝑚

⋅

̅ −𝑚
̅ )+𝑓 ′ (𝑚
̅ )(𝑀
̅ )+
𝑓(𝑚

≅1+

̅)
𝑓 ′′ (𝑚

̅)
𝑓(𝑚

̅)
𝑓(𝑚

̅)
2𝑓 ′ (𝑚

[ 𝑓(𝑚̅) + 1−𝐹(𝑚̅) ⋅ 1−𝐹(𝑚̅) + 1−𝐹(𝑚̅)]

The above expression is greater than 1 if and only if𝑓 ′′ (𝑚
̅ ) ⋅ ℎ2 (𝑚
̅ ) + 2𝑓 ′ (𝑚
̅ ) ⋅ ℎ(𝑚
̅) +
𝑓(𝑚
̅ ) > 0.
∎

PROOF OF RESULT 3. According to Lemma 4, the consumers will search the non-premium
products if and only if 𝑢0 < −𝑝∗ (𝑟) + 𝑚
̅ and 𝑚1𝑗 < 𝑝1 − 𝑝∗ (𝑟) − Δ𝑞 + 𝑚
̅ . Following
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
Wolinsky (1986), the profit of a non-premium seller’s profit is 𝜋𝑖𝑆 (𝑝𝑖 ) = 𝐹0 (𝑚
− 𝑝∗ (𝑟)) ⋅
𝐹(𝑝1 − 𝑝∗ (𝑟) − Δ𝑞 + 𝑚
̅) ⋅

[1−𝐹(𝑚
̅ −𝑝∗ (𝑟)+𝑝𝑖 )]⋅[(1−𝑟)𝑝𝑖 −𝑐]
𝑛−1

and independent of 𝑝𝑖 , so the optimal 𝑝𝑖 should satisfy

. Note that the first two terms is positive
̅ −𝑝∗ (𝑟)+𝑝𝑖 )]⋅[(1−𝑟)𝑝𝑖 −𝑐]
𝜕[1−𝐹(𝑚
𝜕𝑝𝑖

= 0. The

𝑐

FOC implies that 𝑝∗ (𝑟) = 1−𝑟 + ℎ(𝑚
̅ ). ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6. A seller’s profit as a function of its price 𝑝𝑖 is 𝜋𝑖 =
𝐄𝜏 [

̅ (𝜏)+𝜇𝐾 −𝑝∗ (𝑟))
𝐹0 (𝑚
̅ (𝜏)))
𝑛(1−𝐹(𝑚

[1 − 𝐹(𝑚
̅ (𝜏) − 𝑝∗ + 𝑝𝑖 )][(1 − 𝑟)𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐]].

The seller’s optimal price 𝑝̃∗ satisfies the FOC, i.e.,
̅̅̅(𝜏)+𝜇𝐾 −𝑝
̃ ∗)
𝐹 (𝑚
[1−𝐹(𝑚
̅ (𝜏)−𝑝̃∗ +𝑝𝑖 )][(1−𝑟)𝑝𝑖 −𝑐]]
𝜕𝐄𝜏 [ 0
̅̅̅(𝜏)))
𝑛(1−𝐹(𝑚

𝜕𝑝

𝐄𝜏 [

̅ (𝜏)+𝜇𝐾 −𝑝̃∗ )
𝐹0 (𝑚
̅̅̅(𝜏)))
(1−𝐹(𝑚

(𝑝̃∗ − 𝑝̃𝜏∗ )] = 𝐄𝜏 [

= 0 when 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝̃∗ . Rearranging terms, we get 0 =
̅ (𝜏)+𝜇𝐾 −𝑝̃∗ )
𝐹0 (𝑚
̅ (𝜏))
ℎ(𝑚

̅̅̅(𝜏))
𝑓(𝑚

(𝑝̃∗ − 𝑝̃𝜏∗ )]. Let 𝑎(𝜏) =

̅̅̅(𝜏)+𝜇𝐾 −𝑝
̃ ∗)
𝐹0 (𝑚
̅̅̅(𝜏))
ℎ(𝑚
̅̅̅(𝜏)+𝜇𝐾 −𝑝
̃∗)
𝐹 (𝑚
𝐄𝜏 [ 0
]
̅̅̅(𝜏))
ℎ(𝑚

,

which is a strict decreasing function of 𝜏, because 𝐹0 (𝑚
̅ + 𝜇𝐾 − 𝑝∗ (𝑟)) increases with 𝑚
̅ , ℎ(𝑚
̅)
decreases with 𝑚
̅ , and 𝑚
̅ decreases with 𝜏. Note that 𝐄𝜏 [𝑎(𝜏)] = 1, so 𝑝̃∗ = 𝐄𝜏 [𝑎(𝜏)𝑝̃𝜏∗ ]. Note
that 𝑝̃𝜏∗ strictly increases with 𝜏, so 𝑝̃∗ = 𝐄𝜏 [𝑎(𝜏)𝑝̃𝜏∗ ] = 𝐄𝜏 [𝑎(𝜏)]𝐄𝜏 [𝑝̃𝜏∗ ] + 𝐂𝐨𝐯𝜏 (𝑎(𝜏), 𝑝̃𝜏∗ ) <
𝐄𝜏 [𝑝̃𝜏∗ ].

∎
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HETEROGENEOUS SEARCH COST: SPECIAL CASE. Consider the case with
1

𝑐

2

𝜏

𝜏~Uniform(0, 𝜏max ), where 𝜏max < 8 (1 − 1−𝑟) . The FOC can be simplified as ∫0 max 𝜏
1−√2𝜏−𝑝̃∗
√2𝜏

𝑐

√2𝜏max

(𝑝̃∗ − 1−𝑟 − √2𝜏) 𝑑𝜏 = 0. Let 𝑠 = √2𝜏, so∫0
∗

One can derive that 𝑝̃ =

1−

𝑐
1−𝑟

2

1
3
− √ (√2𝜏max −
3

2

1−

𝑐
1−𝑟

2

(1 − 𝑠 − 𝑝̃∗ ) (𝑝̃∗ −

2

1−

) +(

𝑐
1−𝑟

2

𝑐
1−𝑟

1
max

− 𝑠) 𝑑𝑠 = 0.

2

) , which decreases with

𝜏max . ∎
FIXED REFERRAL FEE. Seller 𝑖’s profit is 𝜋𝑖𝑆 (𝑝𝑖 ; 𝑑) =

̅ +𝜇𝐾 −𝑝∗ (𝑑))
𝐹0 (𝑚
̅ ))
𝑛(1−𝐹(𝑚

⋅ [1 −

𝐹(𝑚
̅ − 𝑝∗ (𝑑) + 𝑝𝑖 )] ⋅ [𝑝𝑖 − 𝑑 − 𝑐].
The equilibrium price is 𝑝̃∗ (𝑑) = 𝑑 + 𝑐 + ℎ(𝑚
̅ ), the equilibrium profit is 𝜋̃𝑖𝑆∗ =
̅ +𝜇𝐾 −𝑑−𝑐−ℎ(𝑚
̅ ))
𝐹0 (𝑚
𝑛

̃ = 𝐹0 (𝑚
ℎ(𝑚
̅ ). Total market demand is 𝐷
̅ + 𝜇𝐾 − 𝑑 − 𝑐 − ℎ(𝑚
̅ )). The

platform’s profit is 𝜋̃ 𝑃∗ = 𝐹0 (𝑚
̅ + 𝜇𝐾 − 𝑑 − 𝑐 − ℎ(𝑚
̅ )) ⋅ 𝑑.
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Appendix C
̅ be a consumer’s the
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. Suppose that the firm is high-type. Let 𝑝̃𝑖,2
expectation of type-𝑖 firm’s second-period price after seeing the first-period price. The marginal
∗
consumer who purchases in the first period has a valuation 𝑣̃𝐻,1
=

𝑝̃𝐻,1 −𝑝̃̅𝐻,2
1−𝜇

, and the marginal

∗
consumer who purchase the product in the second period has a valuation 𝑣̃𝐻,2
=
0
period, the firm maximizes its second period profit 𝜋𝐻,2
=(
∗
leads to the optimal 𝑝2 of 𝑝̃𝐻,2
=

𝜇(𝑝̃𝐻,1 −𝑝̃̅𝐻,2 )+(1−𝜇)𝑐
2(1−𝜇)

𝑝̃𝐻,1 −𝑝̃̅𝐻,2
1−𝜇

−

𝑝̃𝐻,2
𝜇

𝑝̃𝐻,2
𝜇

. In the second

)(𝑝̃𝐻,2 − 𝑐), which

. Because consumers have rational

(1−𝜇)𝑐+𝜇𝑝̃𝐻,1
∗
∗
̅ , one can show that 𝑝̃𝐻,2
expectations, i.e., 𝑝̃𝐻,2
= 𝑝̃𝐻,2
=
. In the first period, the firm
2−𝜇

maximizes

its

(1−𝜇)𝑐+𝜇𝑝
̃ 𝐻,1
2−𝜇

𝜇
(1−𝜇)2
4−3𝜇

+

)(

(1−𝜇)𝑐+𝜇𝑝̃𝐻,1

(𝜇−𝑐)2
4𝜇

total

2−𝜇

profit

𝜋̃𝐻 = (1 −

𝑝̃𝐻,1 −

(1−𝜇)𝑐+𝜇𝑝
̃ 𝐻,1
2−𝜇

) (𝑝̃𝐻,1 − 𝑐) + (

1−𝜇
(2−𝜇)2

𝑐

𝑝̃𝐻,1 −

(1−𝜇)𝑐+𝜇𝑝
̃ 𝐻,1
2−𝜇

1−𝜇

𝜇(2−𝜇)

−

𝑐

∗
∗
− 𝑐), which yields 𝑝̃𝐻,1
= 2(4−3𝜇) + 2 , 𝑝̃𝐻,2
= 2(4−3𝜇) + 2 and 𝑝̃𝐻∗ =

. Finally, since we focus on the situation where in equilibrium some consumers buy

∗
∗
the product in the second period, so, 𝑣̃𝐻,1
> 𝑣̃ ∗𝐻,2 and 𝑝̃𝐻,2
> 𝑐, which yields 𝑐 <

(2−𝜇)2
4−3𝜇

𝜇.

The derivation of the low-type’s optimal price and profit is similar. The low-type firm’s
(2−𝜇)2

𝜇(2−𝜇)

∗
∗
optimal first-period price and profit are 𝑝̃𝐿,1
= 2(4−3𝜇), 𝑝̃𝐿,2
= 2(4−3𝜇) and 𝜋̃𝐿∗ =

(1−𝜇)2
4−3𝜇

𝜇

+ 4.

PROOF OF LEMMA 2. We follow three steps to find the LMSE. First, we analyze all separating
∗
equilibria and find 𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑝
, the separating equilibrium which gives the high-type firm the highest
∗
payoff. Next we examine all pooling equilibria and find 𝜎𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
, the pooling equilibrium which gives
∗
the high-type firm the highest payoff. Finally we compare the high-type firm’s profit in 𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑝
and
∗
𝜎𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
to determine the PBE giving the high-type firm the highest payoff.

Step 1: finding 𝝈∗𝒔𝒆𝒑
Consider

separating

equilibria.

Denote

a

separating

equilibrium

𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑝 =

({𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,𝑡 }𝑡=1,2 , {𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,𝑡 }𝑡=1,2 , 𝐺(𝑣), 𝜙) , where 𝑝𝑖,𝑠𝑒𝑝,𝑡 is the i-type firm’s price in period 𝑡 ,
𝐺: [0,1] → {𝑏𝑢𝑦, 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑏𝑢𝑦} describes whether consumer 𝑣 purchase the product in the first period,
and 𝜙 = 𝜙(𝑖|𝑝) is consumers’ belief of the probability that the firm is i-type conditional seeing
the first-period price 𝑝. We assume that 𝜙 is consistent wherever Bayes rule can be applied. One
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can see that for all PBE that are sequential, 𝐺(𝑣) maximizes consumer 𝑣’s expected utility, so the
value of 𝐺(𝑣) can be pinned down given {𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,𝑡 }𝑡=1,2 , {𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,𝑡 }𝑡=1,2 and 𝜙 except for the
marginal consumer who has zero mass on interval [0,1]. Moreover, because in the second period,
both the high-type firm and the low-type firm will charge their perfect-information price
conditional on 𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 , 𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 and 𝜙, the values of 𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,2 and 𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,2 are functions of 𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 ,
𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 and 𝜙 . Therefore, it is convenient to denote a separating equilibrium 𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑝 =
(𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 , 𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 , 𝜙) without loss of generality.
Note that in a separating equilibrium the high-type firm has no incentive to mimic the low-type
firm and consumers can correctly infer the firm’s type. Thus, the low-type firm will set its prices
(2−𝜇)2

(2−𝜇)𝜇

∗
∗
the same as in the perfect information case, i.e. 𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
= 2(4−3𝜇) and 𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,2
= 2(4−3𝜇). Low(2−𝜇)2

∗
type firm’s profit is 𝜋𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
= 4(4−3𝜇).

The high-type firm’s profit is 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝 = (1 −
(1−𝜇)𝑐+𝜇𝑝1
2−𝜇

𝜇

(1−𝜇)𝑐+𝜇𝑝1

)(

2−𝜇

𝑝1 −

(1−𝜇)𝑐+𝜇𝑝1
2−𝜇

1−𝜇

𝑝1 −

) (𝑝1 − 𝑐) + (

(1−𝜇)𝑐+𝜇𝑝1
2−𝜇

1−𝜇

−

− 𝑐). In a separating equilibrium, we need to guarantee the low-type firm

has no incentive to mimic the high-type firm. If the low-type firm mimics the high-type firm, its
profit

𝜋𝐿 (𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 |𝜙(𝐻|𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1) = 1)

is

𝜋𝐿 (𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 , 𝑝𝐿,2 |𝜙(𝐻|𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 ) = 1) = (1 −
(

𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 −

(1−𝜇)𝑐+𝜇𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
2−𝜇

−

1−𝜇

𝑝𝐿,2
𝜇

𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 −

(1−𝜇)𝑐+𝜇𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1

2−𝜇

Therefore,

) 𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 +

1−𝜇

𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 −

.

2−𝜇

(1−𝜇)𝑐+𝜇𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1

) 𝑝𝐿,2 . The FOC gives

𝜋𝐿 (𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 , 𝑝𝐿,2 |𝜙(𝐻|𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 ) = 1) = (1 −
𝜇(𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 −

𝑝̅2 =

and

∗
𝑝𝐿,2

=

𝜇(𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 −

(1−𝜇)𝑐+𝜇𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
2−𝜇

)

, so

2(1−𝜇)

(1−𝜇)𝑐+𝜇𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
2−𝜇

1−𝜇

) 𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 +

(1−𝜇)𝑐+𝜇𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 2

)

2−𝜇
4(1−𝜇)2

. Therefore, to guarantee the low-type firm has no incentive to mimic the

∗
high-type firm, we need to have 𝜋𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
≥ 𝜋𝐿 (𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 , 𝑝𝐿,2 |𝜙(𝐻|𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1) = 1) . This is equivalent

to

𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 ∈ (0,

(2−𝜇)2 +2𝑐(1−𝜇)−(2−𝜇)√𝑐(4+𝑐−4𝜇)

(2−𝜇)2 +2𝑐(1−𝜇)+(2−𝜇)√𝑐(𝑐+4(1−𝜇))

2(4−3𝜇)

2(4−3𝜇)

]⋃[

,1 − 𝜇 +

∗
𝑐) .One can show that under this condition, 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝 is maximized at 𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
=
(2−𝜇)2 +2𝑐(1−𝜇)+(2−𝜇)√𝑐(𝑐+4(1−𝜇))
2(4−3𝜇)

firm

the

highest

. Thus, in the separating equilibrium which gives the high-type

profit,

∗
𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
=

(2−𝜇)2 +2𝑐(1−𝜇)+(2−𝜇)√𝑐(𝑐+4(1−𝜇))
2(4−3𝜇)

141

,

∗
𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,2
=

𝑐 2 (4−5𝜇)+(2−𝜇)2 𝜇+2𝑐(8+𝜇(11𝜇−20+√𝑐(𝑐+4(1−𝜇))))
∗
𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
=

,

4(2−𝜇)(4−3𝜇)
(2−𝜇)2 𝜇+𝑐 2 (4−5𝜇)+2𝑐𝜇(5𝜇+√𝑐(𝑐+4(1−𝜇))−6)

(2−𝜇)2

(2−𝜇)2

(2−𝜇)𝜇

∗
∗
∗
, 𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
= 2(4−3𝜇), 𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,2
= 2(4−3𝜇), 𝜋𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
= 4(4−3𝜇).

4𝜇(4−3𝜇)

Step 2: finding 𝝈∗𝒑𝒐𝒐𝒍
Consider pooling equilibria. Let 𝜎𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 = (𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 , 𝜙) be a pooling equilibrium, where 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
is the price charged by both the high-type firm and the low-type firm in the first period, and 𝜙 =
𝜙(𝑖|𝑝) is consumers’ belief of the probability that the firm is i-type conditional on the first-period
price 𝑝. In equilibrium, consumers believe that the firm is high-type with probability 𝛼, and that
the firm is low-type with probability 1 − 𝛼. If a consumer 𝑣 purchases the product in the first
period, her utility is 𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 = 𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 . If she purchases the product in the second period, her
utility is 𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 = 𝛼 ⋅ max{𝜇𝑣 − 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 , 0} + (1 − 𝛼) ⋅ max{𝜇𝑣 − 𝑝𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 , 0}.
For more interesting analysis, we assume that in the second period there are some consumers
who purchase the product even if the firm turns out to be high-type in the second period, which
requires that the marginal consumer in the first period 𝑣1∗ satisfies 𝜇 > 𝜇𝑣1∗ > 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 . Therefore,
𝑣1∗ − 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 = 𝛼(𝜇𝑣1∗ − 𝑝̅𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 ) + (1 − 𝛼)(𝜇𝑣1∗ − 𝑝̅𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 ), where 𝑝̅𝑖,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 is the belief of the
second-period price in the pooling equilibrium if the firm is type-i. Simple algebra yields 𝑣1∗ =
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 −𝛼𝑝̅ 𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 −(1−𝛼)𝑝̅ 𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
1−𝜇
𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
𝜇
𝑝𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
𝜇

. The high-type firm’s second period profit is 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 = (𝑣1∗ −

)(𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 − 𝑐) , and the low-type firm’s second period profit is 𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 = (𝑣1∗ −

∗
) 𝑝𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 . First order condition yields 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
=

∗
and 𝑝𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
=

𝜇(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 −𝛼𝑝̅ 𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 −(1−𝛼)𝑝̅ 𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 )
2(1−𝜇)

𝜇(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 −𝛼𝑝̅ 𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 −(1−𝛼)𝑝̅ 𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 )+(1−𝜇)𝑐
2(1−𝜇)

. Because the consumer has rational belief,

∗
∗
∗
𝑝̅𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 = 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
and 𝑝̅𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 = 𝑝𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
, which yields 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
=
∗
𝑝𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
=

𝜇(2𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 −𝛼𝑐)

equilibrium

2(2−𝜇)

, and 𝑣1∗ =

is

2𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 −𝛼𝑐
2−𝜇

∗
𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2

2
−4𝜇(4−3𝜇)𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
+4𝜇((2−𝜇)2 +𝑐(2+2𝛼(1−𝜇)−𝜇))𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 +𝑐(𝑐(2−(1+𝛼)𝜇)2 −4(2−𝜇)2 𝜇)

4𝜇(2−𝜇)2

𝜇

𝑐

+2 ,

.
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∗
) (𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
− 𝑐) =

, and the low-type firm’s

profit in a pooling equilibrium is 𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 = (1 − 𝑣1∗ )𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 + (𝑣1∗ −
4(2−𝜇)2

2(2−𝜇)

. Therefore the high-type firm’s profit in a pooling

𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 = (1 − 𝑣1∗ )(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 − 𝑐) + (𝑣1∗ −

2
−4(4−3𝜇)𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
+4((2−𝜇)2 +2𝛼𝑐(1−𝜇))𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 +𝛼2 𝑐 2 𝜇

𝜇(2𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 −𝛼𝑐)

∗
𝑝𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2

𝜇

∗
) 𝑝𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
=

Let 𝛭(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ) = {𝜙|𝜙(𝐻|𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ) = 𝛼} be the set of beliefs which are consistent with the
pooling equilibrium (i.e., 𝜙(𝐻|𝑝1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ) = 𝛼). We proceed to show that (𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 , 𝜙) is a PBE
for some 𝜙 ∈ 𝑀(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 ) if and only if neither the high-type nor low-type firm has an incentive to
deviate to another price 𝑝′ when consumers have a belief 𝜙 ∈ 𝑀(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 ) with 𝜙(𝐻|𝑝1 = 𝑝′ ) =
0, ∀𝑝′ ≠ 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 (i.e., consumers believe that the firm is low-type with probability 1 when 𝑝′ ≠
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ). This is because on the one hand, if this condition is satisfied, then (𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 , 𝜙) is a PBE.
On the other hand, if this condition is violated, then for any other 𝜙 ∈ 𝑀(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ), (𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 , 𝜙)
cannot be a PBE since deviating to 𝑝′ will give the firm even higher profit. Consequently, this
condition is a necessary and sufficient condition for (𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 , 𝜙) to be a PBE for some 𝜙 ∈
𝑀(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ). Hence hereafter we only consider the belief 𝜙 such that 𝜙(𝐻|𝑝1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ) = 𝛼 and
𝜙(𝐻|𝑝1 ≠ 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ) = 0.
The highest possible profit a low-type firm can get by deviating is its perfect-information profit
(2−𝜇)2

∗
𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣
= 𝜋𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝 = 4(4−3𝜇) . For the high-type firm, suppose it deviates by charging

𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 ≠ 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 in the first period. In the second period, its profit is 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,2 =
(

𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 −𝑝̅2
1−𝜇

−

𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,2
𝜇

) (𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,2 − 𝑐)

because 𝜙(𝐻|𝑝1 = 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1) = 0 . When 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 <
𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 ≥
∗
𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,2

(2−𝜇)𝑐
2𝜇

𝑝̅2 =

,where
(2−𝜇)𝑐
2𝜇

𝜇𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1
2−𝜇

, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,2 < 0 . When

, the high-type firm’s optimal second-period price and profit are

𝜇

𝑐

= 2−𝜇 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 + 2 and

∗
𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,2

=

(2𝜇𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 −𝑐(2−𝜇))

2

4𝜇(2−𝜇)2

.

The high-type firm’s total profit by deviating is:
𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣 =
(1 −

𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 −𝑝̅2
1−𝜇

𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 −𝑝̅2

) (𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 − 𝑐) + (

−

𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,2

1−𝜇
(2−𝜇)𝑐

𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 >

𝜇

.

2𝜇

(1 − 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 )(𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 − 𝑐), 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 ≤

{

) (𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,2 − 𝑐),

(2−𝜇)𝑐
2𝜇

Next we will find the 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 which maximizes 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣 . (1) When 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 ≤
(2−𝜇)𝑐
2𝜇

, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣 increases with 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 if 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 ≤

𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 >

1+𝑐
2

(2−𝜇)2

. Because we have assumed 𝑐 ≤ (4−3𝜇) 𝜇 ,

Therefore, when 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 ≤
𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣 =

(2𝜇−(2−𝜇)𝑐)(2−3𝜇)𝑐
4𝜇 2

(2−𝜇)𝑐
2𝜇

1+𝑐
2

1+𝑐

≥

2

and decreases if

(2−𝜇)𝑐
2𝜇

is always true.

,𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣 is maximized when 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 =

. (2) When

𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 >
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(2−𝜇)𝑐
2𝜇

(2−𝜇)𝑐
2𝜇

with

, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣 increases with

𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 when 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 ≤
(2−𝜇)2

When 𝑐 ≤ (2+𝜇)(4−3𝜇) 𝜇 ,
(2−𝜇)𝑐
2𝜇

(2+𝑐−𝜇)(2−𝜇)
2(4−3𝜇)

(2+𝑐−𝜇)(2−𝜇)
2(4−3𝜇)

≥

, and decreases when 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 ≥

(2−𝜇)𝑐
2𝜇

.

4𝜇(4−3𝜇)
2(2−𝜇)𝑐 2 +𝜇(2−𝜇)2 −2𝑐𝜇(6−5𝜇)

>

4𝜇(4−3𝜇)
∗
𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1
=

(2+𝑐−𝜇)(2−𝜇)
2(4−3𝜇)

One

can

show

(2𝜇−(2−𝜇)𝑐)(2−3𝜇)𝑐

.

(2+𝑐−𝜇)(2−𝜇)

with 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣 =

2(4−3𝜇)

that

(2−𝜇)2

𝑐 ≤ (2+𝜇)(4−3𝜇) 𝜇,

when

. As a result, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣 is maximized at

4𝜇 2

∗
with 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣
=

2(4−3𝜇)

is always true. Therefore, when 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 >

, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣 is maximized when 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 =

2(2−𝜇)𝑐 2 +𝜇(2−𝜇)2 −2𝑐𝜇(6−5𝜇)

(2+𝑐−𝜇)(2−𝜇)

2(2−𝜇)𝑐 2 +𝜇(2−𝜇)2 −2𝑐𝜇(6−5𝜇)

.

4𝜇(4−3𝜇)

In a pooling equilibrium with the first-period price 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 , neither the high-type nor the lowtype firm has an incentive to deviate, which requires
∗
𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣

.

∗
𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 ≥ 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣
and 𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 ≥

∗
𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 ≥ 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣

Condition

is

equivalent

2
−4𝜇(4−3𝜇)𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
+4𝜇((2−𝜇)2 +𝑐(2+2𝛼(1−𝜇)−𝜇))𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 +𝑐(𝑐(2−(1+𝛼)𝜇)2 −4(2−𝜇)2 𝜇)
4𝜇(2−𝜇)2

2(2−𝜇)𝑐 2 +𝜇(2−𝜇)2 −2𝑐𝜇(6−5𝜇)

,

4𝜇(4−3𝜇)
(2−𝜇)2 +𝑐(2−𝜇+2𝛼(1−𝜇))

[

2(4−3𝜇)

−

which

can

be

equivalently

(2−𝜇)√4𝑐(4+𝛼−(3−𝛼)𝜇)−4(4−3𝜇)−(2−𝛼)𝛼𝑐 2
2(4−3𝜇)

]

.

We

,

2(4−3𝜇)
(2−𝜇)√4𝑐(4+𝛼−(3−𝛼)𝜇)−4(4−3𝜇)−(2−𝛼)𝛼𝑐 2
2(4−3𝜇)

define

2(4−3𝜇)

4(2−𝜇)2
2(4−3𝜇)
(2−𝜇)2 +2𝛼𝑐(1−𝜇)

[

2(4−3𝜇)

−
−

as

,

(2−𝜇)2 +𝑐(2−𝜇+2𝛼(1−𝜇))

𝒫1 = [

2(4−3𝜇)

−

+

(2−𝜇)2

2(4−3𝜇)

(2−𝜇)√𝛼𝑐(4(1−𝜇)+𝛼𝑐) (2−𝜇)2 +2𝛼𝑐(1−𝜇)

,

2(4−3𝜇)

+

≥ 4(4−3𝜇) , which is equivalent to 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ∈

(2−𝜇)√𝛼𝑐(4(1−𝜇)+𝛼𝑐) (2−𝜇)2 +2𝛼𝑐(1−𝜇)
2(4−3𝜇)

2(4−3𝜇)

𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ∈

] . The condition 𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 ≥ 𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣 implies that

2
−4(4−3𝜇)𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
+4((2−𝜇)2 +2𝛼𝑐(1−𝜇))𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 +𝛼2 𝑐 2 𝜇

(2−𝜇)2 +2𝛼𝑐(1−𝜇)

expressed

,

(2−𝜇)√4𝑐(4+𝛼−(3−𝛼)𝜇)−4(4−3𝜇)−(2−𝛼)𝛼𝑐 2 (2−𝜇)2 +𝑐(2−𝜇+2𝛼(1−𝜇))

[

≥

(2−𝜇)√4𝑐(4+𝛼−(3−𝛼)𝜇)−4(4−3𝜇)−(2−𝛼)𝛼𝑐 2 (2−𝜇)2 +𝑐(2−𝜇+2𝛼(1−𝜇))
2(4−3𝜇)

to

2(4−3𝜇)

+
+

(2−𝜇)√𝛼𝑐(4(1−𝜇)+𝛼𝑐)

] . We define 𝒫2 =

2(4−3𝜇)

(2−𝜇)√𝛼𝑐(4(1−𝜇)+𝛼𝑐)

] . Therefore, there

2(4−3𝜇)

exists a belief 𝜙 ∈ 𝑀(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ) such that (𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 , 𝜙) is a PBE if and only if 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ∈ 𝒫1 ⋂𝒫2 .
The LMSE gives the high-type firm the highest profit among all PBE. One can show that
without the restriction of 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ∈ 𝒫1 ⋂𝒫2 , 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 is maximized when 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 =
(2−𝜇)2 +𝑐(2−𝜇+2𝛼(1−𝜇))
2(4−3𝜇)

.

It

is

obvious

√4(1−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 −2(1−𝜇) (2−𝜇)2 +𝑐(2−𝜇+2𝛼(1−𝜇))

,

𝑐

high-type

firm

the

2(4−3𝜇)

highest

profit

(2−𝜇)2 +𝑐(2−𝜇+2𝛼(1−𝜇))
2(4−3𝜇)

∈ 𝒫1 .

When 𝛼 ≥

∈ 𝒫2 , so the pooling PBE outcome which gives the
∗
are 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
=

𝜇(2−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 (4−(2+(2−𝛼)𝛼)𝜇)−2𝑐𝜇(6−5𝜇−2𝛼(1−𝜇))
4𝜇(4−3𝜇)

that

.
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(2−𝜇)2 +𝑐(2−𝜇+2𝛼(1−𝜇))

When

2(4−3𝜇)

𝛼<

∗
and 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
=

√4(1−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 −2(1−𝜇)
𝑐

,

(2−𝜇)2 +𝑐(2−𝜇+2𝛼(1−𝜇))
2(4−3𝜇)

is higher than the upper bound of 𝒫2 ,

(2−𝜇)2 +2𝛼𝑐(1−𝜇)
2(4−3𝜇)

+

(2−𝜇)√𝛼𝑐(4(1−𝜇)+𝛼𝑐)

.

2(4−3𝜇)

Therefore, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 is an increasing function of 𝑝1,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 on 𝒫1 ⋂𝒫2 . As a result, the pooling PBE
∗
outcome which gives the high-type firm the highest profit are 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
=
(2−𝜇)√𝛼𝑐(4(1−𝜇)+𝛼𝑐)
2(4−3𝜇)

(2−𝜇)2 +2𝛼𝑐(1−𝜇)
2(4−3𝜇)

𝜇(2−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 (4−(3+2𝛼)𝜇)−2𝑐𝜇(6−5𝜇−√𝛼𝑐(4(1−𝜇)+𝛼𝑐))

∗
and 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
=

4𝜇(4−3𝜇)

+

.

Step 3: comparing 𝝈∗𝒔𝒆𝒑 and 𝝈∗𝒑𝒐𝒐𝒍
∗
∗
∗
We compare 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
and 𝜋𝑠𝑒𝑝,𝐻
to choose the LMSE. One can see that 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
=
(2−𝜇)2 𝜇+𝑐 2 (4−5𝜇)+2𝑐𝜇(5𝜇+√𝑐(𝑐+4(1−𝜇))−6)

is independent of 𝛼 . When 𝛼 ≥

4𝜇(4−3𝜇)
∗
𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
=

𝜇(2−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 (4−(2+(2−𝛼)𝛼)𝜇)−2𝑐𝜇(6−5𝜇−2𝛼(1−𝜇))
4𝜇(4−3𝜇)

𝜇(2−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 (4−(3+2𝛼)𝜇)−2𝑐𝜇(6−5𝜇−√𝛼𝑐(4(1−𝜇)+𝛼𝑐))
4𝜇(4−3𝜇)

function

𝛼

of

.

𝛼<

When

4𝜇(4−3𝜇)
∗
𝜕𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙

𝜕𝛼

∗
𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
is a continuous function of 𝛼.

=

,

√4(1−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 −2(1−𝜇)

∗
, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
=

𝑐

it

is

increases with 𝛼. When 𝛼 ≥

𝜇(2−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 (4−(2+(2−𝛼)𝛼)𝜇)−2𝑐𝜇(6−5𝜇−2𝛼(1−𝜇))

𝜇) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛼) > 0. As a result,

,

𝑐

4𝜇(4−3𝜇)

𝑐

∗
. Next we show that 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
is an increasing

√4(1−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 −2(1−𝜇)

𝜇(2−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 (4−(3+2𝛼)𝜇)−2𝑐𝜇(6−5𝜇−√𝛼𝑐(4(1−𝜇)+𝛼𝑐))

∗
𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
=

. When 𝛼 <

√4(1−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 −2(1−𝜇)

. Because 𝑣1∗ =

𝑐[2(1−𝜇)−𝑐(1−𝛼)]

2(4−3𝜇)
∗
Therefore, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙

obvious

that

√4(1−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 −2(1−𝜇)
𝑐

∗
2𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
−𝛼𝑐

2−𝜇

,

< 1 , 2(1 −

> 0. Moreover, one can show that

is a strictly increasing function of 𝛼

when 𝛼 ∈ (0,1).
𝛼≥

When

√4(1−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 −2(1−𝜇)

∗
∗
𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
≥ 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝

,

𝑐

𝜇(2−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 (4−(2+(2−𝛼)𝛼)𝜇)−2𝑐𝜇(6−5𝜇−2𝛼(1−𝜇))
4𝜇(4−3𝜇)
√4−

that

(2−𝜇)2 𝜇+𝑐 2 (4−5𝜇)+2𝑐𝜇(5𝜇+√𝑐(𝑐+4(1−𝜇))−6)

≥

,

4𝜇(4−3𝜇)

.

2𝑐
1−𝜇

8𝑐
𝑐 2 4𝑐
𝑐
𝑐
𝑐
−2(
) +
(2+
)−2(1−
)
√
1−𝜇
1−𝜇
1−𝜇 1−𝜇
1−𝜇
1−𝜇

>

2𝑐
1−𝜇

that

implies

i.e.,

8𝑐
𝑐 2 4𝑐
𝑐
𝑐
𝑐
−2(
) +
(2+
)−2(1−
)
√
1−𝜇
1−𝜇
1−𝜇 1−𝜇
1−𝜇
1−𝜇

𝛼≥
√4−

,

∗
𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝

One

show

that

√4(1−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 −2(1−𝜇)
𝑐

(2−𝜇)2 𝜇+𝑐 2 (4−5𝜇)+2𝑐𝜇(5𝜇+√𝑐(𝑐+4(1−𝜇))−6)

=

can

4𝜇(4−3𝜇)
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. This result, together with the fact

∗
is independent of 𝛼 and 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙

is a

∗
∗
strictly increasing function of 𝛼 when 𝛼 ∈ (0,1), implies that 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
≥ 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
if and only if 𝛼 ≥
√4−

8𝑐
𝑐 2 4𝑐
𝑐
𝑐
𝑐
−2(
) +
(2+
)−2(1−
)
√
1−𝜇
1−𝜇
1−𝜇 1−𝜇
1−𝜇
1−𝜇
2𝑐
1−𝜇

≡ 𝛼 ∗.

In conclusion, when consumers do not know the firm’s cost, when 𝛼 < 𝛼 ∗ , the equilibrium is
separating,

∗
𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝

(2−𝜇)2 𝜇+𝑐 2 (4−5𝜇)+2𝑐𝜇(5𝜇+√𝑐(𝑐+4(1−𝜇))−6)

=

4𝜇(4−3𝜇)

∗
𝛼 ∗ , the equilibrium is pooling, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
=
∗
𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
=

and 𝜋̂𝐿∗ =

(2−𝜇)2 +4(1−𝜇)𝛼𝑐−(1−𝛼2 )𝑐 2
4(4−3𝜇)
(1−𝜇)2
4−3𝜇

(2−𝜇)2

∗
and 𝜋𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
= 4(4−3𝜇) . When 𝛼 ≥

𝜇(2−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 (4−(2+(2−𝛼)𝛼)𝜇)−2𝑐𝜇(6−5𝜇−2𝛼(1−𝜇))

and

4𝜇(4−3𝜇)

. When consumers know the firm’s cost, 𝜋̂𝐻∗ =

(1−𝜇)2
4−3𝜇

+

(𝜇−𝑐)2
4𝜇

,

𝜇

+ 4. ∎

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. We compare the firm’s optimal price and profit when its cost is not
known to consumers with that when the cost is known.
(2−𝜇)2

𝑐

∗
∗
𝑝̃𝐻,1
− 𝑝𝐻,𝑆𝑒𝑝,1
= 2(4−3𝜇) + 2 −

(2−𝜇)2 +2𝑐(1−𝜇)+(2−𝜇)√𝑐(𝑐+4(1−𝜇))
2(4−3𝜇)

(2−𝜇)(𝑐−√𝑐(𝑐+4(1−𝜇)))

=

2(4−3𝜇)

𝜇

∗
∗
∗
∗
𝑝̃𝐻,2
− 𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,2
= 2−𝜇 (𝑝̃𝐻,1
− 𝑝𝐻,𝑆𝑒𝑝,1
) < 0.
(2−𝜇)2

𝑐

∗
∗
𝑝̃𝐻,1
− 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
= 2(4−3𝜇) + 2 −

(2−𝜇)2 +𝑐(2−𝜇+2𝛼(1−𝜇))

=

2(4−3𝜇)

2𝑐(1−𝜇)(1−𝛼)
2(4−3𝜇)

> 0.

𝜇

∗
∗
∗
∗
𝑝̃𝐻,2
− 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
= 2−𝜇 (𝑝̃𝐻,1
− 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
) > 0.
∗
∗
∗
∗
𝑝̃𝐿,1
= 𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
, 𝑝̃𝐿,2
= 𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,2
.
(2−𝜇)2

∗
∗
𝑝̃𝐿,1
− 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
= 2(4−3𝜇) −

(2−𝜇)2 +𝑐(2−𝜇+2𝛼(1−𝜇))
2(4−3𝜇)

=−

𝑐(2−𝜇+2𝛼(1−𝜇))
2(4−3𝜇)

< 0.

𝜇

∗
∗
∗
∗
𝑝̃𝐿,2
− 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
= 2−𝜇 (𝑝̃𝐿,1
− 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
) > 0.

𝜋̃𝐻∗

−

∗
𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝

=

𝑐(−√𝑐+4(1−𝜇)+𝑐+2(1−𝜇))

∗
𝜋̃𝐻∗ − 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
=

2(4−3𝜇)

𝑐
1−𝜇

(1−𝜇)2 ⋅

=

2(4−3𝜇)
(1−𝜇)2 𝜇

(1−𝛼)𝑐(4−4𝜇−(1−𝛼)𝑐)
4(4−3𝜇)

𝑐
𝑐
+2−√
+4)
1−𝜇
1−𝜇

(

> 0.

∗
. Because 𝑐 < (2−𝜇)(4−3𝜇), 𝜋̃𝐻∗ − 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
> 0.

∗
𝜋̃𝐿∗ = 𝜋𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
.
∗
∗
∗
𝜋̃𝐿∗ − 𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
< 0 because 𝜋̃𝐿∗ = 𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣
≤ 𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
.
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< 0.

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.
Cost transparency strictly increases the firm’s expected first-period and second-period prices:
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
(𝛼𝑝̃𝐻,1
+ (1 − 𝛼)𝑝̃𝐿,1
) − (𝛼𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
+ (1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
) = 𝛼(𝑝̃𝐻,1
− 𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
) + (1 −
∗
∗
𝛼)(𝑝̃𝐿,1
− 𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
) < 0.
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
(𝛼𝑝̃𝐻,1
+ (1 − 𝛼)𝑝̃𝐿,1
) − (𝛼𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
+ (1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
) = 𝛼(𝑝̃𝐻,1
− 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
) + (1 − 𝛼)(𝑝̃𝐿,1
−
∗
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
)=𝛼

2𝑐(1−𝜇)(1−𝛼)
2(4−3𝜇)

− (1 − 𝛼)

𝑐(2−𝜇+2𝛼(1−𝜇))
2(4−3𝜇)

2−𝜇

= − 2(4−3𝜇) < 0. ∎

Cost transparency strictly increases the expected consumer surplus:
We define 𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑡 as consumer surplus in period 𝑡 if the firm’s cost is 𝑐𝑖 , and 𝐶𝑆𝑖 = 𝐶𝑆𝑖,1 +
∗

1
𝑣̃
∗
∗
∗
∗
̃ 𝑖∗ = 𝐶𝑆
̃ 𝑖,1
̃ 𝑖,2
𝐶𝑆𝑖,2 is the total consumer surplus. 𝐶𝑆
+ 𝐶𝑆
= ∫𝑣̃∗ (𝑠 − 𝑝̃𝑖,1
)𝑑𝑠 + ∫𝑣̃ ∗1,𝑖(𝜇𝑠 − 𝑝̃𝑖,2
)𝑑𝑠,
1,𝐻

∗
∗
∗
𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑠𝑒𝑝
= 𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
+ 𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑠𝑒𝑝,2
=

∗
𝑣𝑖,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1

1
(𝑠
∫𝑣∗
𝑖,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1

∗
− 𝑝𝑖,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
)𝑑𝑠 + ∫𝑣∗

1

∗
∗
∗
𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
= 𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
+ 𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
= ∫𝑣∗

𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1

2,𝑖

∗
(𝜇𝑠 − 𝑝𝑖,𝑠𝑒𝑝,2
)𝑑𝑠

𝑖,𝑠𝑒𝑝,2
∗
𝑣𝑖,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
∗
𝑣𝑖,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2

∗
(𝑠 − 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
)𝑑𝑠 + ∫

and

∗
(𝜇𝑠 − 𝑝𝑖,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
)𝑑𝑠 , where

̃ ] = 𝛼 ⋅ 𝐶𝑆
̃ 𝐻∗ + (1 − 𝛼)𝐶𝑆
̃ 𝐿∗ when the cost is
𝑖 ∈ {𝐻, 𝐿}. The expected consumer surplus is 𝐸[𝐶𝑆
∗
∗
known to consumers, is 𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝑠𝑒𝑝 ] = 𝛼 ⋅ 𝐶𝑆𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
+ (1 − 𝛼)𝐶𝑆𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
when the cost is not known to
∗
∗
∗
consumers and 𝜎 is separating, and is 𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 ] = 𝛼 ⋅ 𝐶𝑆𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 + (1 − 𝛼)𝐶𝑆𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
when the
cost is not known to consumers and 𝜎 ∗ is pooling.
First, we will show that when 𝜎 ∗ is separating, cost transparency strictly increases consumer
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
̃ 𝐻∗ > 𝐶𝑆𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
surplus. 𝐶𝑆
since 𝑝̃𝐻,1
< 𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
, 𝑝̃𝐻,2
< 𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,2
, 𝑣̃𝐻,1
< 𝑣𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
and 𝑣̃𝐻,2
<
∗
𝑣𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,2
. Intuitively, when consumers know the firm’s cost, consumer surplus is higher because
prices in both periods are lower and the amount of first-period consumers and the amount of total
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
̃ 𝐿∗ = 𝐶𝑆𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
consumers both increase. Moreover 𝐶𝑆
since 𝑝̃𝐿,1
= 𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
, 𝑝̃𝐿,2
= 𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,2
.
̃ ] − 𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝑠𝑒𝑝 ] > 0.
Therefore, 𝐸[𝐶𝑆

Next we show that when 𝜎 ∗ is pooling, cost transparency strictly increases expected
∗
∗
consumer surplus. Let 𝑝̂1 = 𝛼𝑝̃𝐻,1
+ (1 − 𝛼)𝑝̃𝐿,1
. One can see that 𝑝̂1 < 𝑝1 from section (2) of
the proof of proposition 1. Now suppose both the high-cost firm and the low-cost firm have to
∗
charge a price 𝑝̂1 in the first period. Given this first period price 𝑝̂1, type-i firm charges 𝑝̂ 2,𝑖
to
maximize its second period profit 𝜋̃2,𝑖 .Since both types of firms charge the same first period price,
at the end of the first period consumers still cannot tell the firm’s cost type. One can show that
∗
𝑝̂ 2,𝐻
=
2𝑝̂1 −𝛼𝑐
2−𝜇
𝑐
2𝜇

𝜇(2𝑝̃1 −𝛼𝑐)
2(2−𝜇)

𝑐

∗
+ 2 and 𝑝̂ 2,𝐿
=

𝜇(2𝑝̃1 −𝛼𝑐)
2(2−𝜇)

. The marginal consumer in the first period is 𝑣̂1 =

, the marginal consumer in the second period if the firm has high cost is 𝑣̂2,𝐻 =

2𝑝̂1 −𝛼𝑐

+

2(2−𝜇)
2𝑝̂1 −𝛼𝑐

, and the marginal consumer in the second period if the firm has low cost is 𝑣̂2,𝐿 =

2(2−𝜇)

.

Therefore, when both types of firms have to charge 𝑝̂1 in the first period, consumer surplus is
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∗
∗
̂ 𝑖 = ∫1 (𝑠 − 𝑝̂1 )𝑑𝑠 + ∫𝑣̂1 (𝜇𝑠 − 𝑝̂ 2,𝑖
𝐶𝑆
)𝑑𝑠 if the firm has cost 𝑐𝑖 . Since 𝑝̂1 < 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
, 𝑝̂2,𝐻 <
𝑣̂
𝑣̂
1

2,𝑖

∗
∗
∗
∗
̂ 𝑖 > 𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
𝑣̂1 < 𝑣𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
, 𝑣̂𝐻,2 < 𝑣𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
, and 𝑣̂𝐿,2 < 𝑣𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
, 𝐶𝑆
,
∗
̂ ] > 𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∀𝑖 ∈ {𝐻, 𝐿}, therefore 𝐸[𝐶𝑆
].
∗
̂ ] bridges the comparison of 𝐸[𝐶𝑆
̃ ] and 𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
The value of 𝐸[𝐶𝑆
]. One can show that
∗
𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
,

𝑝̂2,𝐿 <

∗
𝑝𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
,

̂ ] = 𝐸[𝐶𝑆
̃ ] = 48−𝛼𝑐(4−3𝜇)[20−(30−11𝜇)𝜇]−𝜇[88−𝜇(32+𝜇(20−11𝜇))]
𝐸[𝐶𝑆
2(4−3𝜇)3

.

Therefore,

̃] >
𝐸[𝐶𝑆

∗
𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
]. Thus, when 𝜎 ∗ is pooling, cost transparency increases the expected consumer surplus.

∎
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.
∗
∗
∗
(𝛼𝜋̃𝐻∗ + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋̃𝐿∗ ) − (𝛼𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
+ (1 − 𝛼)𝜋𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
) = 𝛼(𝜋̃𝐻∗ − 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
) + (1 − 𝛼)(𝜋̃𝐿∗ −
∗
𝜋𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
) > 0.
∗
∗
∗
(𝛼𝜋̃𝐻∗ + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋̃𝐿∗ ) − (𝛼𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
+ (1 − 𝛼)𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
) = 𝛼(𝜋̃𝐻∗ − 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
) + (1 − 𝛼)(𝜋̃𝐿∗ −
(1−𝛼)𝑐(4−4𝜇−(1−𝛼)𝑐)

∗
𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
)=𝛼

+ (1 − 𝛼)

4(4−3𝜇)

𝑐(𝑐−𝛼(𝛼𝑐+4(1−𝜇)))
4(4−3𝜇)

=

(1−𝛼)2 𝑐 2
4(4−3𝜇)

> 0.

PROOF OF RESULT 1. In the first period, a consumer’s utility of purchasing the product in period 1
is 𝑢1,1 = 𝑣 − 𝑝1 and utility of purchasing in period 2 is 𝑢1,2 = 𝛿(𝑣 − 𝑝̅2 ). In the second period,
the utility of purchasing in period 2 is 𝑢2,2 = 𝑣 − 𝑝2.
∗
Consider the high-cost firm. The first period marginal consumer is 𝑣1,𝐻
=

𝑝̃1,𝐻 −𝛿𝑝̃̅2,𝐻
1−𝛿

, the

second period marginal consumer is 𝑣2,𝐻 = 𝑝̃2,𝐻 . Solve the game by backward induction. The
second-period profit is 𝜋2,𝐻 = 𝛿(
𝑝−𝛿𝑝̃̅2,𝐻
1−𝛿

1−𝛿

1

∗
− 𝑝̃2,𝐻 )(𝑝̃2,𝐻 − 𝑐). The optimal 𝑝̃2,𝐻 is 𝑝̃2,𝐻
= 2 (𝑐 +

̅ =
). Consumers have rational expectation: 𝑝̃2,𝐻 = 𝑝̃2,𝐻

periods
(1−𝛿)𝑐+𝑝̃1,𝐻
2−𝛿

𝑝̃1,𝐻 −𝛿𝑝̃̅2,𝐻

𝜋𝐻 = (1 −

is
(1−𝛿)𝑐+𝑝̃1,𝐻

)(

2−𝛿

𝑝̃1,𝐻 −𝛿

(1−𝛿)𝑐+𝑝̃1,𝐻
2−𝛿

. The total profit in both

(1−𝛿)𝑐+𝑝
̃ 1,𝐻
2−𝛿

1−𝛿

) (𝑝̃1,𝐻 − 𝑐) + 𝛿 (

𝑝̃1,𝐻 −𝛿

(1−𝛿)𝑐+𝑝
̃ 1,𝐻
2−𝛿

1−𝛿

−

1

− 𝑐) = (2−𝛿)2 (𝑝̃1,𝐻 − 𝑐)[(2 − 𝛿)2 + 𝛿(1 − 𝛿)𝑐 − (4 − 3𝛿)𝑝̃1,𝐻 ] . The

∗
optimal prices are 𝑝̃1,𝐻
=

(2−𝛿)2 +(4−2𝛿−𝛿 2 )𝑐
2(4−3𝛿)

∗
, 𝑝̃2,𝐻
=
(2−𝛿)2

(2−𝛿)+(6−5𝛿)𝑐
2(4−3𝛿)

, 𝜋̃𝐻∗ =

(2−𝛿)

(2−𝛿)2 (1−𝑐)2
4(4−3𝛿)

.

(2−𝛿)2

∗
∗
Similarly, for the low-cost firm, 𝑝̃1,𝐿
= 2(4−3𝛿), 𝑝̃2,𝐿
= 2(4−3𝛿), 𝜋̃𝐿∗ = 4(4−3𝛿).

PROOF OF RESULT 2. Similar to the proof of lemma 2, we follow three steps to find the LMSE.
∗
First, we focus on all separating equilibria and find 𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑝
, the separating equilibrium which gives
∗
the high-type firm the highest payoff. Next we focus on all pooling equilibria and find 𝜎𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
, the

pooling equilibrium which gives the high-type firm the highest payoff. Finally we compare the

148

∗
∗
high-type firm’s profit in 𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑝
and 𝜎𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
to find the PBE giving the high-type firm the highest

payoff.
Step 1: finding 𝝈∗𝒔𝒆𝒑
∗
In a separating equilibrium, the low-cost firm’s equilibrium prices and profit are 𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑝,1,𝐿
=
(2−𝛿)2

(2−𝛿)2

(2−𝛿)

∗
, 𝑝∗
= 2(4−3𝛿), and 𝜋𝑠𝑒𝑝,𝐿
= 4(4−3𝛿).
2(4−3𝛿) 𝑠𝑒𝑝,2,𝐿

If the low-cost firm mimics the high-cost firm’s price in the first period, its profit is 𝜋𝐿,𝑚𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑐 =
(1 −

𝑝1,𝐻 −𝛿

(1−𝛿)𝑐+𝑝1,𝐻
2−𝛿

) 𝑝1,𝐻 + 𝛿 (

1−𝛿

𝑝1,𝐻 −𝛿

2

(1−𝛿)𝑐+𝑝1,𝐻

1

) = (2−𝛿)2 𝑝1,𝐻 [(2 − 𝛿)2 + 2𝛿(1 − 𝛿)𝑐 −

2−𝛿

2(1−𝛿)

(2−𝛿)2

(4 − 3𝛿)𝑝1,𝐻 ]. The low-cost firm will not mimic iff 𝜋𝐿,𝑚𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑐 <

4(4−3𝛿)

.

∗
When 𝑐 > 𝛿, the high-cost firm can charge its first-best price 𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑝,1,𝐻
=

(2−𝛿)2 +(4−2𝛿−𝛿 2 )𝑐
2(4−3𝛿)

and the low-cost firm will not mimic the high-cost firm. The high-cost firm’s profit is 𝜋𝐻∗ =
(2−𝛿)2 (1−𝑐)2
4(4−3𝛿)

(2−𝛿)2

∗
and the low-cost firm’s profit is 𝜋𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
= 4(4−3𝛿). When 𝑐 < 𝛿 , in a separating

∗
equilibrium, the high-cost firm has to charge a price higher than its first-best price to 𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑝,1,𝐻
=
(2−𝛿)2 +2𝛿(1−𝛿)𝑐+(2−𝛿)√𝑐𝛿[4(1−𝛿)+𝑐𝛿]

.

2(4−3𝛿)

The

high-cost

firm’s

profit

is

∗
𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
=

(1−𝑐)[(2−𝛿)2 +𝑐𝛿 2 ]+2𝑐(2−𝛿)√𝑐𝛿[4(1−𝛿)+𝑐𝛿]

.

4(4−3𝛿)

Step 2: finding 𝝈∗𝒑𝒐𝒐𝒍
Next consider pooling equilibrium. In a pooling equilibrium, the high-cost firm and the lowcost firm charge the same first-period price 𝑝1,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 . The first-period marginal consumer is
∗
𝑣1,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
=

𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 −𝛼𝛿𝑝̅ 2,𝐻 −(1−𝛼)𝛿𝑝̅ 2,𝐿

𝛿(𝑝2,𝐻 − 𝑐)(

𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 = 𝛿𝑝2,𝐿 (
∗
𝑝2,𝐻
=

. The high-cost firm’s second period profit is 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 =

1−𝛿
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 −𝛼𝛿𝑝̅ 2,𝐻 −(1−𝛼)𝛿𝑝̅ 2,𝐿

−𝑝

2,𝐻
1−𝛿
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 −𝛼𝛿𝑝̅ 2,𝐻 −(1−𝛼)𝛿𝑝̅ 2,𝐿

) and the low-cost firm’s second period profit is

− 𝑝2,𝐿 ) . Consumers have rational expectation, so

1−𝛿
2𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 +2(1−𝛿)𝑐+(1−𝛼)𝛿𝑐

2𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 −𝛼𝛿𝑐

2(2−𝛿)

2(2−𝛿)

∗
, 𝑝2,𝐿
=

profit of the high-cost firm is 𝜋𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝐻 = (1 −
2𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 +2(1−𝛿 )𝑐+(1−𝛼)𝛿𝑐
2(2−𝛿)

𝜋𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝐿 = (1 −

)(

2𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 +2(1−𝛿 )𝑐+(1−𝛼)𝛿𝑐

2𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 −𝛼𝛿𝑐
2−𝛿

2(2−𝛿)

∗
. Therefore 𝑣1,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
=
2𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 −𝛼𝛿𝑐
2−𝛿

2𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 −𝛼𝛿𝑐
2−𝛿

The total

2𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 −𝛼𝛿𝑐

) (𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 − 𝑐) + 𝛿 (

2−𝛿

−

− 𝑐), the total profit of the low-cost firm is

2𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 −𝛼𝛿𝑐 2

) (𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ) + 𝛿 (

2(2−𝛿)

) .

Now consider deviation from the pooling equilibrium. It is sufficient to check the belief such
that Pr(𝑐 = 𝑐𝐿 ) = 1 whenever 𝑝 ≠ 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 . If deviate, the high-cost firm’s profit is
𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 = (1 −

2𝑝𝐻,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1
2−𝛿

) (𝑝𝐻,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 − 𝑐) + 𝛿 (
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2𝑝𝐻,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 −(2−𝛿)𝑐 2
2(2−𝛿)

)

∗
, 𝑝𝐻,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1
=

(1+𝑐)(2−𝛿)2
2(4−3𝛿)

,

∗
𝜋𝐻,𝑑𝑒𝑣
=

(2−𝛿)2 +2𝑐 2 (2−𝛿 2 )−2𝑐(4−2𝛿−𝛿 2 )
4(4−3𝛿)

∗
∗
. The high-cost firm will not deviate if 𝜋𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝐻
≥ 𝜋𝐻,𝑑𝑒𝑣
,

𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ∈

i.e.,

(2−𝛿)2 +𝑐[(2−𝛿)2 +2𝛼𝛿(1−𝛿)]−(2−𝛿)√𝛼𝑐𝛿[4(1−𝛿)−(4−(2+𝛼)𝛿)𝑐] (2−𝛿)2 +𝑐[(2−𝛿)2 +2𝛼𝛿(1−𝛿)]+(2−𝛿)√𝛼𝑐𝛿[4(1−𝛿)−(4−(2+𝛼)𝛿)𝑐]

[

,

2(4−3𝛿)

2(4−3𝛿)
(2−𝛿)2

∗
. Similarly, for low-cost firm, if it deviates, its profit is 𝜋𝐿,𝑑𝑒𝑣
= 4(4−3𝛿). The low-cost firm doesn’t

deviate

∗
∗
𝜋𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝐿
≥ 𝜋𝐿,𝑑𝑒𝑣

if

,

(2−𝛿)2 +2𝛼𝑐(1−𝛿)𝛿−(2−𝛿)√𝛼𝑐𝛿[4−(4−𝛼𝑐)𝛿] (2−𝛿)2 +2𝛼𝑐(1−𝛿)𝛿+(2−𝛿)√𝛼𝑐𝛿[4−(4−𝛼𝑐)𝛿]

[

,

2(4−3𝛿)

2(1−𝛿)+√2(1−𝛿)2 +𝑐 2 (2−𝛿)2
∗
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
=

∗
𝜋𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝐻
=

,

2(4−3𝛿)

(2−𝛿)2 +4𝛼𝑐(1−𝛿)𝛿−𝑐 2 [(2−𝛿)2 −𝛼2 𝛿 2 ]

.

4(4−3𝛿)

] .

When

[2(1−𝑐)−(1−𝛼𝑐)𝛿]2 +2(1−𝛼)(1−𝑐)𝑐𝛿 2

,

4(4−3𝛿)

𝛼<

When

(2−𝛿)2 +2𝛼𝑐(1−𝛿)𝛿+(2−𝛿)√𝛼𝑐𝛿[4−(4−𝛼𝑐)𝛿]

Step 3:

2(4−3𝛿)

𝛼>

, the pooling equilibrium giving the high-cost firm the highest profit is :

𝑐𝛿
(2−𝛿)2 +𝑐[(2−𝛿)2 +2𝛼𝛿(1−𝛿)]

2(4−3𝛿)
comparing 𝝈∗𝒔𝒆𝒑

𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ∈

i.e.,

2(1−𝛿)+√2(1−𝛿)2 +𝑐 2 (2−𝛿)2

,

𝑐𝛿

∗
𝜋𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝐿
=
∗
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
=

.

and 𝝈∗𝒑𝒐𝒐𝒍 .

∗
∗
∗
∗
Finally we compare 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
and 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
. One can show that 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
> 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
if and only if

𝛼>

2(1−𝛿)−𝑐(2−𝛿)+√2(1−𝑐)(2−(2−𝛿)(2−𝑐)𝛿)+2𝑐(2−𝛿)√𝑐𝛿(4−(4−𝑐)𝛿)
𝑐𝛿

pooling.

The

profits

are

(2−𝛿)2 +4𝛼𝑐(1−𝛿)𝛿−𝑐 2 [(2−𝛿)2 −𝛼2 𝛿 2 ]
4(4−3𝛿)

∗
𝜋𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝐻
=

and 𝑐 < 𝛿, i.e., the equilibrium is

[2(1−𝑐)−(1−𝛼𝑐)𝛿]2 +2(1−𝛼)(1−𝑐)𝑐𝛿 2
4(4−3𝛿)

.

𝑐<𝛿

If

and

∗
𝜋𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝐿
=

and

𝛼<

2(1−𝛿)−𝑐(2−𝛿)+√2(1−𝑐)(2−(2−𝛿)(2−𝑐)𝛿)+2𝑐(2−𝛿)√𝑐𝛿(4−(4−𝑐)𝛿)

, the equilibrium is (costly) separating.

𝑐𝛿
∗
The profits are 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
=

(1−𝑐)[(2−𝛿)2 +𝑐𝛿 2 ]+2𝑐(2−𝛿)√𝑐𝛿[4(1−𝛿)+𝑐𝛿]
4(4−3𝛿)

(2−𝛿)2

∗
and 𝜋𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
= 4(4−3𝛿) . When 𝑐 >

𝛿, the equilibrium is costless separating. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.
∗
∗
∗
(𝛼𝜋̃𝐻∗ + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋̃𝐿∗ ) − (𝛼𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
+ (1 − 𝛼)𝜋𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
) = 𝛼(𝜋̃𝐻∗ − 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
) + (1 − 𝛼)(𝜋̃𝐿∗ −
∗
𝜋𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
) ≥ 0. The equality holds if and only if 𝑐 > 𝛿.
∗
∗
∗
(𝛼𝜋̃𝐻∗ + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋̃𝐿∗ ) − (𝛼𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
+ (1 − 𝛼)𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
) = 𝛼(𝜋̃𝐻∗ − 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
) + (1 − 𝛼)(𝜋̃𝐿∗ −
∗
𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
) = (1 − 𝛼)𝑐 2 [(2 − 𝛿)2 − 𝛿(4 − 3𝛿)𝛼] > 0.
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]

PROOF OF LEMMA 4 AND RESULT 3. We start by solving the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the
game with cost transparency. Suppose the firm has high cost. Because the second-period price will
∗
be 𝑐, the marginal consumer who purchases in the first period is 𝑣̂𝐻,1
=

𝑝̂𝐻,1 −𝑐
1−𝜇

, and the marginal

𝑐

∗
consumer who purchase the product in the second period is 𝑣̂𝐻,2
= 𝜇. Because the market becomes

perfectly competitive in the second period, the firm earns all its profit from the first period. Hence
𝜋̂𝐻 = (1 −
𝜋̂𝐻∗ =

1−𝜇
4

𝑝̂𝐻,1 −𝑐
1−𝜇

∗
) (𝑝̂𝐻,1 − 𝑐). The optimal 𝑝̂𝐻,1 is 𝑝̂ 𝐻,1
=

1−𝜇
2

+ 𝑐, and the maximum profit is
𝜇

∗
∗
. Finally we have to guarantee that 𝑣̂𝐻,1
> 𝑣̂𝐻,2
, which yields 𝑐 < 2. Similarly, for the

∗
low-cost firm, 𝑝̂ 𝐿,1
=

1−𝜇
2

1−𝜇

and 𝜋̂𝐿∗ =

4

.

Next we solve the game when cost transparency is absent. To find the LMSE, we follow the
same 3 steps as in the proof of lemma 2 and lemma 5. First, we analyze all separating equilibria
∗
and find 𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑝
, the separating equilibrium which gives the high-type firm the highest payoff. Next
∗
we analyze all pooling equilibria and find 𝜎𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
, the pooling equilibrium which gives the high∗
∗
type firm the highest payoff. Finally we compare the high-type firm’s profit in 𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑝
and 𝜎𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
to
find the PBE giving the high-type firm the highest payoff.

Step 1: finding 𝝈∗𝒔𝒆𝒑
Consider separating equilibria. Note that in a separating equilibrium the high-cost firm has no
incentive to mimic the low-cost firm and that consumers can correctly infer the firm’s cost type.
∗
Thus, the low-cost firm will set its price the same as the perfect information case, i.e. 𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
=
1−𝜇
2

∗
and its profit is 𝜋𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
=

1−𝜇
4

.

The high-cost firm’s profit is 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝 = (1 −

𝑝1 −𝑐
1−𝜇

) (𝑝1 − 𝑐). In a separating equilibrium, the

low-cost firm has no incentive to mimic the high-cost firm by charging the high-cost firm’s price
in the first period. If the low-cost firm mimics the high-cost firm by charging 𝑝1 = 𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 , its
profit

is

𝜋𝐿 (𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 |𝜙(𝐻|𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1) = 1) = (1 −

𝜋𝐿 (𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1|𝜙(𝐻|𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1) = 1)
(0,

1−𝜇+𝑐−√𝑐(𝑐+2(1−𝜇))
2

]⋃[

form a PBE (𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 ,
One
(0,

can

2

2

that

1−𝜇+𝑐−√𝑐(𝑐+2(1−𝜇))

1−𝜇+𝑐+√𝑐(𝑐+2(1−𝜇))

2

2

1−𝜇+𝑐+√𝑐(𝑐+2(1−𝜇))
2

)𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1

.

∗
𝜋𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
≥

𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 ∈

, 1 − 𝜇). Moreover, any 𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 in this region can

, 𝜙), where 𝜙(𝐻|𝑝) = 1 if 𝑝 = 𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝 and 𝜙(𝐻|𝑝) = 0 if otherwise.

show
]⋃[

1−𝜇

yields

1−𝜇+𝑐+√𝑐(𝑐+2(1−𝜇))

1−𝜇

𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 −𝑐

∗
, and 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
=

under

the

condition

𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 ∈

∗
, 1 − 𝜇) , 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝 is maximized at 𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
=

(1−𝜇)2 −2𝑐(𝑐+1−𝜇−√𝑐(𝑐+2(1−𝜇)))
4(1−𝜇)
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.

Step 2: Consider pooling equilibria. In such equilibria, consumers believe that the firm is hightype with probability 𝛼, and that the firm is low-type with probability 1 − 𝛼. If a consumer 𝑣
purchases the product in the first period, her utility is 𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 = 𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 . If she purchases the
product in the second period, her utility is 𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 = 𝛼 ⋅ max{𝜇𝑣 − 𝑐, 0} + (1 − 𝛼) ⋅ 𝜇𝑣.
To make the analysis interesting, we assume that in the second period there are some consumers
who purchase the product even if the firm turns out to be high-type in the second period, which
requires that the marginal consumer in the first period 𝑣1∗ satisfies 𝜇 > 𝜇𝑣1∗ > 𝑐. Therefore, 𝑣1∗ −
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 = 𝛼(𝜇𝑣1∗ − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝛼)𝜇𝑣1∗ . Simple algebra yields 𝑣1∗ =
cost firm’s profit is 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 = (1 −
𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 = (1 −

𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 −𝛼𝑐
1−𝜇

𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 −𝛼𝑐
1−𝜇

𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 −𝛼𝑐
1−𝜇

. Therefore, the high-

)(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 − 𝑐) , and the low-cost firm’s profit is

) 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1.

Analogous to the proof of Lemma 1 and 2, it is without loss of generality for us to only consider
the belief 𝜙 such that 𝜙(𝐻|𝑝1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ) = 𝛼 and 𝜙(𝐻|𝑝1 ≠ 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1) = 0. The highest possible
∗
profit a low-cost firm can get by deviating is its perfect-information profit 𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣
= 𝜋̂𝐿 =

1−𝜇
4

.

For the high-cost firm, if it deviates by charging 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 ≠ 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 , its profit will be
𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣 = (1 −

𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1
1−𝜇

∗
)(𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 − 𝑐). Therefore 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣
=

(1−𝜇−𝑐)2
4(1−𝜇)

.

In a pooling equilibrium, neither the high-cost firm nor the low-cost firm has incentive to
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 −𝛼𝑐

deviate. This requires 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 = (1 −
𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 = (1 −

𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 −𝛼𝑐
1−𝜇

1−𝜇

∗
) 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ≥ 𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣
=

∗
) (𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 − 𝑐) ≥ 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣
=

1−𝜇

(1−𝜇−𝑐)2

and

4(1−𝜇)

. The first condition is equivalent to

4

1−𝜇+(1+𝛼)𝑐−√𝛼𝑐(𝛼𝑐−2𝑐−2𝜇+2) 1−𝜇+(1+𝛼)𝑐+√𝛼𝑐(𝛼𝑐−2𝑐−2𝜇+2)

𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ∈ [

,

2

Let 𝒫1 = [
equivalent

1−𝜇+(1+𝛼)𝑐−√𝛼𝑐(𝛼𝑐−2𝑐−2𝜇+2) 1−𝜇+(1+𝛼)𝑐+√𝛼𝑐(𝛼𝑐−2𝑐−2𝜇+2)

,

2

]. The second condition is

2

1−𝜇+𝛼𝑐−√𝛼𝑐(𝛼𝑐+2(1−𝜇)) 1−𝜇+𝛼𝑐+√𝛼𝑐(𝛼𝑐+2(1−𝜇))

𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ∈ [

to

,

2

1−𝜇+𝛼𝑐−√𝛼𝑐(𝛼𝑐+2(1−𝜇)) 1−𝜇+𝛼𝑐+√𝛼𝑐(𝛼𝑐+2(1−𝜇))

[

].

2

,

2

2

2

]

.

Let

𝒫2 =

]. Therefore, there exists a belief 𝜙 ∈ 𝑀(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 )

such that (𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 , 𝜙) is a PBE if and only if 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ∈ 𝒫1 ⋂𝒫2.
The LMSE gives the high-type firm the highest profit among all PBE. One can show that
without the restriction of 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ∈ 𝒫1 ⋂𝒫2, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 is maximized when 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 =
obvious that

1−𝜇+(𝛼+1)𝑐
2

∈ 𝒫1 . When 𝛼 ≥

√(1−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 −(1−𝜇) 1−𝜇+(𝛼+1)𝑐
𝑐

,

2

∗
outcome which gives the high-type firm the highest profit is 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
=
[1−𝜇−(1−𝛼)𝑐]2
4(1−𝜇)

. When 𝛼 <

√(1−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 −(1−𝜇) 1−𝜇+(𝛼+1)𝑐
𝑐

,

2
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1−𝜇+(𝛼+1)𝑐
2

. It is

∈ 𝒫2 , so the pooling PBE
1−𝜇+(𝛼+1)𝑐
2

∗
, and 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
=

is higher than the upper bound of 𝒫2 ,

1−𝜇+𝛼𝑐+√𝛼𝑐(𝛼𝑐+2(1−𝜇))
2

. Therefore, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 is an increasing function of 𝑝1,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 on 𝒫1 ⋂𝒫2 . As a

result, the pooling PBE outcome which gives the high-cost firm the highest profit is 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 =
1−𝜇+𝛼𝑐+√𝛼𝑐(𝛼𝑐+2(1−𝜇))
2

and

∗
𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙

(1−𝜇)2 −2𝛼𝑐 2 −2𝑐(1−𝜇−√𝛼𝑐(𝛼𝑐+2(1−𝜇)))

=

.

4(1−𝜇)

∗
∗
∗
Step 3: We compare 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
and 𝜋𝑠𝑒𝑝,𝐻
to choose the LMSE. One can see that 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
=
(1−𝜇)2 −2𝑐(𝑐+1−𝜇−√𝑐(𝑐+2(1−𝜇)))

is independent of 𝛼 . When 𝛼 ≥

4(1−𝜇)
[1−𝜇−(1−𝛼)𝑐]2
4(1−𝜇)

√(1−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 −(1−𝜇)

. When 𝛼 <

𝑐

,

𝑐

=

. Next

4(1−𝜇)
√(1−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 −(1−𝜇)
𝑐

2

𝑐

∗
𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
= 𝐶 + 2(1−𝜇) [√(𝛼𝑐 + (1 − 𝜇)) − (1 − 𝜇)2 − 𝛼𝑐] ,

yields

∗
, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
=

(1−𝜇)2 −2𝛼𝑐 2 −2𝑐(1−𝜇−√𝛼𝑐(𝛼𝑐+2(1−𝜇)))

∗
𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙

∗
we show that 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
is an increasing function of 𝛼. When 𝛼 <
∗
𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙

√(1−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 −(1−𝜇)

, rearranging

where

𝐶

is

∗
independent of 𝛼 . It is easy to see that 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
strictly increases with 𝛼 when 𝛼 <
√(1−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 −(1−𝜇)
𝑐

. When 𝛼 ≥

√(1−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 −(1−𝜇)
𝑐

∗
, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
=

[1−𝜇−(1−𝛼)𝑐]2
4(1−𝜇)

also increases with 𝛼 .

∗
∗
Moreover, one can show that 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
is a continuous function of 𝛼. Therefore, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
is a strictly

increasing function of 𝛼 when 𝛼 ∈ (0,1).
When

𝛼≥

√(1−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 −(1−𝜇)
𝑐

(1−𝜇)2 −2𝑐(𝑐+1−𝜇−√𝑐(𝑐+2(1−𝜇)))
4(1−𝜇)
2
𝑐
𝑐
𝑐
)
(
+2)−
1−𝜇 1−𝜇
1−𝜇

1−√1−(√

>

𝑐
1−𝜇

4(1−𝜇)

when

𝛼 ∈ (0,1) ,

2
𝑐
𝑐
𝑐
)
(
+2)−
1−𝜇 1−𝜇
1−𝜇

∗
∗
𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
≥ 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝

,

implies

2
𝑐
𝑐
𝑐
)
(
+2)−
1−𝜇 1−𝜇
1−𝜇

that

[1−𝜇−(1−𝛼)𝑐]2
4(1−𝜇)

>

1−√1−(√

, i.e. 𝛼 > 1 −

√(1−𝜇)2 +𝑐 2 −(1−𝜇)
𝑐

(1−𝜇)2 −2𝑐(𝑐+1−𝜇−√𝑐(𝑐+2(1−𝜇)))

𝛼

,

𝑐
1−𝜇

. One can also show that 1 −

∗
. This result, together with the fact that 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
=

∗
is independent of 𝛼 and 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
is a strictly increasing function of

implies

that

∗
∗
𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
≥ 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝

if

and

only

if

𝛼 ≥1−

1−√1−(√

𝑐
1−𝜇

∗
≡ 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
.

∗
In conclusion, when consumers do not know the firm’s cost, when 𝛼 < 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
, the equilibrium
∗
is separating, 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
=

1−𝜇−2𝑐(𝑐+1−𝜇−√𝑐(𝑐+2(1−𝜇))
4(1−𝜇)

∗
equilibrium is pooling, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
=

know the firm’s cost, 𝜋̂𝐻∗ = 𝜋̂𝐿∗ =

(1−𝜇−(1−𝛼)𝑐)2
4(1−𝜇)

1−𝜇
4

∗
and 𝜋𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
=

∗
and 𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
=

.∎
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1−𝜇
4

∗
. When 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
, the

(𝛼𝑐+1−𝜇)2 −𝑐 2
4(1−𝜇)

. When consumers

